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Over the past decades, aggregate litigation has become more common; through var-
ious statutory, rule-based, and informal means, judges and lawyers consolidate
large groups of individual litigants and claims. The paradigm of a class action,
however, continues to dominate the literature, and with it, the assumption that a
single set of lead lawyers represent all of the plaintiffs in the assembled group.
This article addresses the problems raised when, in contrast to that paradigm, ag-
gregation brings together mass tort plaintiffs, some of whom come with
individually-retained plaintiffs' attorneys (IRPAs), who perform tasks in addition
to those done by a court-appointed plaintiffs' steering committee (PSC). Our cen-
tral questions are about the roles of the many lawyers within the aggregate and the
potential for policymakers to use procedural tools and the law of attorneys' fees to
structure incentives to enhance the experience of individual litigants within the ag-
gregate. Animating our interest is the view that, in addition to effectuating out-
comes, litigation is also a means by which to express political and social
relationships. What occurs within an aggregate formed for adjudicatory purposes
is of moment for the polity.
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THE PREVALENCE AND POPULARITY OF AGGREGATION
Individualism pervades the traditional conception of civil litiga-
tion within the United States; the dominant image is that individual
plaintiffs retain specific lawyers to provide services, that those lawyers
in turn file cases, which are then processed individually by the courts.
Some commentators applaud this tradition, while others believe its
mythic qualities are belied by empirical reality.'
Whatever its values and utility, that system has been altered in
significant respects; for some parts of the civil docket, it simply no
longer exists. Group processing is now the norm whenever lawyers or
judges perceive that a series of cases involving similar claims have
been or are soon to be filed.2 Within these aggregations (whether
they are called class actions, multidistrict litigation, bankruptcy, con-
solidated cases, or something else), groups of lawyers, litigants, judges,
special masters, or other ad hoc court appointees all work together to
reach closure. Novel formats have been devised for group-based dis-
covery, for settlement negotiations, for the occasional mass trial, for
1 Compare Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 69 with Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities,
1989 U. I1. L. Rev. 89 [hereinafter Hensler, Myths and Realities].
2 Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer
1991, at 5, 22 [hereinafter Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation"]. As of 1993, the 37,002
cases subjected to multidistrict litigation treatment represented 16.6% of the federal
docket. Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 918, 928
n.39 (1995) [hereinafter Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay] (citing to data from
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
The popular press also focuses on such cases. See Joseph Nocera, Fatal Litigation (pt.
1), Fortune, Oct. 16, 1995, at 60 [hereinafter Nocera, Fatal Litigation I]; Joseph Nocera,
Fatal Litigation: Dow Coming Succumbs (pt. 2), Fortune, Oct. 30, 1995, at 137 [hereinafter
Nocera, Fatal Litigation II] (focusing on the litigation involving Silicone Breast Implants).
Relatively little empirical research explores this phenomenon; as the authors of the most
recent effort put it, their study of 417 cases involving class claims in four federal district
courts provides "separate snapshots" of recent aggregate case activity, and while it aug-
ments the ability to describe such litigation, it cannot test "relationships among variables."
Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule
23 To Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 84 (1996) [hereinafter
Wiliging et al., Empirical Analysis of Rule 23].
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distributing large sums of money, and for other remedies.3 An in-
creasingly common feature of settlements is the creation of a "claims
facility" (analogous in many respects to a mini-agency4), which pro-
vides process and/or payments to claimants within the aggregate.
Whenever aggregation occurs, a question emerges about which
lawyers shall act on behalf of the group. But when the very existence
of a lawsuit is itself predicated on the creation of an aggregate (the
classic example being the class action), the assumptions are that one
set of lawyers represents (or creates) the class, and that without the
availability of the class action mechanism itself, no lawyers would rep-
resent any individual plaintiffs. Examples of such group litigations
range from suits seeking monetary damages (such as securities, anti-
trust, and consumer fraud litigation), monetary and injunctive reme-
dies (such as employment litigation), or structural relief (such as
school desegregation, environmental, and prison litigation). Indeed,
one of the primary purposes of class actions is to enable groups other-
wise without legal representation to obtain access to courts; the group
creates sufficiently large economic or social interests to attract attor-
ney attention and entrepreneurial risk-taking.
Until relatively recently, these kinds of class actions (with a single
set of lawyers acting on behalf of a large group of clients) constituted
the gamut of classes and dominated the discussion of aggregate cases.
Drafters of the federal class action rule had presumptively excluded
mass torts from the reach of their rule,5 and tort cases proceeded, one
by one, through the courts. But in 1968, Congress created multidis-
trict litigation (MDL), by which cases within the federal courts could
be aggregated,6 officially only for pretrial purposes but in practice
often for disposition. In the 1970s and 1980s, judges deployed the
MDL panel for mass accidents such as fires and plane crashes.7 Dur-
ing those years, product liability cases also became both more com-
mon and wider in scope, including many claims for injuries arising out
of the use of a particular product. Judges and lawyers used various
3 E.g., Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 Tex. L Rev. 1587 (1995)
[hereinafter Hensler, ADR in Mass Personal Injury Litigation]; Judith Resnik, Procedural
Innovations, Sloshing Over A Comment on Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass
Half Empty. The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litiga-
tion, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1627 (1995) [hereinafter Resnik, Procedural Innovations].
4 Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," supra note 2, at 38, 63.
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note; see Resnik, From "Cases" to
"Litigation," supra note 2, at 9-16.
6 28 US.C. § 1407 (1994).
7 From the creation of the MDL Panel in 1968 through 1985, about one-quarter (106
out of 404) of all transferred MDL litigations were mass accidents. Resnik, Aggregation,
Settlement, and Dismay, supra note 2, at 927-30, 928 nn.39-41 (1995).
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means to create informal, consolidated processing; such techniques in-
cluded uniform pretrial orders or the assignment of a single judge to a
group of cases.8 In the 1980s, via the Dalkon Shield and the Johns-
Manville bankruptcies,9 judges and lawyers further accustomed them-
selves to handling mass torts in a consolidated or coordinated fashion.
Judges also began to certify some mass torts as class actions.10 By the
mid-1990s, mass tort class actions had become a part of the landscape
of aggregate litigation.1
Mass tort cases, however, are not clones of the more familiar ex-
amples of class actions. Unlike civil rights, consumer, or securities
class actions, in many of the mass tort aggregate cases, plaintiffs retain
individual lawyers hired via contingency-fee contracts before cases are
aggregated. "Individually-Retained Plaintiffs' Attorneys" (IRPAs) is
the name we gave such lawyers,' 2 whose roles in group litigation have
been overshadowed in legal scholarship and in procedural manuals by
court-appointed lead lawyers-a "Plaintiffs' Steering Committee"
(PSC) or "Plaintiffs' Management Committee" (PMC), whose titles
and acronyms are now commonplace.
Little by way of rules or case law guides courts in sorting out the
relationships among clients and the many lawyers within group litiga-
tion.13 While the economic benefits to lawyers of large-scale litigation
8 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, William L.F. Felstiner, Molly Selvin & Patricia A.
Ebener, Asbestos in the Courts: The Challenge of Mass Toxic Torts 69-70 (RAND No. R-
3324-ICJ 1995) [hereinafter Hensler et al., Asbestos in the Courts].
9 See Richard B. Sobol, Bending the Law: The Story of the Dalkon Shield Bankruptcy
37-48 (1991); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
10 Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," supra note 2, at 17-18.
11 Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Liti-
gation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 961 (1993). The recent inclusion of
torts in the class action framework is reflected in both the expanded discussion of mass
torts in the 1995 Manualfor Complex Litigation, see Manual for Complex Litigation, Third
§§ 33.2-.29 (1995) [hereinafter Manual Third], and in the fact that no tort class actions were
found in the Federal Judicial Center's recent empirical project reviewing cases disposed of
from 1992 to 1994 in four federal district courts, Willging et al., Empirical Analysis of Rule
23, supra note 2, at 81-82. The researchers suggest that mass tort class actions are too
recent a phenomenon to have reached disposition in large enough numbers to have been
captured in their sample, with its cutoff date of disposition by 1994. Id.
12 See In re Nineteen Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 982 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Nineteen Appeals] (adopting this no-
menclature); In re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 300 (1st Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Thirteen Appeals] (same). Dennis Cur-
tis and Judith Resnik were appellate counsel for some IRPAs and coined the phrase (Indi-
vidually-Retained Plaintiffs' Attorneys, IRPAs) in their briefs; the opinions in both cases
use the term.
13 That these layers of lawyers need coordination has been apparent for some time.
Initially, informal networks of lawyers began by selecting their own leaders-an approach
supported by the first set of guidelines. Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.92, at 90-91,
§ 4.53, at 157 (5th ed. 1982) ("Lead counsel are chosen by the groups of parties having a
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are well documented, the statutes and rules that create the occasions
for group litigation do not reflect the relationships of such gains to
outcomes for the parties, the diverse roles for lawyers, or the methods
for calculating fees and the specific fees paid. Neither the major vehi-
cles in federal litigation by which groups are currently amassed (the
class action rule and the multidistrict litigation statute) nor contempo-
rary proposals to expand group litigation (such as by means of revi-
sion of federal jurisdictional grants,14 interstate transfers,15 and the
American Law Institute's proposed "consolidation" of complex
litigation 16) mention the impact of aggregation on the financial incen-
common interest," and in "'exceptional circumstances"' or when parties fail to choose, the
court may do so.). By the mid-1980s, and illustrative of the trend toward increasing judicial
managerial control, however, the Manualfor Complex Litigation advised judges to oversee
the appointment of steering committees for the plaintiffs' attorneys. Manual for Complex
Litigation, Second § 20.224 (1985) [hereinafter Manual Second].
In the 1995 edition, the Manual outlined four categories of lawyers: "[Iliaison counsel:
charged with essentially administrative matters, such as communications between the court
and other counsel" and who need not be a lawyer, "[lead counsel: charged with major
responsibility for formulating (after consultation with other counsel) and presenting posi-
tions"; "[t]rial counsel: [who] serves as a principal attorney for the group at trial"; and
"[c]ommittees of counsel," such as steering committees: "formed to serve a wide range of
functions." Manual Third, supra note 11, § 20.221, at 27 & n.59. The Manual Third recom-
mends that judges "take an active part in making the decision on the appointment of coun-
sel" and set forth tasks for such lawyers in court orders or other documents. Id. §§ 20.222
20.224; see also id. § 3322 (detailing case management orders in Silicone Gel Breast Im-
plant Litigation as exemplary).
14 See, e.g., Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991, H.R. 1100, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991).
15 Unif. Transfer of Litigation Act § 101, 14 U.L.A. 115 (West Supp. 1994). See gener-
ally Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALI Project with
the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 La. L. Rev. 897 (1994).
16 American Law Inst., Complex Litigation: Statutory Recommendations and Analysis
with Reporter's Study. A Model System for State-to-State Transfer and Consolidation chs.
3-5 (1994) [hereinafter ALI Complex Litigation] (proposing federal intrasystem consolida-
tion, consolidation in state courts, and federal-state intersystem consolidation). Another
ALI project, developing a restatement on the law of lawyers, considers the question of
reasonable fees but has not (at least yet) considered how to think about reasonableness in
the context of many lawyers working within a large-scale aggregated litigation. Restate-
ment of the Law, The Law Governing Lawyers § 46 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991) [herein-
after ALI Draft Law Governing Lawyers] (Ch. 3, Topic 1 "Legal Controls on Attorney
Fees"; Section 46, entitled "Lawful and Reasonable Fees." applies in proceedings such as
"suits by lawyers for fees").
Judge Schwarzer and others have recently proposed amendments to the existing multi-
district litigation statute to facilitate "coordination of discovery in cases dispersed in state
and federal courts without implicating substantive law choices or delaying trials in state
court." William W Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch & Edward Sussman, Judicial Federalism: A
Proposal To Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute To Permit Discovery Coordination
of Large-Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 Tex. L Rev. 1529, 1532
(1995). Although not addressing IRPAs and fees, Schwarzer et al. assume that
"[r]epresentation of the parties .. would be principally by lead counsel, as it is now";
individual lawyers could appear only by special leave. Id. at 1560. They note that lawyers
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tives of lawyers, on their relations with clients, or on the work
performed.'
7
Congress has paid somewhat more attention to these issues; the
1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act offer some direction about
fees to be paid to bankruptcy lawyers,1 8 and the recently enacted Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199519 provides a mechanism
for selection of lead counsel and discusses payment of fees.20 But
these statutes, like current ethical codes and academic commentary on
aggregation, do not address relationships among the many lawyers
who may be a part of aggregates, some of whom may work solely for
individual plaintiffs, and some of whom may work simultaneously for
individual clients, and, as PSC members, for the plaintiff group as a
whole.21
unenthusiastic about aggregation can "compound the court's management burden and con-
found its efforts to move the litigation toward expeditious resolution." Id. at 1548.
17 In contrast to these litigation-focused rules, some proposals for administrative re-
gimes address lawyer-client fee arrangements. See, e.g., The Black Lung Benefits Act of
1972, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945(c) (1994), a portion of which was upheld in United States Dep't
of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 727 (1990); see also Lester Brickman, The Asbestos
Claims Management Act of 1991: A Proposal to the United States Congress, 13 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1891, 1892, 1915-16 (1992). Brickman advocates that attorneys for successful
claimants be paid reasonable fees based on hourly rates that take into account several
factors, including comparable rates for lawyers in administrative proceedings, the "risk, If
any, borne by the attorney," and the need of claimants for access. He also recommends
that, under limited circumstances, attorneys for unsuccessful claimants be paid as well. Id.
at 1916.
18 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1994) provides in part that a court may award attorneys "reason-
able compensation for actual, necessary services"; courts are to "consider the nature, the
extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors," including
time spent, rates charged, and the utility and benefit of the services. This statute also
requires courts to consider whether the time charged was "commensurate with the com-
plexity, importance, and nature of the problem," and how the compensation relates to that
charged by "comparably skilled practitioners" in nonbankruptcy cases. Id. These provi-
sions were amended in 1994 to prohibit payment for duplication of services. 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(4)(A)(i); see also 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4) (1994) (allowing reasonable attorneys'
fees in administration of estate).
19 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
20 Newly enacted 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v) (West Supp. 1996) ("Selection of
lead counsel") provides: "The most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the
court, select and retain counsel to represent the class." 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(a)(6) ("Re-
strictions on payment of attorneys' fees and expenses") provides: "Total attorneys' fees
and expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a
reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually
paid to the class." Both sections are discussed infra notes 128, 174 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Jack Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 40-41 (1995)
[hereinafter Weinstein, Individual Justice] (arguing that ethical issues in mass torts have
not "been given the special attention they deserve"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and
the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1159,
1172 (1995) (describing current rules as unresponsive to issues of mass torts); Joan
Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What
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The emergence of mass torts as an important part of aggregate
litigation provides an opportunity to reflect on the relationships of in-
dividuals to their lawyers, to each other, and to the court; to consider
the representation of individuals singly and as groups or subgroups;
and to understand how the rules on judicial awards of attorneys' fees
affect relationships, representation, and the processes and outcomes
of aggregate litigation. While group litigation has a long historical
pedigree, 2 and commentators' attention has been focused on the im-
pact of attorneys' fees on group litigation,23 the concerns that we raise
here have not been explored. In the past decade, several articles have
discussed the effects of "entrepreneurial" lawyers,24 the difficulties of
monitoring such lawyers' behavior,2 s and some of the "distributional
dilemmas" encountered when class lawyers assess proposed settle-
ments. 26 But in part because paradigmatic group litigations were not
They Are, What They Might Be: Non-Jurisdictional Matters (pt. 2), 42 UCLA L Rev. 967,
1051 (1995) (discussing increase in consolidated cases, with lead and liaison counsel, and
existence of what she terms "apportionment issues").
22 Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modem Class Action
75-85 (1987) [hereinafter Yeazell, Modem Class Action].
23 See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from
Funds, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1597, 1601-12 (1974) [hereinafter Dawson, Attorney Fees from
Funds] (providing a history of common benefit fee award rule); Harry Kalven, Jr. &
Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L Rev. 684,
719-20 (1941) (examining the need for class action suits, recognizing the role of attorneys
in private enforcement by class actions, and raising concems about those lawyers' "loyalty"
to the class given their own incentives).
24 E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L Rev. 877 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation]. See also Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Mat-
ter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L Rev. 497, 534-48
(1991) (examining the incentives of all the participants, plaintiffs' attorneys included, in
class action securities litigation).
25 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role];
see also Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Rejoinder, 87 Nw. U. L
Rev. 458 (1993) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative
Lawsuits]; Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.
L., Econ. & Organization 55,55-56 (1991); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auc-
tioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L Rev. 423
(1993).
26 Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 Ohio St. LJ. 1,
2 (1993) [hereinafter Morawetz, Bargaining] (little guidance has been provided on how
class action lawyers "should understand the nature of their duty to represent the members
of a class" as a whole); see also Mary K. Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role
of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 385 (1987) (urging greater judicial oversight);
Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L Rev. 1183 (1982) [herein-
after Rhode, Class Conflicts] (proposing methods to respond through increased communi-
cation to diverse views within the class). See generally John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the
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mass torts (in which a multitude of individual claimants had filed cases
prior to aggregation, and some of them could have pursued their
claims individually) and in part because of the absence of discussion of
multiple sets of lawyers within a single aggregated litigation, the rela-
tionships of individual lawyers to individual clients within aggregated
cases have not drawn the attention of judges crafting doctrine or of
academics proposing policy.
The current law of attorneys' fees in aggregate litigation illus-
trates this point; the doctrine contemplates relatively anonymous
groups of people, collectively represented by a single set of lawyers,
who are paid either by defendants pursuant to statutorily mandated
fee shifts or by groups of plaintiffs who share in the "common benefit"
conferred by a litigation. Judges order such fees either by calculating
a "lodestar" (an hourly rate times the number of hours spent, some-
times enhanced by a "multiplier" intended to reflect unusual risks or
efforts) or by charging a percentage of the fund (POF).27
It is our view, however, that both of these models ignore impor-
tant features of aggregate tort context, in which some claimants may
have entered into contingency-fee contracts with individual lawyers
long before the litigation was aggregated, other claimants secure rep-
resentation after and only because of aggregation, and yet others pro-
ceed with no individual lawyers at all.28 While there is some overlap
with the kind of class action that enables access to courts by individu-
als who would otherwise not be able to litigate, aggregation in mass
torts also diverges from this model in several respects. First, it can
result in either the "invasion" or the potential for superintendence
(depending on one's point of view) of some existing attorney-client
relationships and the resulting fees to be paid. Second, in contrast to a
single set of attorneys representing an undifferentiated group of plain-
tiffs (or what economists describe as a single agent acting on behalf of
a host of principals), in mass torts, many lawyers who have a variety of
relationships (to each other, to individual clients, and to the court) are
on the scene. Third, because of the multiple sets of lawyers, the exist-
ence of an aggregate may cost individual litigants more in charges by
lawyers for expenses than litigants would have incurred had the cases
Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 825 (1992) (discussing lawyers in and for
groups); Mary Titchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams, 72 Minn. L. Rev.
697, 735-43, 764-72 (1988) (calling for coordination needed among lawyers in general, In-
cluding in large-scale cases).
27 See infra Part III.B.
28 Contrast for example, plane crashes, fires, or building collapses, in which virtually all
claimants have retained lawyers, and product liability actions, in which notification of the
existence of a settlement fund often results in thousands of unrepresented claimants seek-
ing compensation.
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not been aggregated, and the attorney fees themselves need to be allo-
cated among the various groups of lawyers.29 In Part II, we discuss
the various kinds of "individually-retained" lawyers, the tasks of PSC
attorneys, and the diverse roles played by the many lawyers within
aggregate tort litigation.
How to pay lawyers who operate within these newly minted con-
figurations is a key policy question. Attorney fees not only create in-
centives for bringing litigation; they also provide a powerful
mechanism for shaping the course and outcomes of filed cases. When
courts interpose themselves between litigants and lawyers-by select-
ing lawyers to take the primary roles in dealing with defendants and
with the court itself, and by leaving others to provide legal services to
individual clients-judges also take on some responsibility for deter-
mining which lawyer services will be valued and for how much. Part
IlI reviews the law on legal fees and considers why mechanisms for
aggregation address neither how to pay lawyers in general nor the spe-
cial problems raised by mass tort aggregates in particular.
When disbursing fees at the end of a specific litigation, judges
have measured the value of the legal activity by the sums transferred
to the victor or, in the nonmonetary context, by the outcome of a
change in a legal rule. Our analysis of the history and context from
which attorney-fee law emerged explains why judges and lawyers have
fastened onto "outcome" as a touchstone for determining payment,
and our discussion of the work of IRPAs and PSC members in these
cases explains the interdependencies among lawyer groups that create
disincentives for them to press for altering fee-payment methods.30
Although explainable and expedient, current arrangements do
not respond to significant problems. From virtually every perspective,
calls are coming for reform.3 1 Changes are needed in how courts man-
29 For many judges and lawyers in the contemporary legal arena, aggregation is as-
sumed to be an efficient response to large numbers of similar cases that they fear will clog
dockets. Whether the promise of efficiency has been met is an empirical question not yet
answered. See Hensler, ADR in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, supra note 3, at 1593-94
(discussing the mixed evidence of efficiency gains).
30 See Charles V. Wolfram, Mass Torts-Messy Ethics, 80 Cornell L Rev. 1228,1233-
34 (1995) (arguing that claimants might have the greatest incentive to make improvements
in the current regime). Whether claimants have the ability is another question. See, e.g,
Letter from Brian Sullivan to Dr. Deborah Hensler (Oct. 1995) (on file with authors) (writ-
ig that his 81-year-old father has had his asbestos claim pending for 12 years, that he
found Hensler's name in a newspaper, and that he "was just looking for some information
when these cases will be completed").
31 Some plaintiffs' lawyers argue that aggregate tort litigation is an anathema to United
States legal institutions; one recent article's title----"The Tort that Ate the Constitution'-
captures this theme. Roger Parloff, The Tort that Ate the Constitution, Am. Lawyer, July-
Aug. 1994, at 74. Others include Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1045 (1995); Roger C. Cramton,
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age aggregate litigation, in how lawyers behave within these aggre-
gates, and in the conception of the roles of the claimants themselves.
To inform this reconceptualization, in Part IV, we examine two
competing visions of the purposes of litigation and of courts them-
selves. The first, which we term "enacting rights," aspires to a court
system in conversation with litigants and with the citizenry about the
normative context in which we live and its practical import. Courts
are celebrated because their processes have the capacity to dignify
and respect individuals' entitlements to voice and efficacy. Empirical
support for these insights comes from social scientists, who, when sys-
tematically studying litigants' experiences and attitudes, report that
tort litigants share judicial and legal theorists' beliefs that process mat-
ters. While outcomes are an important result of process, outcomes
are-from these vantage points-not the sole function of process. To-
Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction, 80
Cornell L. Rev. 811 (1995). Parloff, Koniak, and Cramton discuss Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated and remanded, Nos. 94-1925 et al.,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11191 (3d Cir. May 10, 1996), settling a class of "future" asbestos
claimants. The legality of the "futures" asbestos class action is on appeal before the Third
Circuit, with Professor Larry Tribe arguing on behalf of opponents of the settlement that
the settlement was collusive and that its representational structure fails due process man-
dates. Initial Brief of Appellants at 29-36. 65-72. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157
F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (No. 93-CV-00215) (on file with authors).
Some defendants' perspectives are provided by a Fortune Magazine's 1995 cover
story, "Fatal Litigation," which suggested that aggregation enables some plaintiffs' lawyers
to bring weak if not false claims in sufficient quantity as to require defendants to choose
between settlement and bankruptcy. Nocera, Fatal Litigation I, supra note 2, at 62. ThIs
viewpoint also animated Judge Posner's recent dismantling of a class action in a case claim.
ing HIV infection from blood. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,1298-99 (7th
Cir.) (discussing the pressure to settle from the number of claims consolidated), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). Proposals to regulate plaintiffs' attorneys also come from the
Manhattan Institute, which recently published a monograph arguing for limitations on con-
tingency fees. See Lester Brickman, Michael Horowitz & Jeffrey O'Connell, Rethinking
Contingency Fees 26-28 (1994) [hereinafter Brickman et al., Rethinking Contingency Fees].
In 1995, Congress also revised securities class action litigation; in part that legislation was
prompted by the view of too-easily filed lawsuits by plaintiffs' attorneys. See Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
Legal academics have also made proposals to alter fee arrangements. See, e.g., the
call for auctions of claims by Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note
25.
Finally, rulemakers have convened several conferences and commissioned research to
examine the workings of class actions. In 1994 and 1995, the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure convened a series of working conferences (including the
Symposium of which this article is a part) on class actions. E.g., Symposium, Mass Tortes:
Serving Up Just Desserts, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 811 (1995) [hereinafter, Symposium, Mass
Tortes]; Symposium, National Mass Tort Conference, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1523 (1995) [herein-
after Symposium, National Mass Tort Conference]; see also Willging et al., Empirical Anal-
ysis of Rule 23, supra note 2, at 81 (reporting results of research undertaken at request of
Advisory Committee).
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gether, judicial, political, and empirical perspectives provide a vision
of litigation as imbued with political and social import and located in a
liberal theory which values individual autonomy and participation
within a democracy. Yet those who espouse these perspectives have
founded their views largely on the paradigm of individual litigation.
They have not much discussed aggregation, the financing of litigation,
the role of lawyers, or how to shape aggregate cases to enable any of
that to which they aspire-voice, participation, rights seeking, empow-
erment-to occur.
A competing vision, which we label "effectuating outcomes," is
largely but not exclusively associated with law and economics; litiga-
tion is seen as a system designed to achieve voluntary compliance with
legal norms by imposing costs for their violations. For some within
this school, the focus on individualization and on process is a distrac-
tion, if not superfluous or harmful.32 The outcome-oriented approach
is accompanied with attention to the costs of the litigation transaction
(including lawyers' fees) and to changes in the scale of lawsuits. Ag-
gregation is a subject of interest within this literature, which also in-
cludes concrete advice about how to regulate transaction costs
through the use of attorney fees in aggregate litigation. The proposal
of a judicial auction to determine which lawyers control the litigation
is a prime example of ideas about how to minimize the costs of pro-
cess and how to align incentives of lawyer-agents and client-
principals.33
For us, both visions of litigation miss what the other has to offer.
The aspirations for expressing rights through process fail to account
for economic incentives of lawyers and groups of litigants; the focus
on outcomes misses the social and political relationships that litigation
embodies and enacts. We share with economists the view that rules
on attorneys' fees and costs are a central means by which to make
policy, but we do not agree that courts are only in the business (a
word used advisedly) of creating incentives for norm obedience by
transferring wealth.
We are neither nostalgic nor romantic about bygone eras. 4 Un-
like some commentators, we do not rely on individual litigation (with
32 E.g., David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in
Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 210, 214-15 (1996) (criticizing proceduralists' fo-
cus on individual control, which Rosenberg equates with self-determination, arguing that
from the perspective of torts policy, deterrence and compensation objectives are better
achieved by collectivization of risk-based harms in mass exposure cases and that such an
approach maximizes plaintiffs' "rational" interests).
33 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 10516.
34 Rather, we are acutely aware that one way to tell the history of this century's experi-
ence with adjudication is that it is in decline. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudica-
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representation by a lawyer of a particular client in an adversary setting
to be concluded with adjudication) as the relevant baseline for today's
discussion. Over the last thirty years, aggregate litigation has moved
from a specially justified and occasional exception to a more common
and often welcomed response to a set of legal claims. This shift has
been accompanied (and in part enabled) by substantial dissatisfac-
tion-with individual litigation (viewed both as resource consumptive
and as failing to generate equity across similarly situated claimants)
and with lawyers (viewed as erratic providers of services and as self-
interested entrepreneurs). Contemporary conversations about the
utility and desirability of individual representation are thus appropri-
ately freighted with suspicion of both lawyers and litigation, and these
suspicions have deepened as lawyers, when describing their work to
justify fee applications, revealed their practices.
On the other hand, we do not believe that either judges or
rulemakers who craft large-scale litigations should ignore individual
litigants, their lawyers, and the political purposes of litigation.35 Ag-
gregation affects (enables, alters, or severs) whatever semblance of re-
lationships exists between individual litigants and lawyers; aggregation
alters the bargaining power among the litigants. Therefore, policy-
makers must consider the effects of their choices on litigants' exper-
iences of law and on law itself.
The questions, then, are what litigants want, need, and norma-
tively should get from litigation; what roles lawyers for aggregates and
lawyers for individuals, as well as other professionals or lay partici-
pants, might play in responding to litigants; and how the law on aggre-
gate structures, costs, and fees affects those roles. In Part V, we
suggest a first set of answers to some of these questions. In some
ways, our proposals about judicial obligations to oversee both the re-
lationships among members of aggregates and the delivery of legal
services within aggregates are congruent with another shift in the
world of process-a trend toward the convergence of rules of proce-
dure and rules of ethics, which is animated by judicial efforts to gain
control over their docket by regulating lawyers' behavior. The law on
attorneys' fees and costs is a tool of regulation-like the sanction pro-
visions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the judicial
management regime of Rule 16, and some of the revised discovery
tory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494 (1986); Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment?
Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close
of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1471 (1994) [hereinafter Resnik, Whose
Judgment?].
35 We are not alone. See Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at 3 ("Chief
among our current concerns should be the 'individual aspect' of mass litigations.").
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rules? 6 Our hope is that claimants, judges, and lawyers can develop a
rule structure to use the vast resources (monetary and otherwise)
within aggregates creatively to fashion procedures, engender relations,
and make payments for that which they claim to value.
II
THE WORK OF LAWYERS IN LARGE-SCALE TORT AGGREGATES:
Ti ROLES OF PLAINTIFFS' STEERING COMMITTEES
AND OF INDIVIDUALLY-RETAINED PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEYS
In this Part, we provide an overview of the distinctive characteris-
tics of lawyering structures within large-scale tort aggregates, most of
which are not yet visible in either case law or in academic literature.3 7
Our focus is on the roles that different plaintiffs' lawyers play.
8
A. Gatekeeping
Most mass tort cases begin with individual lawyers (IRPAs)-
paid by contingency fees-filing lawsuits. In the discourse of large-
scale torts, some of these lawyers are now referred to as "trail blazers"
36 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (authorizing courts to impose sanctions, sua sponte or on a
motion, on lawyers who fle pleadings not grounded in law and fact); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16
(authorizing judicial officers to direct parties to participate in pretrial conferences, encour-
aging resolutions without trials, and mandating judges to structure the pretrial process by
entering scheduling orders); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring parties to disclose certain
material "without awaiting a discovery request").
37 The materials presented below come from an amalgam of sources, including inter-
views with participants in many aggregate litigations, commentary presented by judges and
lawyers at conferences on aggregate litigation, including Symposium, The Institute of Judi-
cial Administration Research Conference on Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1 (1996)
(Conference on Class Actions and Complex Litigation held at New York University School
of Law in April 1995, cosponsored by the Institute for Judicial Administration at New York
University School of Law and the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, to consider problems in aggregate litigation); Symposium, Mass Tortes, supra note
31 (Symposium held at Cornell Law School in October 1994 about the settlement of and
the ethical issues in mass torts); Symposium, National Mass Tort Conference, supra note 31
(National Mass Tort Conference held in Cincinnati, Ohio, in November 1994, sponsored by
the National Center for State Courts to enable judges and lawyers to compare methods for
handling massive litigations); Conference, A Practical Look at Complex MDL and Mass
Tort Litigation, Conference at Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College, Port-
land, Or. (Oct. 12, 1995) (at which judges and lawyers discussed their experiences in large-
scale litigation), from documents in lawsuits, from reported cases, and from case studies.
See, e.g., Hensler et al., Asbestos in the Courts, supra note 8; Hensler & Peterson, supra
note 11.
38 When we refer below to what such lawyers do, some of that work may be performed
by individuals (paralegals, secretaries, junior associates, or others) within a law firm other
than by a client's named lawyer.
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or those who "set the table. '39 Questions exist about how well IRPAs
function as gatekeepers, selecting and rejecting cases to file. One con-
cern is that their resources are insufficient to permit them to take on
meritorious cases. Assumptions about rationally acting contingency-
fee lawyers posit that they only file cases in which they can expect
their yields to optimize their investments,40 and that in certain types of
mass torts, defendants' resources overwhelm those of individual
contingency-fee lawyers. David Rosenberg, for example, has argued
that certain forms of socially useful mass tort cases will not be filed by
individual contingency-fee lawyers.41
The converse of the concern that IRPAs too easily reject valid
claims is the critique that they are insufficiently careful-that too
many nonmeritorious cases are filed on the assumption that defen-
dants will settle nuisance cases and pay sufficient returns to make such
an enterprise profitable for lawyers.42 A recent study of medical mal-
practice offers support for both criticisms: many injuries caused by
negligence go unredressed, and many claims are filed in which negli-
gence has not been uncovered. 43 Information about aggregate torts
39 Transcript of Hearing on Application of Attorneys' Fees at 75, 44, Bowling v. Pflzer,
Inc., No. C-1-91-256 (S.D. Ohio 1995) [hereinafter Bowling Fee Hearing Transcript] (on
file with authors).
40 TWenty percent of injured claimants in RAND's injury compensation study reported
that lawyers rejected taking their cases based on the amounts of money involved. Deborah
R. Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 12, on
file with authors) [hereinafter Hensler, The Real World]. Lawyers may also be lazy gatc-
keepers, underenergized, and hence insufficiently pursuing meritorious legal claims. In an
empirical survey of class action lawyers, Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel, and S. Jay Plager
found too little "creativity in initiation" of litigation among lawyers who were (in their
terms) legal "mercenaries" (as contrasted with "social advocates"). Bryant Garth, Ilene
Nagel & S.J. Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an
Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 353, 356, 374-78 (1988) (find-
ing that salaried lawyers at public interest or at government-funded legal services offices,
who were freed from fee-generating work, undertook innovative lawsuits while attorneys
dependent on attorneys' fees tended to piggyback their filings of private antitrust and se-
curities cases upon government-initiated investigations and litigation). Whether such "free
riding" is efficient was not discussed.
41 David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System. 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 889-92 (1984) [hereinafter Rosenberg,
Causal Connection].
42 While concerns about lawyers' lack of selectivity are often raised in the context of
securities class action and particularly "stock drop" cases, see, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Pay-
ing Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Cap-
ital in America, 42 Duke L.. 945, 949-50 (1993), these concerns have also surfaced in the
context of tort litigation. For example, Coffee describes a lawyer who obtained retainers
from more than 7000 clients in the Bhopal poisonous gas litigation. Coffee, En-
trepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24, at 886; see also Nocera, Fatal Litigation II, supra
note 2, at 138 (discussing voluminous filings in the Silicone Breast Implant Litigation).
43 Paul C. Weiler, Howard H. Hiatt, Joseph P. Newhouse, William G. Johnson, Troycn
A. Brennan & Lucian L. Leape, A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice
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permits a parallel inference; the number of claims filed subsequent to
court-ordered notice in both the Dalkon Shield and the Silicone
Breast Implant Litigations suggests both that individualized tort litiga-
tion failed to ensure access for some claimants and that easier access
resulted in some, perhaps substantial, overclaiming.44
In short, IRPAs may be imperfect gatekeepers, but, absent a
much different regulatory apparatus, they will retain that role. While
some cases-such as some of the current tobacco litigation-are for-
mulated by lawyers envisioning an aggregate from the beginning,45 in
Litigation, and Patient Compensation 139-40 (1993) (finding that one malpractice claim
was filed for every 7.5 hospital patients who had suffered a "real tort," and finding that
evidence of negligence was provided in one-sixth of the cases actually filed). Education
about the utility and viability of claiming is an important factor in seeking redress. See
Hensler, The Real World, supra note 40, at 12. A related question is whether, were rules of
solicitation different, clients could become more effective shoppers for lawyers.
44 In both, widespread notice in the media resulted in the filing of many times more
claims than those filed by individual tort lawyers. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Public Notifica-
tion Campaigns in Mass Litigation: The Dalkon Shield Case, 13 Just. Sys. J. 220,223 (1988-
89) (describing media notification and the subsequent filing of more than 300,000 addi-
tional claims, of which about 200,000 were deemed valid); Barry Meier, Judge Discloses
New Details on Settlement of Implant Suit, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1995, at 10 (discussing
revision of settlement proposal after some 430,000 claimants filed after notice was pro-
vided of an initial settlement); see also Glenn Collins, Big Publicity Effort Seen in Tobacco
Class Action, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1995, at D2 (describing use of newspaper and magazine
advertising, "900" numbers, and the Internet); cf. Hensler, The Real World, supra note 40,
at 6 (describing RAND's survey findings of injured individuals' pursuit of liability claims;
tort liability is "strongly associated with attributions of causation and fault.... [O]nly ten
percent of those who had been injured took some action that could be construed as 'claim-
ing.'"); see also Hensler, ADR in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, supra note 3, at 1598-99
(describing that the circumstances and severity of the accident and injury contribute to the
likelihood of the filing of a claim and noting that the -precise rate of claiming" in mass
torts remains indeterminate because of lack of data). According to Hensler and Peterson.
rates of claiming are higher for mass torts than for other kinds of injuries and rates of
claiming will vary depending on the context. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 11, at 1025.
45 See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 549-60 (E.D. La. 1995)
(conditionally certifying a plaintiff class of "nicotine dependent persons" for several issues,
including liability for fraud, breach of express or implied warranties, intentional and negli-
gent torts, and punitive damages against many tobacco companies), rev'd, No. 95-30725,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11815 (5th Cir. May 23, 1996); Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,
162 F.R.D. 112, 117 (E.D. La. 1995) (certifying the decision for interlocutory appeal and
staying proceedings); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 889 F. Supp. 904, 907 (E.D. La.
1995) (permitting discovery to proceed); see also Barnaby J. Feder, One Company Seen
Settling Tobacco Suit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1996, at D1 (describing a proposed settlement
on behalf of Liggett & Myers, one of the Castano defendants). The appeal of the class
action certification in Castano was to be heard in April 1996, before Judges Jerry E. Smith,
John M. Duh6, Jr., and Harold DeMoss, Jr., of the Fifth Circuit. Glenn Collins, Panel Is
Named for Tobacco Class Action, N.Y. Tnes, Mar. 26, 1996, at D2.
See also Glenn Collins, A Tobacco Case's Legal Buccaneers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6,1995,
at Dl, D3 [hereinafter Collins, Legal Buccaneers] (quoting Wendell Gauthier, member of
the tobacco litigation PSC as saying, "'[o]ur biggest motivation is money' ... 'but we also
have our pride. The tobacco companies have made it so expensive to sue them that they've
bankrupted a string of lawyers and tried to scare the plaintiffs' bar away from the court-
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many instances, individual lawyers will continue to start a series of
cases that will later be aggregated, either by judges or by lawyers, and
either when "mature" 46 or earlier.
The description of various filing patterns reflects the next point:
that there is more than one kind of "individual" lawyer. First are
those operating on an individual basis, which is to say that lawyer and
client seek each other out individually, meet personally to discuss and
to evaluate a case, and then enter into a contract for legal services.47
Thereafter, the lawyer continues to view the client as an individual
and to treat the case individually. Some of these individual case-
oriented attorneys may come to represent scores or more of similarly
situated plaintiffs in what becomes a mass litigation. A subset or vari-
ation on this pattern should also be noted: some lawyers keep certain
kinds of cases but refer others to lawyers specializing in a particular
field. Contractual arrangements result, in which referring and repre-
senting lawyers share fees.
In contrast to one-on-one attorneys are a second set of lawyers
who, while they have individual clients, get them by relatively anony-
mous exchanges such as sign-ups in union halls or by advertisements.
house"'). While the Castano lawsuit is a class, ab initio, that litigation comes after many
individual cases pursued various liability theories against tobacco companies. See Robert
L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 853, 858 (1992)
(discussing the limiting frame that tort provides for responding to the harms caused by
smoking and the difficulties encountered by individual litigants and their attorneys).
46 Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 659
(1989) (raising concern that collectivization may occur before sufficient development of
facts and law has occurred by virtue of individualized litigation). We note but hold aside
several questions: Should such early venturers, many of whom may have individual cases
that lose, get premiums for their risk-taking and for ferreting out possible injuries? Should
clients, some of whom lost because their cases were tried before information was uncov-
ered, be compensated, after the fact, if a large recovery is obtained for similarly situated
individuals? Should those who win early be required to transfer some of those recoveries
to subsequent plaintiffs who do not prevail? Who decides the boundaries of the group
formed?
A few of these issues are either illustrated by or addressed in the literature. See, e.g.,
Philip Hager, State Farm To Pay Women $157 Million for Job Bias, L.A. Times, Apr. 29,
1992, at Al (describing the voluntary contributions of more than $320,000 made by suc-
cessful women plaintiffs in a settlement of a class action employment gender discrimination
case to other plaintiffs who had lost earlier cases against the same defendant); Macey &
Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 114-15 (considering the idea of
compensating the "first movers"-rewarding lawyers who ferret out claims); Nancy
Morawetz, Underinclusive Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 402, 415-20 (discussing the
ways in which lawyers decide the parameters of class action lawsuits).
47 While changes in the legal profession are fast moving, individual lawyers continue to
attract some clients by reputation, personal interaction, third-party reference, or advertise-
ment; many within the legal profession respect the ability of lawyers to attract clients; In
the corporate context, such lawyers are described as "rainmakers" who can bring in clients.
Lawyers who pursue clients in other contexts are sometimes termed "ambulance chasers."
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To rely on market metaphors, these lawyers might be understood as
wholesalers, as compared to the first set who might be seen as dealing
retail. The wholesalers recruit large numbers of clients, handle their
"inventory" of clients in groups, and sometimes enter into block set-
tlements with defendants on behalf of a "stable" of cases.
A third group of lawyers appears to operate primarily as entre-
preneurs, and in the context of mass torts, are now termed "tort class
action lawyers." They enter litigation planning on its aggregation, and
they anticipate from the outset that they will be appointed to leading
roles. They appear to conceive of the litigation primarily as a massive
economic deal and of their role as the financiers and transaction man-
agers. For many of these lawyers, large numbers of clients are a
means to an end, which is a "global" settlement.
These three sets of lawyers should not be conceived to be pure
types or to cover the landscape. We currently lack the empirical data
that would reveal the variations and frequencies thus far; moreover,
the practice is evolving rapidly. What we do know is that lawyers may
function differently both over time and depending on the kind of
case-handling some cases individually, referring others on, wholesal-
ing in other settings, and, if amassing sufficient capital, participating as
class counsel. Further, lawyers may share clients, with layers of agree-
ments and a range of contractual payment obligations between and
among them.49
But identifying three kinds of lawyers helps to detail differentia-
tion of functions and of talents. The individual lawyer may be well
versed in fact investigation, skilled in interpersonal relations with cli-
ents, and adept at communicating with juries. Lawyers representing
large groups of more anonymous clients may develop streamlined
strategies for information collection and mass communication,
thereby both creating and achieving economies of scale. These law-
yers may also develop effective strategies for achieving large-scale set-
48 See Hensler et al., Asbestos in the Courts, supra note 8, at 94-95; Weinstein, Individ-
ual Justice, supra note 21, at 74; see also Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 617, 619-21 (1992) (criticizing law-
yers who represented large numbers of claimants in the Dalkon Shield Trust). See gener-
ally Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation, 36 J. Legal Educ. 317, 319-20 (1986) (discussing the
Bhopal disaster specifically and the problems of overcharging and underrepresentation).
John Coffee reports that a relatively small number of plaintiffs' firms provide services
to large numbers of claimants in most mass torts. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The
Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1364-65 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Coffee, Class Wars]. He distinguishes between "boutique firms" that screen clients
more carefully than do "wholesalers," comprised of lawyers who in turn "invest little in
indidual case preparation." Id. at 1365.
49 See, e.g., Coffee's discussion of fee splitting, but only in the context of the members
of a PSC. Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24, at 902-03.
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tlements, which both provide compensation for current clients and
enable the creation of a financial base for securing and representing
new groups of claimants.
The class action lawyers, who frequently serve on PSCs, may have
yet more extensive staff and computer facilities, and, most impor-
tantly, greater financial wherewithal to "bankroll" litigation.50 They
also have interest in establishing and maintaining relationships with
judges (and perhaps with prospective defendants and their lawyers),
who may turn to these lawyers to play key roles in group litigation.
Because class action lawyers' relationships with plaintiffs in the litiga-
tion are the most attenuated of the three sets of lawyers, and their
interest in maintaining the unity of the group is the highest, they may
have the least interest-relative to the other sets of lawyers-in pro-
moting mechanisms to focus on individual plaintiffs and their poten-
tially diverse interests and the most interest in securing an aggregate
outcome through settlement, with the fees attendant.
B. Financing the Litigation, Augmenting Resources,
and Monitoring Representative Counsel
In personal injury litigation, individual lawyers front the costs of
litigation for their own clients. 51 In large-scale cases, judges and law-
yers arrange for pooling resources at the front-end to finance the liti-
gation, and then, at the back-end, determine how the fees, net of
expenses, will be divided among participating lawyers. Membership in
PSCs may be conditioned on a "down payment" of hundreds of
thousands of dollars, the commitment of staff, and/or yearly dues. As-
sessments of lower amounts from IRPAs are routine.5 2
50 They may be very adept at what Gilson and Mnookin term (in the context of a differ-
ent legal practice) "value-creating opportunities." Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1995).
51 Lawyers recover both costs and fees if they are successful. if unsuccessful, clients In
states that have adopted the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct can be relieved
of the obligation to repay costs. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(e)(1)
(1995). Clients are "ultimately liable" for costs in states that still adhere to the ABA's
Code of Professional Responsibility, see Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-
103 (1980), but the repayment obligation may neither be enforced nor be readily
enforceable.
52 See In re Showa Denko K.K. L-Tryptophan Prods. Liab. Litig.-II, 953 F.2d 162,
164, 165-67 (4th Cir. 1992) (overturning in part an administrative order as overbroad In
taxing every plaintiff $1000 plus "0.5 [percent] of the value of settlement or verdict" en-
tered based on the assumption that all derived benefits from a steering committee's discov-
ery); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., MDL 721, 1989 WL 168401, at "10-*15
(D.P.R. Dec. 2, 1988) (Pretrial Order No. 127, Amended Case Management Order)
(describing assessment/financing scheme). The lawyers who have formed one of the to-
bacco class actions required some 60 participating firms to contribute $100,000 each, "fill-
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In addition to augmenting cash resources, IRPAs are sometimes a
source of legal resources. Like the large amount of capital needed to
finance the litigation, a good many lawyering activities are involved,
many of them resulting from the scale of the undertaking. Because
the plaintiffs' attorneys' financial incentives are to "build a pot," some
plaintiffs' lawyers are eager to include a large number of claimants.
Further, to make possible very large recovery funds, these lawyers
may (depending on the kind of case) seek to name as defendants an
array of individuals and businesses, ranging from direct suppliers or
providers in product cases, to owners and builders in building col-
lapses and hotel fires, to others, such as former owners, product and
service suppliers, and manufacturers. Each defendant in turn may
bring one or more layers of insurance to the bargaining table.
Preparing these sprawling cases requires substantial fact investi-
gation and knowledge of relationships among defendants. The requi-
site data may include information on individual-specific causation and
injury, as well as groupwide discovery related to liability and general
causation, and then understandings of the contractual agreements
among defendants and of insurance coverage obligations. Also re-
quired is research on legal rules that may vary across jurisdictions,
affecting either groups of claimants or individuals. Negotiations may
proceed as a whole or in subsets, including one-on-one deals. De-
pending on the issue in dispute at a particular phase, groups of defen-
dants may join with sets of plaintiffs on certain issues and diverge on
others.
The availability, therefore, of many lawyers beyond the five to
twenty on PSCs provides the potential to distribute some of this work.
Lawyers on PSCs are often described as working frantically under dif-
ficult time pressures;5 3 IRPAs can be "extra hands," augmenting
PSCs' resources by taking on assignments for the group, such as cov-
ering depositions or investigative work, or doing the work of learning
from individual clients about the nature of claims and potential proof.
The existence of two sets of lawyers, as well as of special masters
or other court appointees in some aggregates, also offers some possi-
bility of monitoring the work done within the aggregate. Many of the
plaintiffs' lawyers have more access to information and a greater abil-
ity to assess decisionmaking by lead lawyers than do many claimants
themselves. IRPAs' financial interests may also prompt them to lobby
ing an annual war chest of nearly $6 million." Collins, Legal Buccaneers, supra note 45, at
D1.
53 See, for example, Peter Schuck's description of the workload pressures in Agent Or-
ange litigation. Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial 119-24 (1986) [hereinafter Schuck,
Agent Orange].
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against early settlements that might reap great benefits for lead coun-
sel but could result in smaller individual payouts, on which IRPAs'
fees depend.
IRPAs' ability to perform monitoring useful to clients varies, de-
pending in part on the degree to which they coordinate among them-
selves and in part on what they conceive to be their own and their
clients' interests. For example, some IRPAs may hope that, by ingrati-
ating themselves with PSC members, they will be asked to join the
"club" and, in subsequent mass torts, will have a share of more clients
or will receive recommendations from PSC members to be on the next
PSC. Alternatively, by threatening to or holding out scores of clients
from a group settlement, IRPAs may hope to receive assurances that
their own contingency-fee contracts will be protected-rather than su-
pervised and limited-in the payout scheme. Moreover, given that
both IRPAs and PSCs have parallel interests in a favorable outcome,
tensions of monitoring each other could inhibit useful teamwork.
C. Helping Clients Relate to the Law: Information,
Evaluation, Education, Coventuring
Thrning from some of the relationships among lawyers to that of
lawyer to client, one aspect of what lawyers do is explain to clients
how the legal system works.5 4 Another is to give value to a litigant's
claim by case preparation and investigation, while yet another role is
to help a litigant assess the utility of what law can offer for that indi-
vidual.5 5 Lawyers might also help to inspire or organize clients into
self-conscious political claimants, or dampen such interest. 6 Further,
lawyers communicate clients' claims to judges, other factfinders, or
dispute resolution personnel. Below we fill out a few exemplary spe-
cifics in the context of aggregate torts.
1. Discovery, Trial, Settlement, and Negotiating Claims Facilities
The degree to which discovery is individuated in aggregation var-
ies with the kind of case and kind of injuries alleged as well as with the
stage of the proceedings. In some mass torts, individual depositions
54 Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk
in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 Yale L.J. 1663, 1664 (1989) [hereinafter Sarat & Fel-
stiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness].
55 Morawetz, Bargaining, supra note 26, at 16-17 (explaining that different class mem-
bers may attribute different value and meaning to proposed remedies in both the antitrust
and public benefits context).
56 See Karen M. Hicks, Surviving the Dalkon Shield IUD: Women v. The Pharmaceu-
tical Industry 100-01 (1994) (describing both kinds of lawyers); Martha F. Davis, Brutal
Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960-1973, at 29-31 (1993) (describing
a conception of welfare litigation as part of a social movement).
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are taken, individual interrogatories filled out, and individual experts
contacted to prove economic and/or physical losses. In some in-
stances, PSC members may provide assistance by providing formats
for answering depositions, but in many cases, PSC members are them-
selves engaged in intensive activities that leave no time for individual-
specific work; IRPAs may be left to their own devices for much of the
individual case preparation, and that work in turn may be either mini-
mal or substantial.
Lawyers are not the only source of that information. In some
litigations, special masters provide information on the degree of injury
suffered by individual plaintiffs and the value of such claims.s 7 In yet
other mass torts, little attention is given to evaluation of individual
claims. The collective structure subsumes the issues that would have
been the subject of discovery had the case been litigated
individually.58
During the pretrial phase, judges typically discourage IRPAs
from contacting them directly; communication from lawyers to the
court goes through PSC members. Similarly, issues relating to defen-
dants en masse are the preserve of the PSC lawyers, who usually un-
dertake the negotiations with defendants. In some cases, however,
group settlement values may be derived from individual values, ascer-
tained through negotiation by IRPAs of individual cases for settle-
ment.59 Trials occasionally occur, and either PSC members or IRPAs
or both may try representative lawsuits.6"
After valuation, whether done individually or en masse, IRPAs
often have the role of directly relating proposed or decided outcomes
57 See, e.g., Sobol, supra note 9, at 170-77 (describing data collection by Special Master
Francis McGovern to assist in valuing the claim in the Dalkon Shield bankruptcy); see also
Francis E. McGovem, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, Law & Contemp. Probs., Au-
tumn 1990, at 61, 63-64 (discussing data collection by special master).
58 For example, in the Agent Orange litigation, the lawyers negotiating for the class did
not know the number of claimants nor their degrees of injury. Schuck, Agent Orange,
supra note 53, at 161-62. Alternatively, if cases are bifurcated or trifurcated, the question
of individual injury may take a back seat to general causation, with a focus on underlying
scientific questions rather than on plaintiffs' injuries. See, e.g., In re Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1222 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
59 E.g., Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1992). Each IRPA met with a "settle-
ment judge," presented a packet of materials about the injuries sustained by particular
clients, and negotiated a value for each plaintiff by discussing the case with the settlement
judge, who played the role of a claims appraiser or of a defendant. The total amount of the
individual valuations thereby established the plaintiffs' monetary goals for settlement and/
or trial. Id. at 605.
60 See, e.g., id. at 605 ("collaborative" team of three PSC members and four IRPAs
handled 12 representative trials); Cimino v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653
(E.D. Tex. 1990) (58 lawyers involved in the consolidated trials of representative cases),
appeal docketed, No. 93-4452 (5th Cir. argued Feb. 8, 1995).
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to clients, a task that is sometimes described as "controlling" the cli-
ents61 or "selling" them on the desirability of an agreement.62 Alter-
natively, IRPAs may counsel that litigants exit63 or threaten to do so,
which in turn could be aimed either at controlling the PSC's offers of
compromise or at resisting judicial pressures to settle. IRPAs can also
be conduits between clients and PSC members-providing clients with
information about settlement offers and providing PSC members with
61 See, e.g., Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar Settlement Threatens Top
Texas Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6 (describing claimants' challenge that for-
mer lawyers used "high-pressure tactics to force acceptance of settlement offers" in a mass
tort involving a fire at a chemical complex in which 23 people died and many hundreds
were injured).
62 See, e.g., Schuck, Agent Orange, supra note 53, at 200 (discussing a lawyer who be-
lieved that he played an important role in persuading plaintiffs-veterans of the desirability
of the settlement).
63 The issues raised by exit are many, including the legal availability of exit, its practical
viability for individual litigants and lawyers, and its strategic implications for the litigation
as a whole. For example, exit is not permitted if the aggregate is a mandatory class action
or bankruptcy. Further, as judges cross jurisdictional lines to work together on mass torts,
the possibility of filing in state court to avoid federal aggregate proceedings is decreasingly
a means of exit. See Manual Third, supra note 11, § 33.23 (advocating coordination of
proceedings between state and federal judges to reduce "duplication of effort" and includ-
ing suggestions of holding joint hearings and working together on settlement efforts);
Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective
Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 171,203-08 (1996) (describing "ju-
dicial federalism" in which state and federal judges sit together or coordinate management
of large-scale cases). This amalgamation of state-federal cases is illustrative of how quickly
the world is changing; when Coffee wrote in the mid-1980s, a state lawsuit seemed a more
reliable means of avoiding inclusion in the group. See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation,
supra note 24, at 910-11 (describing a strategy of filing a state action prior to a federal one
and thereby having the option of litigating in state court).
Further, even if "opting out" is possible legally, questions about the practical possibili-
ties of opting out remain: Will one's case go to the back of the line? Will individual law-
yers be willing to bear the risk of the expenses of an individual trial? Will judicial pressure
be brought to bear? Cf. id. at 915-16, in which Coffee assumes that plaintiffs who opt out
will do better in terms of recovery-not only that such plaintiffs might be able to get first
dibs on funds but also because staying with the group means that high-stake plaintiffs'
claims may be averaged with lower-stake claims. Coffee invokes the Hyatt Skywalk exam-
ple, in which a state court litigant received over $10 million in recovery at trial, in contrast
to the payment of $20 million paid in settlement to all state plaintiffs in settlement. See Id.
at 913-15 (citing In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982)). In contrast,
under the rules established by the Dalkon Shield Claimants Tkust, those who want to try
cases are at the end of the queue. See Dalkon Shield Option Packet, provided by the fTust
(Mar. 1990) (on file with authors).
Moreover, staying in the aggregate may alter individual or group settlements. See,
e.g., Voidance of Defendants' Judgment/Settlement Sharing Agreement, Order No. 221 at
2, 6, In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., MDL 721 (D.P.R. May 8,1989) (on file
with authors) (agreement for sharing defense costs by defendants also included "exclusive
settlement mechanism," which trial court concluded prohibited "individual settlements" by
defendants and therefore voided it as against public policy). On the plaintiffs' side, the
possibility of exit and/or bargaining around it may be enhanced when plaintiffs or their
lawyers threaten a collective migration of significant numbers of claimants.
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information about clients' perceptions of the utility of proposed
resolutions.64
Further, to the extent a proposed settlement provides that distri-
bution of funds will depend upon distinctions among claimants and/or
provision of information by claimants, IRPAs may have information
that PSC members lack. For example, IRPAS may know the kinds of
evidentiary materials available, which in turn may illuminate the ac-
ceptability of the rules by which claims facilities will operate.6 Of
course, with richer knowledge may come keen awareness of conflicts
within the aggregate, that some methods of distribution favor one
group or another. Such potential for conflict has prompted a debate
within the plaintiffs' bar about whether a mass tort class action lawyer
should have his or her own clients when serving on a PSC, but the
problem is not unique to the tort context.66
After formulas of distribution are established, often with grids
and schedules, individual claimants still need to find out and perhaps
disagree about where they fit. Depending upon how a distribution is
structured, the work of an attorney in this phase may vary from per-
functory assistance with forms67 to preparing a complex claim and try-
64 See, e.g., Morawetz, Bargaining, supra note 26, at 16-19 (arguing that the "real
value" of remedies-the utility to clients-should be a dominant factor in aggregate
negotiations).
65 For example, under provisions of the Dalkon Trust, a document negotiated by group
lawyers operating under the supervision of a deeply engaged trial judge, medical records or
an affidavit from a "health care provider" are needed to receive compensation in excess of
$725. See Dalkon Shield Option Packet, supra note 63. Many claimants had received
Shields from clinics or from doctors who were no longer in practice. Further, no details of
the rules the Trust would use for settlement negotiations and alternative dispute resolution
were provided in the agreement. The subsequent objections by claimants, that the rules
established by the Trust were unfairly restrictive, were rejected by the Fourth Circuit, de-
ferring to the district court's approval of the choices of rules made by the administrators of
the claims facility. In re A.H. Robins Co., 42 F.3d 870, 875 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding
arbitration rules promulgated by trustee); see also Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money.
Comparative Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn
1990, at 113 (1990) (describing Dalkon Shield Trust's refusal to negotiate and other
threats); Schuck, Agent Orange, supra note 53, at 161-62 (discussing the limited knowledge
of the Plaintiffs' Management Committee of the patterns of alleged injuries within the
class).
66 See, e.g., Morawetz, Bargaining, supra note 26, at 25 (discussing how, within a group
competing for funds, less exacting proof requirements may disadvantage one category of
claimants over others).
67 Some have criticized the fees paid to plaintiffs' lawyers for the work performed dur-
ing this stage of litigation. See Vairo, supra note 48, at 620 n.10 (complaining about law-
yers who receive contingency fees for such work); see also In re A.H. Robins Co., No. 85-
01307-R (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 1995) (Order Disallowing Unreasonable Attorneys Fees on Pro
Rata Distribution) (on file with authors); In re A.H. Robins Co., No. 85-01307-R (E.D. Va.
May 2, 1995) (Order & Mem.) (on file with authors) (concluding that lawyers representing
claimants would be overcompensated, were they to receive the full amounts of their con-
tingency fees on the subsequent distributions of funds, Judge Merhige issued an order,
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ing it within an administrative structure of a claims facility.68 IRPAs
may again function as gatekeepers, either boosting claimants' aware-
ness of their rights or screening and sorting claimants. While some
tort litigation funds have been "oversubscribed," 69 some consumer
class action funds appear to be undersubscribed. 70
2. Voice, Vindication, Attention, or Subordination
The right to counsel, embodied in constitutional doctrine and
statutory mandates, imagines lawyers as empowering litigants in their
battle with the state. In class actions, lawyers have been called "pri-
vate attorneys general,"'71 a term that links the class lawyer to the
state's or the "people's" lawyer. If the analogy is played out, the cli-
ents for whom "private attorneys general" work can be as anonymous
as are the "people" on whose behalf "the government" stands up in
court. In contrast, IRPAs have the potential to be closer to clients.
As our discussion of the different kinds of "individual lawyers" above
suggests, such closeness may not in fact exist or, if it does, may be
productive or destructive.72 In some instances, IRPAs work with cli-
"Disallowing Unreasonable Attorneys Fees on Pro Rata Distribution" and prohibiting law-
yers, absent a specific showing, from receiving "any compensation or fees ... in excess of
ten percent of such pro rata distribution by the Trust to the Claimant"), appeal pending sub
nom. In re A.H. Robins, Co., Bergstrom v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, No. 95-2239-L
(4th Cir. argued Mar. 5, 1996, before Judges Russell, Chapman, and Widener of the Fourth
Circuit).
68 Peterson, supra note 65, at 113-15.
69 Id. at 119 (reporting that, by November 1990, Manville Trust had 150,000 claims,
50% more claims within the first two years than had been predicted for the life of the
trust).
70 See Gail Hillebrand & Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures in Large Consumer Class
Actions and Equitable Distribution of Benefits, 28 Santa Clara L. Rev. 747, 749-51 (1988)
(finding that, in a state antitrust case involving overcharges for blue jeans, 14-33% of eligi-
ble class members filed claims; that the rate of claiming in commercial litigation with
higher stakes was greater, such as a reported 77% rate of claiming in the In re Folding
Carton Antitrust Litigation, 557 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. I11. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985)).
Instances of low-claim rates suggest either the need for measures to better inform
claimants of available remedies or raise questions about the nature of such settlements. Id.
at 760-61. Hillebrand and Torrence argue that in consumer class actions, rates of filing
claims varied with the demographics of claimants and that lower income, non-English-
speaking, and less educated claimants did not reap the benefits of these remedies because
claims procedures skewed the ability to obtain benefits toward more affluent and better
educated claimants; they called for a reorientation of processes to provide for the diverse
needs of all claimants. Id.
71 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implica-
tions of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, The Plaintiff's Attorney]
(using that term); Garth et al., supra note 40, at 353 (same).
72 See infra Part IV.C.
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ents to pursue legal claims and help them vindicate rights7 3 Some
IRPAs provide not only legal advice but also attention, consolation,
and appreciation; other IRPAs are inaccessible and unavailable to
their clients.
D. The Creation of an Ad Hoc Law Firm
One other aspect of large-scale tort litigation needs to be
mapped. Until recently, in the prototypical class action, plaintiffs'
lawyers were either all in one firm or from a few firms that jointly ran
the case.74 In contrast, the practice in aggregated torts is for a judge
to appoint a PSC of five to twenty lawyers who, in essence, become an
ad hoc law firm created to litigate a particular case. Sometimes the
overhead of such a creation may be minimal; the participants use their
home offices as their base and come together by travel and telecom-
munications. In other instances, the ad hoc firm rents office space,
hires staff, buys office equipment, prints stationery, and "sets up
shop."75
Who are such a "firm's" clients? Judges, in effect, create the
firms and (according to the Manual for Complex Litigation) should
remind them of "their responsibility to the court and their obligation
to act fairly, efficiently, and economically in the interests of all parties
and their counsel." 76 What are the obligations owed by this "firm" to
lawyers not appointed? To clients of those lawyers? To the judge who
appointed the PSC? How is one to mediate conflicts between one's
own individual clients and the group as a wholeW7 What forms of fee-
73 As discussed infra Part IV.C, some commentators see lawyers as subordinating cli-
ents, while others posit lawyers as vindicators of clients' rights. These are not mutually
exclusive roles. See, for example, Lucie White's account of her individual representation
of a welfare recipient who disputed the government's request for reimbursement. Lucie E.
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing
of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1990) [hereinafter White, Notes on the Hearing]. Readers
are left with a mixed sense of the lawyer's role: at one level, White's lawyering might have
helped to open lines of argument, but that lawyering was forever removed from the exper-
iences and realities of the person represented.
74 Compare recent class actions, including Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160
F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, No. 95-30725, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11815 (5th Cir.
May 23, 1996) in which some 60 firms are reportedly involved. See Collins, Legal Buc-
caneers, supra note 45, at D1.
75 We know of no empirical data that permit conclusions about the frequency of partic-
ular forms of this practice.
76 Manual Third, supra note 11, § 20.22.
77 One might ask who the clients of PSC members are. Courts have commented about
obligations of such lawyers to all plaintiffs, rather than only to those clients who had indi-
vidually retained PSC members. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig.,
888 F.2d 940, 942 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting the district court's discussion that the PSC repre-
sents "'by its very nature... a!! plaintiffs"'); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818
F.2d 216,223 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that lead counsel had a "fiduciary duty" not to "over-
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sharing and splitting are permissible?78 How should the costs of these
firms be allocated among plaintiffs' attorneys, between attorneys and
their clients, and among the plaintiffs, who often do not receive identi-
cal monetary amounts when awards are made? Law in mass torts has
yet to expound much by way of rules or to explain these
relationships.
79
Here some background about billing customs is in order to make
plain the kinds of problems posed by these ad hoc firms. The two
dominant payment modes are hourly rates and contingent fees.80
reach" in class fee application (quoting Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 18
(S.D.N.Y. 1980))); In re Air Crash Disaster at Malaga, Spain, 769 F. Supp. 90, 91
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing "duties to plaintiffs" owed by lead counsel). However, neither
codes nor case law detail what duties that representative capacity imposes. See, e.g., Now
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Gloucester Envtl. Management Servs., Inc., 138 F.R.D.
421, 430 (D.N.J. 1991) ("Although the relationship between Liaison Counsel and group
members is not an attorney-client relationship, the conduct of attorneys may nonetheless
be guided by analogy to the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to fees and billing
arrangements.").
78 One financing mechanism has been ruled out by the Second Circuit. See Agent Or-
ange, 818 F.2d at 240 (Appeal of David Dean) (invalidating an agreement among lawyers,
in which some lawyers were to receive premiums for investing capital, to be paid out of
other attorneys' fees awarded by the court). In practice, courts have not often required
information about the agreements among PSC lawyers or among PSC and IRPAs, includ-
ing how clients are shared among lawyers. Cf. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a), which requires
that an application for compensation be accompanied by disclosure of any agreements
made for payment in connection with the case, including whether other persons expect to
share in compensation; fee-sharing agreements within law or accounting firms of which the
applicant is a member or associate do not have to be provided; E. & S.D.N.Y. Loc. R. 5(a)
(requiring that attorneys who request fees in "stockholder and class actions" provide no-
tice which "shall include a statement of the... amounts requested ... and shall disclose
any fee sharing agreements with anyone").
79 The Manual for Complex Litigation suggests equitable sharing of expenses and fees
of PSCs by those who benefit and calls for periodic billing but leaves the terms of such
compensation to "agreement among counsel" with court approval. Manual Third, supra
note 11, § 20.223. The Manual also calls for court monitoring of such billing, for considera-
tion of a "tentative budget" and for early determination of the methods for compensating
fees but does not provide detailed standards for how to assess the reasonableness of pay-
ments. See id. § 24.2 ("Proceedings to Award Fees").
The academic literature is similarly unresponsive to these configurations. See, e.g.,
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509,550-57 (1994) [hereinafter
Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents] (arguing the centrality of lawyers' agency
roles in understanding dispute resolution and the need for lawyers to increase their cooper-
ative behavior). Gilson and Mnookin, however, assume models of practice of individual
attorneys or of small and large firms, rather than the increasingly formalized collectives of
lawyers who are structured into a temporary firm by virtue of appointment to PSCs. Id. at
522-34.
80 Repeat-playing clients have begun to bargain for variations, sometimes combining
features (such as guaranteeing a lower base rate and including a contingency bonus) as well
as adopting a "uniform task-based billing system" that organizes fees not by attorneys'
time but by tasks. See, e.g., Zbe Baird, A Client's Experience with Implementing Value
Billing, 77 Judicature 198, 198-200 (1994) (describing Aetna's implementation of this form
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When lawyers charge by the hour, they factor into billing rates certain
items of overhead, such as the cost of maintaining offices, phones, and
support personnel. In addition, these lawyers may charge clients for
hours spent by paralegals or associates (whose hourly rates, in turn,
also build in overhead costs). Other charges to clients may be the
expenses or "costs" associated with a particular matter for items such
as photocopying, travel, express mail, and the retention of experts.8'
Contingency-fee lawyers have a similar, but not identical, set of
overhead expenses and similar direct costs. Typically, contingent-fee
percentages are expected to capture all staff costs including paralegal
or associate work. Whether contingency-fee lawyers calculate their
fee as a percentage of the gross award before expenses paid directly
by the client are taken out or on the net amount after expenses works
either to the advantage of the lawyer or the client. According to the
American Bar Association, for either hourly or contingent billing, all
charges should be specified in advance when the parties enter into
retainer agreements.82
of billing); Uniform Task-Based Management System: Litigation Code Set, Litig. News.
JunelJuly 1995, at 4 (describing a budgeting and billing system developed by the American
Bar Association, the American Corporate Counsel Association, and Price Waterhouse
LLP to create a uniform computer-based mechanism by which to enhance client control
over attorney bills and inform clients of the cost of the work done on their behalf); Richard
H. Alpert & Fred H. Bartlit, Opposing Counsel: Task-Based Billing, Litig. News, June/July
1995, at 11 (including a debate between a corporate counsel and a corporate litigator about
the pros and cons of such a system).
81 Substantial variation exists; for example, some law firms charge for secretarial work.
See Karen Dillon, Dumb and Dumber, Am. Law., Oct. 1995, at 5, 7 (describing S50 per
hour charges for daytime secretaries that exceed overhead costs and could result in mil-
lions of dollars in profits). Further, the use of services such as photocopying as "profit
centers" is a source of controversy. According to Dillon, the reports of cutting such
charges by law firms is overstated, and many firms continue to bill at 25o a page for photo-
copying, two dollars per fax, and 50% markups on LEXIS costs. Id. at 46. Many of the
corporate counsel did not know what they were charged for "disbursements." Id. at 5-7,
42,46. For an example of detailed objections to law firm charges, see Omnibus Objection
of the United States Trustee to Various First Interim Applications for Approval of Profes-
sional Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses, In re F & M Distributors, Inc., No. 94-522115
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 18, 1995) (on file with authors). According to a staff member at
the United States Trustee's Office, Judge Shapero ruled, on May 25, 1995, and September
28, 1995, on the objections; in his decision from the bench, he sustained many objections;
the United States Trustee's Office estimated that the reductions approximated 10% across
the board. Thereafter, the parties settled. Conversation with U.S. Trustee Staff Member
(Apr. 8, 1996).
82 In ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379
(1993), the Committee concluded that in the absence of specified fee agreements:
the lawyer is obliged to charge the client no more than the direct cost associ-
ated with the service (La, the actual cost of making a copy on the photocopy
machine) plus a reasonable allocation of overhead expenses directly associated
with the provision of the service (eg., the salary of a photocopy machine
operator).
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None of the extant ethical mandates about fees address the crea-
tion of PSCs. Moreover, it is not clear who should or does negotiate
any of the details of the PSC billing practices. The possibilities in-
clude judges on behalf of plaintiffs, IRPAs who may have their own
fees at issue as well, and litigants directly. Currently, some judges is-
sue case management orders when they appoint PSC members and
provide some guidelines, such as stating that no first-class travel will
be reimbursed, only "reasonable" hotel and meal costs will be
honored, and the like.8 3 No nationwide standard establishes what
constitutes reasonable charges.84 Some judges cut lawyers' claims for
travel expenses;85 others inform lawyers that they will not pay full
hourly rates for hours worked beyond eight in a day;86 some permit
twenty-five-cent copying costs, and others refuse.8 7 In addition, some
Id. at 9.
83 See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., MDL 721, 1989 WL 168401,
at *10-*15 (D.P.R. Dec. 2, 1988) (Pretrial Order No. 127, Amended Case Management
Order); see also Alan Hirsch & Diane Sheehey, Federal Judicial Center, Awarding Attor-
neys' Fees and Managing Fee Litigation 95-117 (1994) (detailing techniques judges have
used for managing these issues-sometimes in advance and other times at the conclusion
of litigation).
84 Richard Bieder proposes that a group of lawyers, clients, and judges promulgate uni-
form rates, akin to the Internal Revenue Service's schedule on what constitutes appropri-
ate deductions for travel expenses or government per diems. Richard Bieder, Comments
Presented at A Practical Look at Complex MDL and Mass Tort Litigation, Conference at
Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College, Portland, Or. (Oct. 12, 1995). In
March 1995, the Executive Office for United States Trustees promulgated uniform guide-
lines for the trustees to apply when monitoring costs. The guidelines provide that photo-
copying and fax should be compensated at "actual costs." with disclosure of both per page
and aggregate charges and documentation of how the actual cost figure is calculated, that
mileage be compensated at IRS mileage rates, and that charges not be made for overhead
absent "extraordinary circumstances." Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for Com-
pensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Filed under 11 U.S.C. § 330, 11 U.S.C.S. § 330,
Section IV.I (Law. Coop. Supp. July 1995) [hereinafter United States Trustee Guidelines].
Overhead is defined as "all continuous administrative or general costs or expenses incident
to the operation of the professional's office not particularly attributable to an individual
client or case." Id. Section IV.I.7.
85 See, e.g., Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 957 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding
that a charge of $917.24 for two nights when arguing in the United States Supreme Court
was unreasonable); Mokover v. NECO Enters., Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1083, 1093-94 (D.R.I.
1992) (reducing travel expenses by 50%); Fleet Bank of Me. v. rivers, 799 F. Supp. 1248,
1250 (D. Me. 1992) ("'This court does not permit travel time to be recovered at anything
approaching a usual billing rate."' (quoting Auburn Police Union v. Tierney, 762 F. Supp.
3, 4 (D. Me. 1991))).
86 E.g., Telephone Interview with Judge Richard Bilby, United States District Court
Judge, District of Arizona (Nov. 8, 1995).
87 Compare In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., MDL 721 (D.P.R. Nov. 23,
1993) (Order No. 510-A) and MDL 721 (D.P.R. Jan. 28, 1994) (Order No. 520) (upholding
PSC charges of 25V a page for photocopying and almost $1 million as "costs" for the reten-
tion of a lawyer experienced in insurance litigation who was charged to clients as an "ex-
pert"), appeals docketed, No. 95-2285 (1st Cir. 1995) with Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'i
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lawyers seek reimbursement for the costs of operating a separate PSC
office as well as for their own firm's staff time.
When these billing customs are placed in the context of mass tort
litigation, it becomes plain that aggregation has the potential to in-
crease the costs of litigation to individual clients (perhaps contro-
verting the assumption that aggregation is a source of economy for
litigants). To date, in cases in which IRPAs and PSC members both
provide legal services, PSC fees are generally deducted from the
IRPAs' contracted contingency fees, the total of which comprises the
"common fund" of fees allocated between sets of lawyers. IRPAs and
their clients are both conceptualized as having benefitted from the ag-
gregate lawyering and therefore taxed (either by the lodestar or POF
method) for the fees.88 A "sleeper," however, is the issue of "costs"-
the charges that come directly from the clients.89 If clients are
charged, separately from attorneys' fees, the costs of running the ag-
gregate lawyers' offices or for bank trust charges and other "miscella-
neous" expenses, as well as charged by IRPAs for the specific costs of
individual cases, then the plaintiffs may pay more for the fact of
aggregation.90
How should one think about the possibility of such a surcharge?
Much of the justification of aggregation is that it offers economies of
scale; anticipated is a reduction in transaction costs, implicitly those of
litigants. (Given that defendants, the judicial system, and the plain-
Bank & Trust Co., 38 F.3d 1429, 1441 (7th Cir. 1994) ("'[C]harges for in-house reproduc-
tion may not exceed the charges of an outside print shop."' (quoting Martin v. United
States, 931 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1991))); Spicer v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 844 F.
Supp. 1226, 1260 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (reducing photocopying charges from 25g to 10g per
page). See also Dillon, supra note 81, at 42 (reporting results of a survey of New York
firms' practices on charges assessed clients as costs).
88 See infra Part IILB.
89 A few judges are beginning to attend to the interrelationship of fees and costs and to
the possibility that lawyers may try to shift items that would reduce their own profits from
"fees" into separately reimbursable "costs." See, e.g., In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157
F.R.D. 467,470 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (requiring, in the context of appraising proposals to be-
come lead counsel in a securities class action, that bids include costs and fees and further
noting that "an attorney generally has no incentive to minimize litigation expenses unless
his fee award is inversely related to such expenses," and that "when an attorney treats a
resource devoted to litigation as a reimbursable expense, the attorney has a clear incentive
to substitute that research for those paid out of the attorney fee").
90 The Manual for Complex Litigation adverts to this possibility. Manual Third, supra
note 11, § 20.221 (urging judges not to appoint committees that may "substantially in-
crease[ ] costs" but providing little guidance on how to assess the tradeoffs); see also Alan
Abrahamson, Payments Raise Questions Over Lawyers' Fees, L.A. Times, Oct. 22,1995, at
B1, B3 (describing two firms involved on behalf of a specific plaintiff in a silicone breast
implant case, in which payments to the firms of $4. million in fees and costs exceeded an
individual's recovery, the lawyers' explanation was that the fees paid by the defendant
included payment for work done by those lawyers for other clients).
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tiffs each incur costs, the beneficiaries of a claimed reduction in trans-
action costs could be participants other than plaintiffs.) Other
commentary posits that aggregation affects outcomes; John Coffee ar-
gues that in certain contexts, aggregation will transfer money from
high-value claimants to low-value claimants-all paid from a common
pot.91 When such intra-plaintiff transfers occur, should that fact affect
charges made to plaintiffs for the costs of aggregation? Should claim-
ants who obtain large sums be taxed identically to those who receive
small amounts? What forms of subsidization are appropriate?
We do not purport here to answer these basic equity questions.
Rather, we want to make them, along with the fact of the diverse law-
yering roles and the many lawyers, central issues of discussion within
aggregation proposals. The problem posed (or opportunity offered)
by the existence of individual lawyering within the aggregate has to be
explored.
III
UNADDRESSED ISSUES: PAYING LAWYERS IN GENERAL
AND PAYING FOR INDIVIDUALIZED WORK
IN PARTICULAR
Why don't procedural rubrics for aggregation (specifically the
MDL statute and class action rule) directly address the differing roles
of lawyers or the ways in which they will be paid? How does that
absence illuminate current arrangements and the potential for
change? This Part considers the history of contemporary aggregate
forms, their justifications, and the development of legal doctrine on
fees.
A. Creating Aggregates Without Directly Addressing Lawyers'
Roles, Case Financing, and Fees
The absence of discussion of fees in the 1960s' provisions for ag-
gregation-MDL and class actions-makes some sense when the ori-
gins of these mechanisms (rather than their contemporary functions)
are considered. Take the MDL first. As Judith Resnik has explained,
in theory MDLs were designed "only" to consolidate already pending
lawsuits, filed by attorneys retained by individual clients, typically via
contingency-fee contracts. 92 Such consolidation was (again in theory)
"only" for pretrial processes. The MDL statute was billed as an effec-
tive mechanism for responding to what was on the judicial plate; its
91 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24, at 904-10; see also Hensler et
al., Asbestos in the Courts, supra note 8, at 96.
92 Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," supra note 2, at 33-35.
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purposes were managerial, to economize on resources and to coordi-
nate activities among identified participants. Formally, MDL
respected the individual character of the lawsuits that came within its
rubric. Each case remained technically separate, brought together to
share discovery or the like, then disaggregated for disposition. 93 With
that framing, the statute did not present an occasion upon which to
reconsider the fee arrangements among individual lawyers, individual
clients, and the lawyers for the group as a whole; from the litigation
context of the 1960s, it is not surprising that the judicial promoters of
the legislation did not foresee the scope of the role for today's lead
counsel in MDLs nor the potential of multidistrict litigation to affect
individual attorney-client relations.
In contrast, the class action rule (also drafted in the 1960s) might
have taken some attorney-fee issues into account, but only in the con-
text of a single set of lawyers for the class. The class mechanism was
designed to enable the bringing of claims not already filed. 4 Class
actions assumed the existence of claims (not yet "cases") in which
neither lawyer-client relationship nor lawsuit would exist, save by for-
mation of the class. 95 Class action framers-from Harry Kalven and
Maurice Rosenfield in the 1940s to Ben Kaplan and the Advisory
Committee in the 1960s-plainly understood that lawyers were central
to the procedure they crafted.96 Not only did Kalven and Rosenfield
93 Id.
94 See Memorandum from Benjamin Kaplan and Albert M. Sacks to Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules (Apr. 21, 1965), Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Commit-
tees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 1935-1988, microformed on CIS No. CI-7004-074
(Congressional Info. Serv.) [hereinafter CIS Judicial Conference Records]. Kaplan ad-
dressed a concern in the bar that a "flexible" category of class actions might force essen-
taily legislative actions on unwilling parties:
"the class may have a high degree of cohesion .... or the amounts at stake for
individuals may be so small that separate suits would be impracticable." It
seems to us that subdivision (b)(3) is responsive to current conditions in which
large numbers of persons may be similarly affected by alleged wrong-doing and
a class action rather than individual actions may be the only realistic method of
vindicating rights.
Id. No. CI-7005-011 (section EE-2 of memorandum) (citation omitted).
95 Recent research found that of 152 certified class actions reviewed, the "median level
of individual recoveries ranged from $315-$528 and the maximum awards ranged from
$1505 to $5331 per class member." Willging et al., Empirical Analysis of Rule 23, supra
note 2, at 84-85. What these data do not reveal is whether class certification was necessary
to facilitate meritorious claims; it is possible that the amount of individual recoveries re-
flects a mixture of high value and much weaker claims.
96 The 1960s Advisory Committee's records include occasional references to lawyers
and fees. See, e.g., Letter from David NV. Louisell to Ben Kaplan (Apr. 20, 1962), CIS
Judicial Conference Records, supra note 94, No. CI-6812-009, at -011 (asking whether the
Committee should consider "contingent fee arrangements by which apparently many if not
most plaintiffs' class suits are financed" as part of its work); Letter from Geoffrey C. Haz-
ard, Jr. to Ben Kaplan (Feb. 28, 1962), id. No. CI-6811-084, at No. CI-6812-001 ("Explicit
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consider the problems of "loyalty" of class action lawyers, they also
foresaw and accepted large fees as the incentives that would animate
lawyers' interest in private enforcement of the law.97
But the class action rule did not contemplate the contemporary
situation, in which layers of lawyers operate. Rather, the focus was on
a single lawyer for a large number of unrepresented claimants, not on
lawyer-client relations preexisting the aggregate. Indeed, one of the
reasons for excluding torts from class action status in the 1960s was
the view that the financial incentives of the contingent fee sufficiently
motivated the plaintiffs' tort bar to litigate such cases so that no addi-
tional mechanisms were needed to enhance access to courts in this
category of cases.98
While assumptions about the limits of rulemaking powers99 and
the desire to avoid unnecessary controversy explain the absence of
discussion of lawyers' roles and fees in the class action rule of the
1960s, the reluctance of contemporary rulemakers to focus on these
problems is more troubling. Aggregation itself is established; dozens
of examples of specific cases provide windows into its impact, and the
interaction among lawyer fees, the prospect of profits, and aggrega-
tion is now well marked.
Moreover, no longer does a strong dichotomy between MDL
consolidation and class action hold. Despite MDL's formal respect
for individual lawsuits and its provision for release of individual cases
for trial,100 MDL creates in practice a kind of de facto mandatory class
action, albeit for a limited purpose.' 0' During the pretrial process, liti-
recognition should be given to the problem of attorneys' fees. This is often the heart of the
matter.").
97 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 23, at 715-20; see id. at 717 ("It is thus seen that the
class suit is a vehicle for paying lawyers handsomely to be champions of semi-public
rights.").
98 Cf. Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 41, at 889-93 (arguing that, given de-
fense resources, individual contingent-fee lawyers were insufficient to ensure plaintiff ac-
cess). For a discussion of factors that animated the exclusion of tort litigation from the
class action rubric, see Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," supra note 2, at 15-16.
99 One doctrinal explanation for the lack of discussion is the view that under the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994), rulemaking on fees affects substantive rights be-
yond judicial rulemaking authority. Attorney fees have been interpreted in diversity litiga-
tion to be "substantive" under Erie v. Tompkins R.R. Co., 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and
governed by state law. See, e.g., Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Contemporary
Real Estate Assocs., 979 F.2d 329,331-32 (3d Cir. 1992); see also infra Part III.B.1 (discuss-
ing federal court powers in class actions over fees).
100 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994) (providing for remands of each action transferred at
or before "the conclusion of... pretrial proceedings").
101 For discussion of why MDLs were not accompanied by controversy similar to that
embroiling class actions, see Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," supra note 2, at 46-48
(analyzing how procedural innovations aimed at efficiency are perceived to be of less polit-
ical moment than those aspiring to enable access to courts).
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gants cannot "opt out" and proceed as solo actors. And during that
pretrial process, neither judges nor litigants permit hundreds of indi-
vidual lawyers to undertake repetitive discovery; instead they insist on
coordinated litigation. Under the MDL rubric, lawyers select or trial
judges appoint "lead counsel" and PSCs.102 As noted above, those
lawyers become lawyers for a group yet have an even less defined set
of ethical obligations than has the class action lawyer.10 3 And judges
award such lawyers fees that are taken from funds recovered in recog-
nition of the work on behalf of the whole.104 Because the MDL stat-
ute is now used as a model for proposals to enhance the powers of
aggregation, 05 lawyering and its costs within such "consolidated" ac-
tions should also be central issues. In short, whether reviewing MDLs
or class actions or some variations on these themes, policymakers
ought to consider the problems of IRPAs, PSCs, and the sets of indi-
viduals and clients that both represent.
One other piece of the history of the interaction between MDL
and class actions over these last decades needs to be sketched. The
convergence of MDL and class actions demonstrates how, over the
last twenty years, the distinctions among purposes for group litigation
(one predicated on expediting pending, individual cases and the other
aimed at enabling filing of new cases) have conflated. Efficiency has
come to include not only the termination of pending cases but also the
desire-at least, on the part of some-to "invite" future claims in the
hopes of resolving them all.'0 6 Class actions have also evolved beyond
102 See Manual Second, supra note 13, § 31.13 (describing court's power to appoint "at-
torneys to act as lead or liaison counsel"); see also Paul D. Rheingold, The Development of
Litigation Groups, 6 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 1, 4 (1982) (arguing that, unless court-appointed,
lawyers' committees lack power to make binding decisions).
103 See supra Part ILD.
104 See Rheingold, supra note 102, at 3-5 (describing lawyer-created networks and the
economic incentives to gain leadership in such groups); id. at 10-11 (explaining that fee
awards rely on either percentage of fund, lodestar, or "rate per case" methods). The
source of judicial authority in such cases is the equitable "common fund" or "common
benefit" doctrine. See discussion infra Part IILB.2.
105 See ALI Complex Litigation, supra note 16, at 21; Schwarzer et al., supra note 16, at
1532-33, also described in William W Schwarzer, State-Federal Judicial Relationships: A
Legislative Agenda in Proceedings of the Western Regional Conference on State-Federal
Judicial Relationships, 155 F.R.D. 233, 262-69 (1994).
106 Illustrative is the ALI's recent Complex Litigation Project. ALl Complex Litigation,
supra note 16. While the Project describes its proposal as a "consolidation" mechanism,
the ALI also proposed a means by which to seek out claims. Id. § 5.05, at 275-77 ("The
court may issue a notice of intervention and preclusion to individuals who are not yet
parties to a consolidated action but whose joinder is deemed an integral part of making a
comprehensive adjudication of a complex litigation."). With the power of consolidation
and the ability to invite intervention, all in the search for finality and binding, conclusive
results, the ALI project's consolidated actions look a lot like their cousins, class actions.
The reporter comment does note the "family similarity between class actions and consoli-
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the initial conception of them as enabling rights enforcement;10 7 a
good deal of today's interest stems from a vision of class actions as
efficient,108 particularly in arenas like mass torts. Some judges hope
that, while forming a class may enable filings not otherwise brought,
class actions also operate as a means of processing the high quantity of
claims that are expected to be brought individually. 10 9 On the other
hand, the potential that class action leverage improperly affects settle-
ment negotiations has also been the grounds for rejection of class
certifications.' 10
dated actions," distinguishing them by the fact that plaintiffs' lawyers create the scope of
class actions, whereas under the ALI version, the court would create the enlarged scope of
consolidated action. Id. § 5.05, at 287 n.11. Under the ALI's plan, a court could decide
that the pending cases do not capture all the relevant participants and request that individ-
uals or groups file new lawsuits--called in the ALI report "unasserted claims." Id. § 5.05,
at 275-77.
To distinguish itself from class actions in which preclusion is predicated on the ade-
quacy of representation, the ALI project would preclude nonparties from whom the court
has "invite[d]... participation" but who declined. Id. § 5.05, at 287 n.11.
107 A goal, some argue, that has been abandoned, at least in particular litigating con-
texts. See Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance
in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title
VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. Rev. 211, 257 (1992) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions have
"eliminated Rule 23 as an accessible vehicle for Title VII plaintiffs and detracted from the
policy of collective relief that impelled" the drafting of Rule 23).
108 See, e.g., the recent decision that a settlement of a state class action can have preclu-
sive effect by releasing claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, No. 94-1809, 1996 WL 79477, at *11 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1996).
109 Yeazell, Modem Class Action, supra note 22, at 46-58 (discussing that both features,
enabling and efficiency, historically have been part of the class purpose).
110 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). Other federal appellate courts have expressed hesitancy about dis-
trict court readiness to certify classes or approve settlements in class actions. See, e.g., In
re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1074 (6th Cir. 1996) (granting mandamus to va-
cate conditional class certification in a products liability case involving alleged injuries
from penile prostheses); see also In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 797-800 (3d Cir.) (disapproving the settlement of a con-
sumer class action and holding that the district courts may not vary the criteria of class
action certification depending upon whether the certification is accompanied by a pro-
posed settlement or not), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995); see also Edward H. Cooper,
Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 13 (1996) [hereinafter
Cooper, Rule 23] (describing interest in "substantial curtailment of class action practice"
on the one hand and in alterations on the other to "capture and perhaps improve [on] the
growing efforts to adapt the present rules to the needs of dispersed mass injuries").
While some federal judges are counseling hesitancy about class certifications, lawyers
report a blossoming of class action practice in state courts; without empirical research, it Is
difficult to assess claims either of retrenchment or expansion of class actions. Some defen-
dants appear to believe that they need to be aggressive in fending off class action filings.
See, e.g., Robyn Meredith, Chrysler Lawsuit Takes Aim at Class Actions, N.Y. Times, Mar.
27, 1996, at A14 (reporting Chrysler's filing against five attorneys for allegedly unethical
practices in class action litigation).
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The thirty years of experiences with MDLs and class actions pro-
vide additional context for the problems considered by this essay.
First, the appearance of many individual lawyers representing individ-
ual clients prompts interest in "efficient" management, which in turn
prompts selection of lead counsel-from the available pool of law-
yers-to focus on tasks directed by the court. The PSCs we described
above stem from the desire to simplify the structure and centralize
lawyering. What IRPAs, still obliged by contract to represent clients
in the litigation, do is perforce less visible to the court and/or defen-
dants' counsel, and what the lead lawyers do is similarly opaque to
individual clients.
Second, during the same decades in which aggregation has be-
come familiar to lawyers and judges by virtue of MDL and class ac-
tions, adjudication itself has been undergoing significant changes. The
orientation has shifted from a focus on regulatory rights-
pronouncement and individual litigants to an emphasis on dispute res-
olution, which has been facilitated by court adoption of settlement
conferences, court-annexed arbitration, and other modes of encourag-
ing consensual dispositions.'11 An interaction between aggregate
modes of dispute processing and an increasing emphasis on dispute
resolution affects the impetus behind collecting a large number of
claimants. The goal is not only to enable fair distd'ibution among com-
peting rights-seekers, but also to create a framework for what is
termed "global peace"-a resolution that promises to limit not only
defendants' exposure to future lawsuits but also the courts' exposure
to more litigants.112
Third, the commingling of purposes for group litigation-en-
abling and efficiency-is another factor creating a context in which
rule drafters attend little to individuals within the aggregate. While
sweeping heretofore "individual" cases into aggregates, preservation
of individuality is not a goal. The American Law Institute's Complex
Litigation proposal, the MDL statute, the use of bankruptcy, and the
class action rule support a general proposition of law, circa 1996, that
while (in the words of the ALI) individual control over litigation is
both relevant and "weighty,"' 1 3 particularly in the mass tort context,
individual interests are not "immutable."1
14
111 See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 10 Ohio St. J. on Disp. ResoL 211 (1995): Resnik, Whose Judgment?,
supra note 34.
112 Hensler, ADR in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, supra note 3, at 1613-18.
113 ALI Complex Litigation, supra note 16, § 3.01, at 46 (citing Roger Trangsrud, Join-
der Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L Rev. 779 (1985)).
114 Id.
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Fourth, despite a robust literature on the economic opportunities
that aggregation creates for "entrepreneurial lawyers," lawyers and
judges who formulate aggregation rules remain reluctant to take on
the issues of what roles to assign lawyers within the aggregate and
how much to pay in fees. While detailed provisions may not be appro-
priate for statutes and rules, 115 even the ALI's many-faceted Complex
Litigation Project addresses neither the fees nor the financing of the
large litigations it would create." 6
Contemporary suggestions about revision of the 1966 class action
rule also do not come to terms with the issues of diverse relationships,
depending on the kind of class action, among lawyers, litigants, and
fees. 117 A February 1995 draft of possible revisions to Rule 23 recog-
nized explicitly the role of lawyers and financing in group litigation,118
115 The recently revised Manual for Complex Litigation, Third elaborates on the exist-
ence of many lawyers within an aggregate but not the relations among them. See Manual
Third, supra note 11, § 20.221; see also supra note 13.
116 The ALI Project seems to anticipate that its complex litigation would be in the hands
of a lawyers' executive committee or management committee. ALl Complex Litigation,
supra note 16, § 3.01 cmt. c. A central set of counsel would play the primary role, with
individual attorneys playing minor roles. Id. § 3.01, at 51 nn.17-19 (discussing cooperation
and the problems of lawyers). As Judge Weinstein also notes, the ALI's ongoing work on a
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers also does not address these issues in any de-
tail. Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at 44; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Unfin-
ished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project Rests, 54 La. L. Rev. 977, 981 (1994)
(arguing that the ALI project failed to address many issues of relevance to the resolution
of mass torts).
Similarly, the proposed alteration of federal jurisdiction to relax diversity require-
ments for multiparty, multiclaim litigation does not address paying the lawyers for such
litigation. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Mul-
tiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 7 (1986); Thomas D. Rowe. Jr., Juris-
dictional and Transfer Proposals for Complex Litigation, 10 Rev. Litig. 325 (1991).
117 For discussion of the problems that rulemakers have in this area, see the thoughtful
overview provided by Professor Edward H. Cooper, who is the Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules. Cooper, Rule 23, supra note 110. What the shape of any actual
proposed revision of Rule 23 will be is not yet clear. As Professor Cooper details, three
drafts of a revised rule have been circulated in the past few years. Id. at 13-14 (describing
the preparation of a "comprehensive draft" by the Honorable Sam Pointer, when he
chaired the Advisory Committee, and then analyzing the 1995 proposal and appending two
drafts, circulated in 1995, when the Honorable Patrick Higginbotham chaired the Advisory
Committee). The Advisory Committee met in April 1996 to finalize proposals; it has, how-
ever, forwarded a copy of the November draft to the Standing Committee to appraise It of
the direction in which the Advisory Committee may be going. Id. at app. B at 68.
118 Case law under current Rule 23 has understood "adequacy" of representation to
depend on lawyers as well as on the named representatives. The February 1995 draft of
Rule 23(a)(4) would have moved lawyers into the text of the rule, to require consideration
of whether the "representative parties and their attorneys are willing and able to fairly and
adequately" protect interests of class members. Id. at app. A at 53 (Proposed Rule
23(a)(4), Feb. 1995 draft) (emphasis added). Revised Rule 23(c)(1)(A)(v) would have au-
thorized judges to condition a class on putative members "bearing a fair share of litigation
expenses incurred by the representative parties." This provision was explained as provld.
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and plainly anticipated that mass torts could come within class action
purview." 9 But the draft provided no details of the obligations of
judges to superintend the relationships that we have sketched among
the many lawyers involved in varying ways within a litigation.120 The
November 1995 draft, which could be understood as attempting to cir-
cumscribe class actions, 121 also provided little guidance about how
judges should work with the many lawyers and clients within mass tort
aggregates, or respond to the tensions now apparent. For example,
the proposal would require judges to make a preliminary appraisal of
the merits as a predicate to the certification of damage class actions. 122
But the proposal is silent on a critical aspect of any such hearing:
Which lawyers will represent which claimants or appear on behalf of
the proposed "class"? 123 How shall those lawyers be selected? And
paid? Further, by underscoring the distinctions among potential class
members, the proposal might make class certification more difficult in
mass torts;124 to that extent, the draft would thereby move some mass
torts out of Rule 23 and over to the MDL statute, in which issues of
individual and group lawyering would have to be faced.
Fifth, experience with aggregated litigation demonstrates that,
while the role of individuals within the aggregate varies, individualiza-
tion is not erased by the group form. In some instances, plaintiffs are
fairly described as "figureheads"'12 whose names provide a symbolic
ing compensation in defendant class actions. The assumption was that in plaintiff class
actions, the common fund doctrine would enable fee reallocation. Id. at app. A at 55 (Pro-
posed Rule 23(c)(1)(A)(v), Feb. 1995 draft). Proposed Rule 23(d)(1)(C)(iii) would have
offered judges the ability to provide class members with an opportunity to "signify whether
they consider the representative fair and adequate." Id. at app. A at 56-57 (Proposed Rule
23(d)(1)(C)(iii), Feb. 1995 draft).
119 Id. at app. A. at 53-54 (Proposed Rule 23(b), Feb. 1995 draft).
120 The proposed rule does discuss the possibility of disaggregation (andlor bifurcation
or trifurcation) for specific issues. Id. at app. A at 55-56 (Proposed Rule 23(c)(2), Feb.
1995 draft).
121 See, for example, the possibility of requiring a preliminary hearing on the "probable
success on the merits of the class claims, issues, or defenses" as a predicate to certification.
Id. at app. B. at 69 (Proposed Rule 23(b)(1)(3)(E), Nov. 1995 draft).
122 See id.
123 The proposal does provide that after a class has been certified, notice would include
information on how class members could bring "challenges to the class certification or
representation and for supervision of class representatives and class counsel by other class
members." See id. at app. B at 71 (Proposed Rule 23(c)(2)(A)(i), Nov. 1995 draft).
124 See, for example, the proposed language of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)(3), requiring that a
district court find that questions common to the certified class predominate over individual
questions and that the class is both a superior and "necessary" method for the disposition
of the matter. Id. at app. B. at 69 (Proposed Rule 23(b)(1)(B)(3), Nov. 1995 draft). On the
other hand, the proposal also plainly contemplates mass tort aggregate class certification
and further that classes can be certified on certain questions but not on others. See id. at
app. B. at 69-70 (Proposed Rule 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(4), Nov. 1995 draft).
125 Winter, supra note 42, at 947.
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function but whose specific injuries (and requisite "personal stake" in
the outcome 126) are indistinguishable from others within their co-
hort.127 Securities class actions have been the example often but not
exclusively given for this genre.128 But commercial litigation does not
avoid all individualized questions; as Nancy Morawetz has explained,
class members may not benefit equally nor attach the same value to
remedies. 129 Ibrning to injunctive actions, such as institutional reform
litigation, conflicts within groups of similarly situated litigants are oc-
casionally acknowledged. According to Deborah Rhode's "taxonomy
of conflicts" within the structural reform context, differing "constitu-
encies" within the collective may have varying appraisals of the status
quo and of various proposed changes. 130 But in both injunctive and
commercial class actions, judges and the public may be less aware of
intragroup disagreements, in part because of the absence of access to
legal services for individual members of or groups within the class. 131
Tort litigation is the genre in which individual variations within
the class are most readily perceived. It is not only its prior exemption
from aggregation that has marked its individual character; while lead/
class/group lawyers may perform an array of services, an array of spe-
cific tasks (some of which are fairly characterized as legal services to
individuals) is not encompassed in or addressed by those managing
and litigating the lawsuit as a whole. As detailed above, during the
pretrial phase, IRPAs may be involved in individualized discovery,
settlement negotiations, and then, if a trial occurs, in trying represen-
tative cases. In the distribution phase, claims facilities sometimes pro-
126 And hence, within the federal courts, having standing to litigate. See generally
Board of Sch. Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975), as modified by United States Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (requiring that a personal stake in the litigation
was needed at least at the time of filing, if not at certification, of a class).
127 A distinctive concern about the role of a named plaintiff is whether that individual
exerts any power or has any specific role to play in class suits. See Jean Wegman Bums,
Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in Class Actions, 42 Hastings
L.J. 165, 167-86 (1990) (arguing that the named class plaintiff has no legal authority and
serves no useful purpose).
128 See Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 93 (asserting
that in large-scale, small-claims shareholder derivative cases, "courts should forthrightly
acknowledge that the named plaintiff is a figurehead"). In the 1995 securities legislation,
Congress has responded by specifying a series of conditions that lead plaintiffs must fulfill,
including that the plaintiff did not purchase the security for the purpose of litigation and
must have "the largest financial interest in the relief sought" or otherwise demonstrate
adequacy to represent other plaintiffs' interests. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(1)(bb)
(West Supp. 1996).
129 For example, consumers may value in-kind relief (coupons for airplane trips or prod-
ucts at discounted prices) differently. Morawetz, Bargaining, supra note 26, at 13-16 (dis-
cussing Cuisinart antitrust litigation).
130 Rhode, Class Conflicts, supra note 26, at 1186.
131 Id. at 1200.
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vide individualized methods to determine distributions of funds; even
when grids are used, questions arise about where individuals fit on a
grid. 32 Some form of personalized guidance-delivered by lawyers or
others-may be needed to enable individual recoveries.1 33 In short,
disaggregation occurs both before and after resolution, as individual
plaintiffs make distinctive claims on the services of someone-law-
yers, courts, or administrators.134
But a client-oriented set of tasks is not the only basis for individu-
alization; the impulse toward individualism comes also from IRPAs'
economic interests and power, or what Stephen Yeazell has termed
"economic individualism. ' 135 Lawyers whose incomes derive from
contingency-fee contracts have economic incentives to argue for and
preserve some forms of individual client representation. Lawyers who
represent classes in turn depend on IRPAs to persuade their clients
not to opt out of mass settlements and thereby undermine global
deals.
The description of lawyering within tort aggregates and the recent
history of aggregation thus provide a series of "givens" of the contem-
porary debate about large-scale litigation and for this essay. First, ag-
gregation will exist (in some form). While enthusiasm may wax and
wane, judges and lawyers have too strong an investment to pull back
substantially. Second, at least for some time to come, litigants' claims
of rights to individualized representation, and lawyers' interests in
that treatment, will require court attention and response. Reforms to
ban individual representation are unlikely in light of lawyers' eco-
nomic interests and their potential political clout, as well as in light of
more widely shared commitments to individualism, to freedom of con-
132 While Georgene Vairo, Chairperson of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, has ar-
gued that the Trust's design was aimed to reduce the role of lawyers and is critical of some
of the lawyers who appear before the Trust, the Trust has not eliminated all roles for advo-
cates. See Vairo, supra note 48, at 652; see also discussion of the claims liquidation process
in In re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation, 120 B.R. 648, 677 (Bankr.
E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) (app. C).
133 Here we disagree with Mullenix that this mass tort aggregation is the same as any
other "representative" action. Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Par-
adigm Misplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579,586-87 (1994) [hereinafter Mullenix, Mass Tort as
Public Law Litigation].
134 Cf. id. (arguing that "the quintessential feature of mass tort litigation is that it is by
definition aggregate litigation and, therefore, by its nature representational litigation").
Her assumption minimizes attention to the role of individualization within the aggregate.
Mullenix also criticized Judge Weinstein for his description of mass torts as public law
cases. Id. at 580-82. See Jack Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 469, 543 (1994) [hereinafter Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas].
135 Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. I. L Rev. 43,
59 [hereinafter Yeazell, Collective Action].
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tract, and to a constitutional structure of liberal individualism.136
Third, judges are and will continue to be involved in distributing fees
among sets of lawyers, and it is to the current state of fee law that we
now turn.
B. Formulating Fee Payment Rules
Paralleling the development and expansion of techniques to ag-
gregate cases was, of course, the creation of rules for payment of fees
to the lawyers who represented groups. The law of fees is of particu-
lar relevance here because fees are assumed to be the primary consid-
eration of lawyers when deciding to file lawsuits?137 Thus fee rules are
a critical tool by which policymakers could structure relationships and
representation within aggregates. Moreover, the work for which law-
yers are paid reflects and engenders value; judicial discussions of at-
torneys' fees are thus a source of information about what such values
are. Below we provide a brief overview of contemporary doctrine.
Intersecting in the case law are four factors: the source of courts'
power to award fees, the method by which fees are calculated, the
work that is compensable, and the kinds of cases in which fees are
awarded. As the discussion below develops, missing from sustained
consideration are IRPAs, the provision of services to individuals
within an aggregate, and recognition of aggregation's potential to in-
crease costs charged to litigants.
1. Courts' Power over Fees
Courts have power over fees either because Congress has said so
(in the context of requiring defendants to pay attorneys' fees of pre-
136 The Manhattan Institute proposal on contingent fees, mindful of such interests, ar-
gued for government regulation-not abolition-of contingency fees. See infra notes 205-
07 and accompanying text. Its implicit rejection in the winter of 1994 by the American Bar
Association demonstrates our point about the practical limits of reform aspirations. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389 (1994); see also ALl
Draft Law Governing Lawyers, supra note 16, § 46 cmt. b (discussing "the American free
market for legal services").
137 A few commentators describe other aspirations. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 56, at
22-39 (discussing Ed Sparer's conception of lawyering); Gerald P. L6pez, Rebellious Law-
yering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive Law Practice (1992) [hereinafter L6pez, Re-
bellious Lawyering]; Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal
Profession 295-96 (1993) (both L6pez and Kronman call for lawyers to have aspirations
other than private remuneration); see also infra Part IV.C.
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vailing plaintiffs,13 in the bankruptcy arena,139 and in other statutory
litigation schemes) or because courts have found their own authority.
If fee payments are part of a proposed class action settlement, then
Rule 23's requirement that class actions be neither "dismissed" nor
"compromised" without court approval has licensed judicial inquiry
into and authority over fees.140
When judges want to award fees in class actions that do not in-
volve statutory fee shifts or in MDLs that involve neither class actions
nor statutory fee shifts, judges turn to the equitable doctrine of the
"common fund" or "common benefit." Dating from the nineteenth
century, this doctrine provides that when a plaintiff confers a benefit
on others or creates a common fund in which others share, those ben-
eficiaries have an obligation to reimburse the plaintiff for the costs
(including lawyers' fees) of achieving the victory.141 Under this equi-
table doctrine, courts award compensation from a group of plaintiffs
to a lawyer whom they have not retained but who succeeds in estab-
138 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) (civil rights). This fee-shifting provision functions
in some ways as does the class action-to enable private enforcement of the law. Accord-
ing to the legislative history, Congress worried about the supply of lawyers and hoped, by
fee-shifting, to attract lawyers to an area. See S. Rep. No. 1101, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910-13 (discussing what became 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984) (finding the lodestar to be the
appropriate basis for calculation of a "reasonable fee," including fees for legal services
provided by nonprofit law offices that do not charge clients).
As of 1987, of some 200 federal fee-shifting statutes, most were one-way fee shifts in
which attorneys for prevailing plaintiffs received fees from losing defendants. Prevailing
defendants, in contrast, only received fees upon a court finding special justification, such as
bad faith or frivolous litigation. See Richard Larson, The Origins and History of Attor-
neys' Fees Law, in Court Awards of Attorneys' Fees: Litigating Antitrust, Civil Rights,
Public Interest, and Securities Cases 9, 30 (Guy T. Saperstein & Melvyn I. Weiss eds.,
1987). Justice Brennan provided a list of federal fee-shifting statutes in Marek v. Chesny,
473 U.S. 1 app. at 43-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1994).
140 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Judges have also relied occasionally upon Rule 23(a)(4), which
requires judicial superintendence of the adequacy of representation.
141 Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). In that case, a bondholder in the Flor-
ida Railroad Company sued the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of Florida, a
land fund pledged as security for the bonds, for alleged fraudulent conveyance of lands and
failure to meet obligations. The bondholder preserved the asset (land) that was sold for
the benefit of himself and other bondholders, and then sought compensation for the ex-
penses out of the proceeds of the sale. The Supreme Court agreed that the other bond-
holders should "contribute their due proportion of the expenses which he has fairly
incurred." Id. at 532; see also Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1939)
(relying on the equitable powers of courts to provide successful litigants with counsel fees
and litigation expenses).
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lishing either a fund 142 or conferring a benefit on that group's
members. 1
43
A related but distinct issue is whether and when courts have
power to change a fee contract agreed to by an individual lawyer and
a client. In general, courts have deferred to contractual rights, typi-
cally brought to judges' attention by a lawyer seeking to compel pay-
ment by a client. For example, a court-calculated fee award (owed by
defendant by statute to a prevailing plaintiff) does not insulate a client
from having to pay a lawyer the agreed upon one-third of a recovery,
even when that one third exceeds the "reasonable" fee as determined
by a judge.144 However, on some occasions, courts have exercised
their "inherent" or other powers 145 or enforced statutory and ethical
rules to limit fee payments in specific kinds of cases.1 46 Moreover,
142 In Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), the Supreme
Court concluded that, under the Greenough premise, lawyers had an independent claim for
compensation from a fund. Id. at 124-25.
143 See, e.g., Sprague, 307 U.S. at 162, 167 (conferring the benefit of the creation of liens
on the proceeds of bonds rather than the creation of a fund per se); Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970) (concluding that the benefit of uncovering misleading
proxy statement provided a basis for fee reallocation).
144 Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87 (1990). The defendant's payment is a setoff; the
lawyer cannot collect two fees. The existence of a contingency-fee contract that requires a
payment of far less than what a court finds a "reasonable fee" also does not insulate a
defendant from having to pay more to that plaintiff's attorney under a statutory fee shift.
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93-95 (1989).
145 See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 119-21 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (charging co-plaintiffs for costs of
common benefit lawyers and concluding that rather than consider or alter independently
agreed-to contingent-fee contracts, the court should allocate, pro rata, the costs of common
benefit lawyers to the class); Dunn v. H.K. Porter, Co., 602 F.2d 1105. 1109-10 (3d Cir.
1979) (finding that, while some class members had entered into contingent-fee agreement
with class counsel, Rule 23 authorized court inquiry into the reasonableness of the fees);
see also Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law,
1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269, 326 (arguing that aggregate measures enable court protection of
the "financial interests of plaintiffs when they diverge from the interests of their attorneys
by controlling transaction costs and by reviewing settlements and attorneys' fees"); Vairo,
supra note 48, at 620 (asking whether courts should control contingent fees); id. at 654
n.135 (questioning fees paid to contingency-fee lawyers based on the claim that unrepre-
sented claimants in the claims facility netted amounts equivalent to those of claimants who
had paid lawyers' fees).
146 For example, ethical codes forbid contingent fees in criminal cases and substantially
restrict contingency fees in family law cases. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.5(d) (1995); Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106(c) (1980); Stephen
Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 54-59 (1996)
(outlining selected state variations of these rules). In addition, some states have limited
contingency fees in medical malpractice claims. E.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146 (West
1990) (limiting fees to 40% of the first $50,000 in recovery, to 33% of the next $50,000, to
25% of the next $500,000 and to 15% of any amount exceeding $600,000); see also ALl
Draft Law Governing Lawyers, supra note 16, § 47; In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel
Fire Litig., 768 F. Supp. 912, 922 (D.P.R. 1991) (limiting contingent fees when plaintiffs are
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judicial assertion of authority over individual contingent agreements
in contemporary mass torts constitutes a trend toward increased court
involvement in fees paid in these kinds of cases.147
2. The Methods by Which Fees Are Awarded
Whether prompted by congressional mandate or interpretation of
their own powers, judges have articulated methods of fee payment,
focused either on the time expended by the attorney, the hourly rate
that such a lawyer could recoup in the marketplace, the attendant risk
of the litigation and its complexity, or on the amount of money ob-
tained by virtue of the lawyer's efforts. Over the past twenty-five
minors), order vacated on other grounds sub noam. Nineteen Appeals. 982 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.
1992).
Courts have been reluctant to intervene in fee contracts between knowledgeable cli-
ents and their attorneys. See, e.g., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d
866, 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979). Courts have sometimes intervened
when a client is lacking information and a fee is excessive in light of the time spent by the
lawyer. See, e.g., Bushman v. State Bar, 522 P.2d 312 (Cal. 1974). See generally Stephen
Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics 129-38 (1995).
147 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., No. 85-01307-R, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1,1995)
(Order Disallowing Unreasonable Attorneys Fees on Pro Rata Distribution) (on file with
authors) (relying on the court's power "to supervise members of the bar, its inherent pow-
ers to regulate attorney-client relations and compliance with ethical standards by attor-
neys" as well as equitable powers in bankruptcy and in general, and disallowing, subject to
motions by attorneys for reinstatement, full payment of the contractual contingent fees on
the pro rata distributions to Dalkon Fund claimants); In re A.H. Robins Co., No. 85-01307-
R, slip op. at 20, 16-20 (E.D. Va. May 2, 1995) (Order & Mem.) (on file with authors)
(characterizing the payments as "bonuses" to the claimants, characterizing the attorneys'
work as ministerial, asserting that a "relatively small number of lawyers" have been "paid
handsomely" and reiterating the disallowance of full payments of contingency fees) (ap-
peal pending, in which one issue is the jurisdiction and power of a bankruptcy court to
control such fees); In re A.H. Robins Co., No. 85-01307-R, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 20,
1995) (Order Regarding Payment of Pro Rata Distribution Funds) (on file with authors)
(ordering that "each claimant shall receive ninety percent of the gross amount of the in-
stallment payment without regard to any additional claim from counsel for costs or any
other claim"), appeal pending sub nom. In re A.H. Robins, Co., Bergstrom v. Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust, No. 95-2239-L (4th Cir. argued Mar. 5,1996, before Judges Russell,
Chapman, and 'Widener of the Fourth Circuit), (discussed supra note 67); Thirteen Appeals,
56 F.3d 295 (1st Cir. 1995) (ordering 50-50 split between IRPAs and PSC members); In re
Joint Eastern & Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648 app. C at 677 (Bankr. E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (limiting attorneys' fees for "claims liquidation" to the "lower of the fee
provided in the contract between claimant and counsel or 25%").
The now defunct proposed settlement in the breast implant case also addressed fees.
See Breast Implant Litigation Settlement Notice I 24(b)(3)(4), In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Litig., MDL 926 (N.D. Ala. revised Sept. 16, 1994) (asserting authority over all
attorney-fee payments of plaintiff class; not permitting enforcement of contingency-fee
contracts entered into after March 1, 1994, when the existence of a proposed settlement
was generally known; and reserving the right to "set maximum limits on the contingency
percentages that may be recognized" on those contracts allowed, to "afford equity among
counsel" and to pay the services of "common benefit" counsel).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 339 1996
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
years, the case law and commentary have come to rest on two ap-
proaches, the "lodestar" and the "percentage of the fund" (POF). 148
The application of these methods varies somewhat depending on
the source of judicial authority to award fees.149 In nonstatutory
cases, either a percentage of the fund or the lodestar method may be
used; many courts have expressed a preference for the POF test, 150
while a few have opted for the lodestar,' 5' and some circuits let the
district courts choose.152 When the lodestar calculation is used, it is
based on a variety of formulations, such as a multifactor analysis
148 See generally Manual Third, supra note 11, § 24.11-.13; Mary Frances Derfner &
Arthur D. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees ch. 15 (1994); Arthur R. Miller, Attorneys'
Fees in Class Actions (1980). For discussion of a mixture of the two (the "hybrid
method"), see infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. A variant of the percentage
method, by which a judge sets an attorney fee for lead counsel early in a litigation (Instead
of at its conclusion) by selecting lead counsel based on choosing among competitive bid-
ders, is discussed infra notes 380-85 and accompanying text.
Many statutes require the award of a "reasonable fee," and only a few specify factors
to be taken into account when courts make such awards. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)
(1994), discussed supra note 18; 15 U.S.C. § 2060(f) (1994) (consumer product safety) (A
"reasonable attorney's fee is a fee.., based upon.., actual time expended by an attorney
in providing advice and legal services in connection with representing a person [and] such
reasonable expenses... incurred.... computed at the rate prevailing for the provision of
similar services with respect to actions brought in the court which is awarding the fee.").
Despite congressional specificity in bankruptcy, courts have relied on a variety of formulas
to award fees; methods of calculating fees are discussed in Ralph C. McCullough, II, Attor-
neys' Fees in Bankruptcy: Toward Further Reform, 95 Com. L.J. 133 (1990). Some courts
use the "Johnson factors," others the "Lindy" approach, others a "straight" lodestar, and
yet others a "percentage of the recovery." See discussion infra notes 149-78 and accompa-
nying text; see also Symposium, Paying the Piper: Rethinking Professional Compensation
in Bankruptcy, 1 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 231 (1993). For the argument that bankruptcy
fee awards should follow class action methodology because of the functional resemblance
between the two procedures and that both should use the percentage of the fund recovery,
see Christine Jagde & Mamie Stathatos, Professional Fees in Bankruptcy: Percentage-of-
the-Recovery Method-A "Solvent" Response for Bankruptcy Proceedings?, I Am.
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 471 (1993).
149 See generally Hirsch & Sheehey, supra note 83.
150 See, e.g., Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (apply-
ing a percentage method); Camden I Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768,
774 (11th Cir. 1991) (requiring a percentage method in common fund cases).
151 See, e.g., In re Boesky Sec. Litig., 888 F. Supp. 551, 560-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (reiterat-
ing that equitable fund fee awards must be calculated using the lodestar method as held in
City of Detroit v. Grinell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974)); see also McLendon v. Conti-
nental Group, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 142, 163-64 (D.N.J. 1994) (relying on a lodestar in part
because of the difficulties of setting a percentage after settlement).
152 See Thirteen Appeals, 56 F.3d 295, 306-08 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that district courts
have discretion to choose); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d
1291, 1296, 1299-1301 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding district court's choice); Rawlings v.
Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that district
courts have discretion on methodology as long as the award is "reasonable under the cir-
cumstances"); In re Continental Iil. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1992) (leaving
method of calculation to the choice of the district court but suggesting a preference for
percentage method); Brown v. Phillips Petroleum, 838 F.2d 451, 456 (10th Cir.) (holding
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(called "Johnson factors"'53) or a somewhat pared-down, overlapping
list (the "Lindy factors"lM). In statutory fee-shifting cases, the
Supreme Court has instructed that fee calculations must be done by
the lodestar method 55 and that no "enhancements" or "multipliers"
can be awarded for the risk of nonpayment.1 6
The common fund/common benefit fee calculation might also
have been tied to the same lodestar analysis. This equitable doctrine
could be understood as correcting a free-rider problem by equalizing
expenses among those plaintiffs who hired a lawyer and those who did
not but had benefitted (either in monetary or other form) from the
lawyer's work. Professor John Dawson and Samuel Berger argued
that a district court's award, based on a percentage of fund, was not abuse of discretion),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988).
153 The name comes from a Fifth Circuit opinion, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), which involved a statutory fee shift in a itfle VII class
action. Its factors are: 1) time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved; 3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly;, 4) the pre-
clusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) the custom-
ary fee; 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) time limitations imposed by the client
or the circumstances; 8) the amount involved and the results obtained; 9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; 10) the "undesirability" of the case; 11) the nature
and the length of the professional relationship with the client; and 12) awards in similar
cases. Id. at 717-19.
154 This test is named after the Third Circuit case of Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). on remand, 383 F.
Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
Lindy involved the settlement of an antitrust class action involving plumbing fixtures.
Having determined that statutory fee shifting in antitrust cases was not available when
cases were settled rather than tried, id. at 164-65, the court relied on equitable powers to
order that fees be reallocated among successful plaintiff members of the settlement class,
id. at 122. Lindy fee calculations oblige a judge to consider hours spent, the rate, the
"'contingent nature of success,"' and the "'extent, if any to which the quality of an attor-
ney's work mandates either increasing or decreasing the amount.'" Id. at 108 (quoting the
district court). Lindy also required that, "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, the unrep-
resented claimants should pay for the attorneys' services in proportion to their benefit
from them-measured by the percentage of the class' recovery" they received. Id.
For discussion of the overlap between the Johnson and Lindy approaches, see Court
Awarded Attorney Fees: Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 24445
(1985) [hereinafter Third Circuit Report] (concluding that the most important factors
under either approach are the time spent, the rates, and the work done).
155 See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557,562 (1992) (describing the lodestar as
the "guiding light of our fee shifting jurisprudence").
156 Id. at 561-67. For discussion of whether the nonenhancement for risk principle
should apply in common fund cases, see the concurring opinion in Nineteen AppeaLs, 982
F.2d 603, 619-20 (1st Cir. 1992) (Lay, J., concurring) (arguing for Dague's application);
Florin v. Nationsbank of Ga., N.A., 34 F.3d 560, 564-65 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that
"fhe holding in Dague should not extend to this case," and that "Dague, by its terms,
applies only to statutory fee-shifting cases"). For consideration of enhancements for other
than risk, see, e.g., Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69,75-76,79 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (providing a
1.75 multiplier for "undesirability" because the plaintiffs were engaged in a robbery when
the defendants, police officers, allegedly used unlawful force).
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that the equitable principles on which this approach is predicated-
restitution and avoidance of unjust enrichment-required only that
work performed or costs incurred by the person who conferred the
benefit should be compensated. 157 As Dawson pointed out, common
benefit lawyers could be "fully compensated" by the individual client
obliged to pay a fee.158 Further, to the extent that the existence of
beneficiaries other than the actual client caused the lawyer to incur
additional costs or expend extra efforts, courts might have ordered co-
plaintiffs to pay for such expenses or work. Instead, a good many
courts calculate fee awards by awarding a percentage of the total fund
recouped to the common benefit lawyer-a payment that Dawson
called an "extra fee."'159
Payment of that premium enables the common fund fee doctrine
to perform a function similar to the class action rule as well as to share
features of one-way fee-shifting statutes and contingency fees. When
the amount paid to the lawyer exceeds the amount that the hiring
plaintiff was obliged to pay, then the common benefit fee award cre-
ates an incentive for lawyers to file and win such cases. These bonuses
also provide inducements to consolidate. If judges pay lawyers such
bonuses (either by using the percentage method or enhancing the
lodestar amount), they both endorse the concept of a "bounty-
hunting" lawyer as doing something socially useful and turn those law-
yers into what Dawson and Berger termed "profit sharers.
'160
Over the past decade, the debate about the relative efficiencies of
the two dominant modes of payment has intensified, as has criticism
of the private market contingency-fee arrangement. Commentators
complain that the entire enterprise-fee awards-is burdensome to
judges and wasteful of their scarce time.' 61 Each method of fee calcu-
157 See Dawson, Attorney Fees from Funds, supra note 23, at 1601-02; Samuel R.
Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 281,
299 (1977). Professor Dawson also argued that whatever fee arrangement existed between
the individual client and the attorney who conferred a common benefit should not be "con-
trolling: the fee... agreed on ... may be unreasonably high or abnormally low.., ." The
test should be the "reasonable value of the legal services rendered." John P. Dawson,
Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 853-54
(1975) [hereinafter Dawson, Public Interest Litigation].
158 See Dawson, Attorney Fees from Funds, supra note 23, at 1604-07.
159 Id. at 1605.
160 Id. at 1609.
161 E.g., Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. 237, 254-64 (1985) (making many recommen-
dations framed to conserve court time devoted to fees); Alexander, supra note 24, at 578
(arguing that judicial consideration of fee records is a "positively breathtaking waste of an
Article III judge's time"); Cooper, Rule 23, supra note 110, at app. A. at 57 (Proposed
Rule 23(e), Feb. 1995 draft) (providing for referral to special master for evaluation of pro.
posed settlements, including, presumably consideration of fee agreements made therein).
In 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to authorize the use of special
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lation also has its own critics. Reliance on the lodestar, with its hourly
rates, may create incentives to "pad" hours, waste time, or prolong the
litigation.162 Given high "agency" and other costs, small-claims plain-
tiffs have little possibility of monitoring their class action attorney,
163
so that supervision of hours and expenses falls to the courts and, if
done carefully, is time-consuming.164 Further, if judges are permitted
to "enhance" the hourly rate by multiplying it by some amount (e.g.,
1.5 or 2.5), they gain wide-ranging discretion, potentially exercised in
an arbitrary fashion.165
Percentage of the fund recovery, while simpler to administer,166
rests entirely on judicial discretion.167 Judges select a figure whose
arbitrariness is cushioned only by reference to other similarly arbi-
masters outside the parameters of Rule 23 to work on fee calculations and thereby to
reduce the time investment of judges. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(D) (permitting issues of
valuation to be referred to a special master who would not otherwise meet the criteria of
Rule 53 for such appointment and the fee decision itself to be referred to a magistrate
judge "as if it were a dispositive pretrial matter"). See Notice Concerning Amendments to
Federal Rules, 151 F.R.D. 145 (1993) (explaining that, given the absence of congressional
action, the amendments to the federal rules became effective December 1, 1993).
To minimize the time spent, some courts have employed sampling techniques,
whereby a subset of time sheets are reviewed. See, e.g., Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 945
F.2d 969, 975 (7th Cir. 1991) (approving district court's use of this procedure to estimate
the number of hours to be compensated); Evans v. City of Evanston. 941 F.2d 473,477 (7th
Cir. 1991) (finding that a sampling technique applied by a district court was not arbitrary).
162 Coffee, The Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 71, at 681. Coffee also describes possible
"structural collusion" in a lodestar formulation-that plaintiffs' attorneys have an incentive
to build up hours, which also helps defendants, interested in delay. Id. at 718; see also
Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 4 (arguing about im-
proper incentives as well as problematic estimates of the amount of time worked). In an
earlier essay, Coffee also argued that mechanistic application of the lodestar formula cre-
ated incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to agree to nonpecuniary settlements that did not
constrain misbehaving defendant corporations. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Pri-
vate Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not working,
42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 24647 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney
General].
163 See Coffee, The Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 71, at 724.
164 Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. 237, 246 (1985).
165 See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992) (commenting that risk
enhancement makes "the setting of fees more complex and arbitrary"); see also Berger,
supra note 157, at 310 (describing a survey of 140 fee district court awards, in which the
mean hourly rate for antitrust lawyers was $181 and for Title VII employment discrimina-
tion lawyers was $40).
166 Illustrative of the difficulties of careful fee supervision under the lodestar approach is
Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 801 F. Supp. 804, 811-29 (D. Me. 1992)
(while disallowing fees in total, specifically reviewing a myriad of charges and awarding
specific amounts of compensation for each category of item claimed), aff'd sub nom. BTZ,
Inc. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 47 F.3d 463 (1st Cir. 1995). For discussion of the adminis-
trative utility of the percentage of the fund method, see Swedish Hospital Corp. v. Shalala,
1 F.3d 1261, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
167 Dawson called the percentage a "court-directed game of roulette." Dawson, Public
Interest Litigation, supra note 157, at 929.
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trary decisions. A few so-called "benchmarks" exist. One lawyer-
commentator argued some years ago that five to seven percent of the
fund was a commonplace fee award to lead lawyers in mass torts. 168
Others invoke the twenty-five to thirty percent figure, 169 which has
some rough parallel to the one-third contingency fee.170 When the
amount of the fund is very large, courts have balked at the one-third
percentage and used a smaller amount.17'
The percentage method may also create undesirable incentives,
such as prompting lawyers to settle too soon to "cash out." In re-
sponse, modifications have been proposed, such as percentages fixed
at the outset and the use of sliding scales, 172 or of a "hybrid" method
under which trial judges evaluate the number of hours actually spent,
make a lodestar calculation, and then compare that figure with the
percentage that seems reasonable given previous awards in similar
cases. 173 As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not chosen in com-
168 See, e.g., Rheingold, supra note 102, at 10 (reporting five-percent figure but also
"precedent for 7-10%" for common benefit lawyers, who presumably were also paid addi-
tional sums by virtue of contingency fees from individual clients with whom they had con-
tracts for representation). But see In re Shell Oil Refinery, 155 F.R.D. 552, 573, 569 n.49
(E.D. La. 1993) (awarding in a settlement of an oil refinery explosion nearly 18%-almost
$32 million-in fees to a Plaintiffs' Legal Committee consisting of 11 lawyers).
169 See, e.g., 3 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg On Class Actions § 14.03,
at 14-13 to 14-14 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Newberg on Class Actions] (discussing attor-
neys' fees in securities and antitrust suits as ranging from 20-30%, and 50% as the upper
limit on fee awards for common funds; if multiple firms are involved, the court may allo-
cate among lawyers if they do not do so, and not discussing the issue of whether such a
percentage should be applied when both PSC and IRPAs were involved); Manual Third,
supra note 11, § 24.121 (also making no distinctions among kinds of cases); see also Six
Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301,1311 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming
a 25% award and noting that amount was a "benchmark" for awards to class counsel).
170 According to Willging et al., Empirical Analysis of Rule 23, supra note 2, at 135, of
the class actions in which moneys were distributed, rarely did fees exceed one-third.
171 See, e.g., In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefits ERISA Litig., 886 F. Supp.
445,462 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("Awarding 20 to 45 percent of the $111 million fund ... would be
manifestly unjust."); 3 Newberg On Class Actions, supra note 169, § 14.03, at 14-14 (re-
porting that fee percentages became "significantly more modest" as recoveries approached
or exceeded $100 million).
172 For example, the Third Circuit's Task Force recommended that fee percentages for
common benefit funds be negotiated in advance between bench and bar; no mechanism for
litigant involvement was provided. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. 237,255 (1985). The
report proposed that such negotiation be an "arm's length" discussion, modeled after the
contingency-fee agreements that detail the work to be expected, the kinds of risks reason-
ably anticipated, and the like, and that once agreed upon, "renegotiation should not be
permitted." Id. at 256-58. The report added the caveat that, if matters "not within the
reasonable contemplation of the parties" at the time of negotiation emerge, modification
would be possible. Id. at 258. The Task Force also suggested that the percentage decrease
as the amount of the fund increased. Id. at 256.
173 See Hirsch & Sheehey, supra note 83, at 66-67; Strang v. JHM Mortgage Sec. Ltd.
Partnership, 890 F. Supp. 499, 502-03 (E.D. Va. 1995) (cross-checking a lodestar and POF
calculation to determine that 25% instead of 30% of the fund sufficed). One empirical
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mon benefit cases the method by which fees should be paid, and attor-
ney-fee litigation consumes substantial resources.
Further, while Congress addressed attorneys' fees in its 1995 se-
curities legislation, it too has not promoted a single methodology by
which courts calculate attorney-fee awards. Congress required that
the fees and expenses paid to plaintiffs' lawyers in securities class ac-
tions "shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any
damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class."174 The
term "reasonable percentage" is defined only in terms of reference to
monies actually received by plaintiffs; the legislative history explains
that the "reasonable percentage" provides courts with flexibility to de-
termine fees on a case-by-case basis, and further, that Congress has
neither stipulated the method by which to calculate fees nor prohib-
ited using the lodestar method for such calculations. 175 Using the
damages actually paid as the baseline against which to check reasona-
bleness (as contrasted with the amount in a settlement fund, not all of
which may in fact be dispensed to the class) is an innovation; to date,
fee calculations are often made before distributions to claimants are
completed. Fee calculation focusing upon damages actually paid in-
creases attorneys' incentives to craft mechanisms by which funds are
distributed expeditiously and fully.176 The 1995 securities legislation
thus recognizes that the attorney-fee awards can be used to try to alter
behavior of lawyers; that act defines the value of work as the sums
actually received by class members. Below, we explore both what the
case law has considered when authorizing payment to lawyers1 "7 and
other possible metrics of "value."
178
3. The Types of Work Compensated
What is the work for which fees are paid? The discussion of what
"counts" for compensation under the lodestar method, while familiar,
bears repetition with the mass tort, IRPA, PSC, and individual client
configurations in mind. Whether under statutory fee-shifts or by way
of equitable doctrine, and whether the lodestar is calculated by
study suggests that in practice, the two methods produce very similar results. See William
J. Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiffs' Bar Awarding the Attorney's Fee in Class-Action
Litigation, 23 J. Legal Stud. 185,195-209 (1994) (reviewing fee awards in class action secur-
ities litigation and arguing that the data support the view that courts award fees for a
mixture of lawyer effort and results achieved).
174 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(a)(6) (West Supp. 1996).
175 HLR. Rep. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1995).
176 Compare studies of less than complete distributions of consumer class action funds.
See supra note 70.
177 See infra Part IIL.B.3.
178 See infra Part IV.A-B.
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twelve,179 four,'8 0 or two factors, the focus is on the monetary or other
legal result, not on the individual litigants' experiences with either
courts or their lawyers or on the diverse roles played by different
lawyers.
Of all the various formulations, only the Johnson test includes as
a factor the "nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client.'' 1 However, the client's perspective on that relationship is
not the basis of inquiry. 18 Courts have defined the relevance of a
professional relationship not in interpersonal but in economic terms-
that expectations of future business could provide a basis for discount-
ing current services. Fee opinions do not discuss other measures of
relationship, such as client satisfaction or understanding; they also ig-
nore forms of participatory lawyering that critical scholars advo-
cate. 8 3 Moreover, under federal statutory fee-shifting doctrine, only
179 See the Johnson factors, supra note 153.
180 See the Lindy factors, supra note 154.
181 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1974) (ox-
plaining that a "lawyer in private practice may vary his fee for similar work in the light of
the professional relationship of the client with his office"). Of the hundreds of cases citing
Johnson, few elaborate this factor's meaning. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 553 F. Supp. 567,
594 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("The meaning of this criterion and its effect on the calculation of a
'reasonable' fee has always been unclear."). In Ruiz, Judge Justice suggests that this factor
could refer to the possibility of future employment by the client of a lawyer and therefore
permit a fee reduction in light of the prospect of a future stream of income. Id. A few of
the other cases that analyze this factor also mention attorney discounts of rates for
"[r]egular clients." See, e.g., Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743,
795 (W.D. Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977). Other cases
note that lawyers do not present information relating to this factor. See, e.g., Sheppard v.
Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1369, 1381 (D. Md. 1994). Given the capacity
of this factor to limit a lawyer's recovery, plaintiffs' attorneys would have no incentive to
do so, and while defense counsel might have incentives to raise the issue, they may lack the
relevant information.
182 We found no reported opinion in which a judge described receipt of client testimony
about perceptions of the "nature and length of the relationship." In one decision, how-
ever, a court mentioned exemplary client communication and contact as bearing on this
criterion. See In re Shell Oil Refinery, 155 F.R.D. 552 (E.D. La. 1993). This court noted
that, although the lawyers were appointed by the court and did not have the relationship
"usual" in litigation, the Plaintiffs' Legal Committee "frequently had face-to-face and tele-
phone contact with the claimants" and that "[c]ounsel responded to innumerable inquiries
from class members who needed explanations, assistance, and assurances." Id. at 573. In
another decision, involving an individual employment discrimination claim, a court noted
that the "relationship [between attorney and client] is already ten years in duration and the
time of its termination is not in sight. I do not know how to give this factor any particular
weight .... Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 570 F. Supp. 1044,1049-50 (W.D.N.C.
1983). Some of the Johnson factors have also been described as permitting enhancement
for "superior representation," described as the way counsel worked, given the "results ob-
tained ... [and] the professional methods utilized." In re Farrah, 141 B.R. 920, 926 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1992).
183 See infra Part IV.C.
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lawyer time spent on prevailing claims is recoverable. 184 The fee deci-
sions consider the provision of legal services not in terms of "personal
services rendered" or in terms of political and social action but instead
measure the impact of such services by the money recovered or the
legal principle enforced or established.18s
But wide differentials between monetary outcomes gained by
plaintiffs and the attorney fees reaped by lawyers have surfaced in the
case law in the context of statutory fee-shifting-and in these cases,
judges have had to confront whether economic outcomes are the only
ones for which lawyers should be paid. The leading example is the
Supreme Court's 1986 decision in City of Riverside v. Rivera,18 in
which "eight Chicano individuals" were arrested at a party and sued
police officers for civil fights violations. A jury awarded $33,350 in
compensatory damages, and lawyers sought and were awarded
$245,456.25 in fees from the defendants. 87 Writing for the plurality
affirming the award, Justice Brennan refused to require that fee
awards in civil rights cases be "proportionate to the amount of dam-
ages a civil rights plaintiff actually recovers." 1 8 Brennan's justifica-
tion was the public stake in this genre of litigation; he argued that,
unlike tort litigation, civil rights cases have a social function making
inappropriate the equation of the worth of the lawsuit with the money
184 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (interpreting civil rights fee shift to
prevailing parties as available to those who "'succeed on any significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit!" (quoting Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978))). As subsequently amplified, to obtain a
fee award from a defendant, a plaintiff has to "receive at least some relief on the merits of
his claim." Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987). Further, declaratory relief may be
insufficient for one to prevail, absent a "modification" of a defendant's behavior. Rhodes
v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988). The "legal relationship" between plaintiff and defendant
has to change, either by litigation or settlement. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (finding a settlement sufficiently altering of
behavior to support a finding that a plaintiff "prevailed"); see also Maher v. Gagne, 448
U.S. 122, 129 (1980). Further, an award of nominal damages makes attorney-fee awards
unlikely. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992), discussed infra note 193.
185 In the criminal context, the Supreme Court has also declined to interpret the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as encompassing the right to a "'meaningful attorney-client
relationship."' See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983) (quoting appellate court
decision, Morris v. Slappy, 649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1981)) (holding that the substitution
of counsel, after another lawyer had prepared the case and after the court had refused to
provide a continuance, did not constitute a Sixth Amendment violation, given the substi-
tuted lawyer's statement that he had had adequate opportunity for preparation and
investigation).
186 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
187 Id. at 564-65 (the rate charged was $125 per hour).
188 Id. at 574. Justice Powell concurred, concluding that the factual findings of the trial
court were not clearly erroneous. Id. at 584-86 (Powell, J., concurring).
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obtained. 8 9 From the other opinions in the case, one learns of two
other arguments for declining to equate value with monetary awards:
either that juries will not measure all plaintiffs' injuries equally be-
cause of ethnic, racial, or other biases, or that juries will be reluctant
to impose large financial obligations on government officials who are
the defendants in civil rights cases. 90
Some tort theorists believe that tort litigation has deterrent, cor-
rective, and/or distributive functions, expressing values about obliga-
tions and relationships among individuals within a community. 191
While these theorists might agree with Chief Justice Rehnquist's equa-
tion (in dissent in City of Riverside) of civil rights and tort litigation,
they may not be pleased that he placed no value, other than the
amount of money recouped, on results from either form of litigation.
Calling for "billing judgment" and wise investment of resources, he
criticized such a differential between lawyers' fees and client dam-
ages. 92 Some six years later, in the context of a fee request for more
189 Id. at 574 ("Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate
important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms.").
According to the plurality, the social benefits here (a finding of police "'general hostility to
the Chicano community"') resulted in deterrence of police misconduct. Id. at 574-75 (cita-
tion omitted). Justice Brennan also relied on the congressional history of the civil rights
fee statute, with its model of private attorney general, as well as a view that large awards
could not be expected in such cases. Id. at 576-80.
190 See Justice Powell's concurrence, with its heavy reliance on trial court findings, id. at
583-84 (Powell, J., concurring), as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, in which he
quotes the trial judge as saying: "'the size of the jury award resulted from (a) the general
reluctance of jurors to make large awards against police officers, and (b) the dignifled
restraint which the plaintiffs exercised in describing their injuries to the jury."' Id. at 591
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also discussion infra notes 354-55 and accompanying text
about "rebellious lawyering," of which this may be an example; rather than stress victimi-
zation, clients and lawyers in this case focused on the wrongful behavior of the defendants.
For discussion of the effects of gender and race on civil damage awards, see Martha
Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in
Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 73, 84-89 (1994) (review-
ing empirical studies, including some from court-based task forces on gender and minority
status, describing lower awards made to women and/or minorities than to whites or men);
Regina Graycar, Compensation for Loss of Capacity To Work in the Home, 10 Sydney L.
Rev. 528 (1985) (also addressing gender discrimination and damage awards).
191 See, e.g., Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 41, at 907-08; Jules L. Coleman,
Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 Ind. L.J. 349, 361-69 (1992); Jules L.
Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 15, 28-31 (1995); see also
Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of
Tort Law, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 765,783-85 (1987) (arguing that tort law's goals include being
responsive to injured victims' felt needs for justice and to societal interests in the mainte-
nance and enforcement of its norms); Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at 42
("[M]ass tort litigations often have an underlying, if less focused, purpose which goes be-
yond mere transfers of wealth-they deal with the health and sense of security of many
individuals and the viability of major economic institutions.").
192 City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 594-95 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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than $250,000 when a jury had awarded nominal damages to a civil
rights plaintiff, the Court concluded that while such a plaintiff "pre-
vailed" as defined in the statutory fee-shift, defendants had no obliga-
tion under the statute to pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees unless the
litigation served public purposes.
193
Under the current regime, relatively few cases report the award
of lawyers' fees when civil rights litigants receive nominal awards.' 94
While City of Riverside's nonproportionality rule survives to some ex-
tent, when nominal awards are given, courts usually attribute nominal
value to the litigation, and the "prevailing" party's lawyers receive no
fees from defendants.195
193 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,115 (1992). The Farrars had run a home for disturbed
teenagers, which had been closed after a death of one of the residents. They sued the
Texas Lieutenant Governor, who had issued a press release critical of the home and of
others. Id. at 106. Justice O'Connor, concurring, argued for a holding that "(w]hen the
plaintiff's success is purely technical or de minimis, no fees can be awarded." Id. at 117.
However, she also sought to draw a distinction between nominal and de minimis awards.
In her view, one had to evaluate the difference between the amount sought and the amount
received, as well as whether public purposes, such as the revelation of a pattern of miscon-
duct, were served. Id. at 121-22. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter joined Justice
White, concurring and dissenting in part, in reading the majority as not precluding fee
awards in all cases of nominal damages. Id. at 124.
194 One interesting exception is worth noting. See Lucas v. Guyton, 901 F. Supp. 1047
(D.S.C. 1995), in which a judge awarded attorneys' fees to lawyers representing a death
row inmate. A jury had found that Lucas had been beaten by correctional officers and
then awarded 10g in damages. According to the trial judge. "[d]efendants maliciously and
sadistically" beat Cecil Lucas, a man who did not "deserve much sympathy." Id. at 1050.
The judge held that the verdict was "in reality a significant accomplishment," that the
plaintiff's success went well beyond the amount of the damages by vindicating the constitu-
tional rights of a death row inmate, and awarded some $30,DO in costs and fees. Id. at
1052, 1060.
A few other exceptions can be found in which judges have concluded that some "pub-
lic concerns" or establishment of a legal principle justify fee awards. See, e.g., Franz v.
Lytle, 854 F. Supp. 753,757 (D. Kan. 1994) (awarding S250 in actual damages for the strip
search of a child, and permitting an attorney-fee award of $33,225 because the issue was
one of first impression, involving important public question of investigatory practices in
neglect cases); Stacy v. Stroud, 845 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (relying on the
"public interest concern" implicated by a jury trial on the use of excessive force and defen-
dants' indifference to serious medical needs when making an arrest of a driver and con-
cluding that, despite the plaintiff's award of $4000, some $23,000 in fees to the lawyers was
proper); see also Carroll v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 53 F.3d 626, 628-31 (4th Cr. 1995) (up-
holding $500 fee award, which was below the statutory minimum, in a Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act case on the grounds that the district court had discretion to determine that
the violation was technical and the plaintiff's success was limited).
195 See, e.g., Cramblit v. Fiske, 33 F.3d 633, 635 (6th Cir. 1994) (declining to award an
attorney fee and rejecting the argument that vindication interests sufficed to support a fee
award when an unlawful police search claim resulted in a jury award of one dollar in nomi-
nal and one dollar in punitive damages). Cf. Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives
To Comply with the Law, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1069, 1107-09 (1993) (analyzing the effects of
fee-shifting rules and arguing for a "liberal interpretation" of prevailing plaintiffs to in-
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One other aspect of fee shifting bears noting. Many fee statutes,
including the civil rights fee-shifting statute, are "one-way" shifts.
Prevailing plaintiffs receive fees; prevailing defendants do not. 196 The
refusal to tax losing plaintiffs could be understood as acknowledging a
social value in or utility of litigation independent of its outcome. Loss
does not equate with a penalty for bringing the lawsuit; the justifica-
tion is that invoking procedure has either personal or social benefits
and should not be discouraged,19 7 or that two-way risk-shifting would
indiscriminately deter litigation because of differential vulnerability
among litigants to economic penalties. In contrast, when two-way
shifts occur and all "losers" pay, then results become the sole measure
of value.198
In short, in the context of civil rights fee shifts that oblige defen-
dants to pay plaintiffs' fees, the attorney work that is compensated
varies, primarily depending on the monetary value that juries put on
the claim. When actual damages are awarded, judges may award law-
yers' fees in excess of that amount, thereby finding something of value
beyond the dollar damages. When nominal damages are awarded,
courts find vindication, rights-seeking, and public interests either in-
significant or insufficient to overcome juries' refusal to monetize the
value of that vindication. A judgment that a case lacked economic
value to the individual is taken to mean that the litigation achieved
insufficient public value to require defendants to pay plaintiffs' attor-
neys who enabled the litigation. But under current law, when defen-
dants win civil rights cases, they cannot recoup their fees from losing
plaintiffs, thereby suggesting that some social value is placed on even
plaintiffs' failed efforts at rights-seeking. 199
elude those who win nominal damages because such fee-shifting would enhance compli-
ance with the law).
196 In a recent case, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal copyright statute's fee-
shifting provision to provide for a two-way shift, such that prevailing defendants as well as
prevailing plaintiffs recouped fees from their losing opponents but "only as a matter of the
court's discretion." See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1033 (1994).
197 An analogy might be drawn to provision of counsel for criminal defendants-that
the activity of defending is useful in and of itself, rather than that such activity is useful
only when a defendant is acquitted.
198 We do not here debate current "loser pays" proposals, but our discussion of whether
to value litigation solely in terms of monetary outcomes and enforcement of rights has
implications for that controversy. See Attorney Accountability, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
199 Defendants can recoup statutory fees only upon a finding that a case was "frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 421 (1978) (holding in a Title VII case that the district court has discretion to make
such an award upon such a finding).
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Moving from a statutory fee shift that obliges losing defendants
to pay plaintiffs' lawyers to those equity cases that impose lawyers'
fees on a group of co-plaintiffs, the focus on results is parallel. When
the percentage of the fund method is used, the fund-the amount re-
covered-is the measure of the work for which lawyers are compen-
sated200 One critique of the percentage approach echoes the City of
Riverside trial judge's worries that money awards themselves will be
badly calibrated. In the common fund context, Janet Alexander's con-
cern is that the monetary sums of settlements may not be good meas-
ures of the "legal value" of cases because they are a product of a
variety of incentives to avoid litigation rather than of the merits of
claims30 ' Hence the dollar amount of a settlement fails as an accurate
economic metric by which to assess fees. Our question is whether the
fund is the only outcome of a case; ignored are the processes of litiga-
tion as well as whether-or not-lawyers provided to clients legal
services that conferred benefits on either those clients, the courts, or
the public.
While judges have thus far shown little interest in the difficulties
of measuring even the economic value in common fund cases,202 the
arbitrariness of the percentage of the fund payment method and its
effect of turning lawyers into "profit sharers" might have been suffi-
200 When the percentage of the fund method is used in bankruptcy, it is not surprising
that the value of the services rendered is readily equated with economic conservation of
assets or recovery. The personal injury litigant within bankruptcy was, until recently, an
anomaly;, bankruptcy was focused on the assets of the debtor and their distribution to cred-
itors. See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co., 160 B.R. 404,412 n.10 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993) ("While
the phrase 'quality of representation' is linguistically distinct from the phrase 'results ob-
tained,' this Court considers them to be two sides of the same cause-effect relationship....
The First Circuit has recently joined the concepts as a single 'Exceptional Performance/
Results Enhancement' topic .... " (citation omitted)).
201 Alexander, supra note 24, at 578-81 (also discussing that the percentage method that
includes both fees and costs in the same lump sum creates an incentive for lawyers to
minimize the expenses of investigation and fact gathering in order to maximize their fees).
2M One emerging exception is the question of valuation when the fund includes both
monetary recovery and other remedies, such as medical research or promises of future
financing, should health problems emerge. See, e.g., Bowling Fee Hearing Transcript,
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-1-91-256 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-1-
91-256, slip op. at 48-50 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 1996) (Memorandum and Order on Applica-
tions For Attorneys' Fees and Expenses) (on file with authors) (disagreeing with the Class
and Special Counsel's proposed valuation of the fund at $165 million-which included po-
tential future payments-and concluding that its value exceeded $100 million and consti-
tuted a "substantial benefit" on the class); see also Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d
1439 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that a fee award of $2.5 million was excessive and remand-
ing the shareholder derivative case for an evidentiary hearing on the benefits conferred by
the litigation); Barry Meier, Math of Class-Action Suit: 'Winning' $2.19 Costs S9133, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 11, 1995, at Al (describing class action settlement of lawsuit against banks for
excess charges on mortgages in which lawyers' fees of $8.5 million were charged to class
members, and criticizing valuation of remedy and method of attorney-fee calculation).
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cient to remove it fromthe judiciary's armamentarium and to turn
their attention to developing fee rules that attend more to the nature
of the work undertaken. But the POF remains in part because it is so
deeply familiar, resembling closely the contingency-fee payment sys-
tem in which risk-taking by lawyers in individual litigation has been
financed for some time, and in part because a percentage award frees
the judge from vexing inquiries into hours spent by lawyers.203 The
distinguishing feature between the contingency fee and the POF is
whether the percentage is set in a contract in advance between client
and lawyer or before/after the fact by the court.2°4
But like the percentage of the fund, the contingency fee itself has
also been the subject of criticism, which (with the support of the Man-
hattan Institute) has solidified around a proposed alternative. Lester
Brickman, Michael Horowitz, and Jeffrey O'Connell argue for regula-
tion of contingency-fee payments by tying payment to offers of settle-
ment made by defendants.205 Under their proposal, attorneys could
not charge contingency fees on sums obtained by virtue of promptly
made settlement offers.206 This proposal is continuous with the judi-
cial fee allocation methods outlined above; in each, the value of the
lawyers' services is equated with the monetary outcome obtained by
the client.207
In sum, whether by relying on a lodestar calculation or a percent-
age of the fund method for the payment of attorneys' fees, judges
203 See, e.g., Willging et al., Empirical Analysis of Rule 23, supra note 2, at 155 (finding
that, in class actions in which money was distributed to claimants, when the percentage of
the fund was used to calculate fees, attorneys were paid 27-30% of the funds).
204 As the ALI Draft Law Governing Lawyers, supra note 16, § 46, at 212, § 47, at 218-
20, explains, because the contingency fee requires risk-taking, the sums paid are freed from
being measured by the number of hours of work entailed. To the extent courts actually
engage in factfinding to determine what constitutes an appropriate percentage, the predi-
cate information is both complex and may be contested. See Thirteen Appeals, 56 F.3d
295, 308-13 (1st Cir. 1995).
205 Brickman et al., Rethinking Contingency Fees, supra note 31, at 26-28. In response
to a request from Brickman and others for an ethical ruling, the ABA issued an opinion
that, while not directly referring to the Manhattan Institute, concludes that contingent-fee
agreements remain ethical and that the percentage need not be limited because of early
settlements or in cases when liability is clear, in part rejecting the idea that such a category
exists. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389 (1994).
206 Brickman et al., Rethinking Contingency Fees, supra note 31, at 27-28.
207 The Brickman-Horowitz-O'Connell proposal also defines risk solely in monetary
terms; risk is conceptualized as the risk of nonpayment in a specific instance, rather than
including the general risk of maintaining a contingency-fee law practice or the risk of asso-
ciating with unpopular causes or clients. Id. at 19. Moreover, not only is the value equated
with the immediate economic benefit to an individual, but no place exists within this model
for premiums to be paid for engendering outcomes (via settlement or lawmaking) with
third-party effects. In contrast, under an enhanced lodestar model or a percentage system,
payments could be paid for something other than the economic results.
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have developed a body of case law in which outcomes are the central
basis of fees and in which the distinct question of separately charged
costs has not spawned much doctrine. In contemporary discussions of
either court-awarded lawyer fees or of contingency fees, the purpose
of lawyering is defined as generating results. Commentators have
shared that focus as well. Not much other than the economic conse-
quences of litigation is under discussion. But results are not the only
possible measure of value taken from the litigation by individual par-
ticipants, by the group, and by the public. Lawyers might also be paid
for work that enhances the process or the experiences of either liti-
gants or the public. Thus, a further question needs to be asked, about
why the issue of the value of litigation has not been more fully ex-
plored in fee case law. Below we examine how the occasions upon
which fee law was made help to explain its current shape, which in
turn offers little guidance for the contemporary problems of handling
mass tort aggregates.
4. The Dominant Paradigms
Focusing on results is attractive for its very simplicity, especially
in the aggregate context, in which individual litigants have neither vol-
unteered to participate in a cohort nor have electoral or other means
of expressing their preferences. Sorting out comparative preferences
among such group members is avoided. Further, because litigation
can impose significant burdens on opponents, using results as the mea-
sure of value also avoids considering which strategic activities of liti-
gants have unacceptable effects on opponents and which are within
the bounds of adversarialism. Moreover, in the one-way fee context,
defendants are paying their opponents' lawyers; asking them to pay
more for the quality of their adversaries' legal experiences may seem
to be adding insult to injury. Thus, while lawyers can be paid for time
spent with clients,2 08 fee awards focus on whether lawyer work affects
results and/or recoveries, and not on whether lawyer work responds to
client concerns about processes or to court and public views of the
desirability of such responsiveness.
But current doctrine does not provide a completely coherent pic-
ture of results as the sole metric of value. While reliance on results as
a metric solves the problem of having to compensate attorneys for
losing plaintiffs, it does not explain why nominal victories are equated
with losing ones or why winning defendants should not be compen-
208 Under the lodestar method, such hours are billed, and under the contingency or per-
centage of the fund method, some of the fee could be understood as payment for client
contact.
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sated. Further, missing from the case law is how to think about which
lawyers generate results; little by way of rules exist about how or why
to pay IRPAs for their roles in aggregate litigation.209 And, within the
academic literature critiquing fee payments, attention is not paid to
the provision of legal services to individual litigants within aggre-
gates210 or to the complexity of intragroup distinctions. The commen-
tary generally emphasizes alignment of incentives between lawyers
and the groups they represent and on the outcomes generated.
The shape and focus of the discussion stems from the litigation
contexts in which lawyers and judges have articulated and criticized
attorney-fee rules. Three paradigms dominate the discussion to
date.21' The first arises from the public interest world with its institu-
tional litigators whose clients include children in school desegregation
cases, prisoners, mental patients, or environmental litigants. Whether
appropriate or not, clients within institutional civil rights cases have an
anonymous aura.212 The second is represented by the lone private
lawyer appearing on behalf of a single client in an individual police
brutality, civil rights, or due process case. The third paradigm is com-
mercial, involving securities, antitrust, or consumer litigation.
Whether fees are awarded because of a statutory fee-shift mandate or
by virtue of a court's equitable powers, the doctrinal analysis in corn-
209 For example, the First Circuit mandated a 50-50 IRPAs/PSC fee split in one litiga-
tion, but not much other than a desire for closure justified that division, as contrasted with
the 10% of the total recovery for both costs and fees to PSC members that had been set
forth in a pretrial order or with the trial judge's subsequent 30-70 IRPAs/PSC allocation,
reversed on appeal. Thirteen Appeals, 56 F.3d 295, 308-09, 312-13 (1st Cir. 1995). Nineteen
Appeals, 982 F.2d 603, 608 (lst Cir. 1992).
210 A few discussions mention but do not explore the roles of individual lawyers and
clients. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 148, at 246-54, 343-44 (discussing payments to lawyers
who are not lead counsel).
211 These paradigms emerge from Supreme Court doctrine, lower court case law, and
the commentary. For example, in a review of the 22 Supreme Court attorney statutory fee-
shifting cases between 1985 and 1995 (excluding the four cases interpreting the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act), there were seven class or group actions (involving either civil rights or
Titles VI or VII), four environmental cases, 10 individual civil rights or Title VII actions,
and one patent litigation. The Johnson case is also a Title VII class action, while the Lindy
case involves the settlement of an antitrust plumbing fixtures litigation. See also Thomas
E. Wiliging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, Preliminary Report on Time Study
Class Action Cases 1 (Feb. 9, 1995) (in the districts studied, securities cases were the "sin-
gle largest type of case"-at 24%, or 12 cases-followed by prisoner, other civil rights, and
employment litigation) (on file with authors).
212 See, e.g., United States v. City of S.F., 748 F. Supp. 1416, 1430 (N.D. Cal. 1990) ("The
very nature of this type of case tends to indicate that an ongoing professional relationship
is unlikely. Most counsel are employed by public interest firms. The few who are In pri-
vate practice ... do not have a professional relationship with any of the plaintiffs or class
members apart from this case.") For discussion of intragroup conflicts that undercut the
undifferentiated approach to such plaintiffs, see Rhode, Class Conflicts, supra note 26, at
1186-1202.
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mercial aggregates has paralleled that of the institutional civil rights
context in that the focus has been on lawyers for the group and the
impact of those lawyers on the outcome, measured by monies recov-
ered or redistributed. As in much of large-scale public interest litiga-
tion, undifferentiated litigants are assumed in the commercial context
as well.
These three paradigms meld well with the history of aggregate
procedures detailed above. Class actions were designed for civil rights
plaintiffs and for consumers; single sets of lawyers litigated these
cases, and attorney-fee doctrine addressed them. But it is a fourth
context, the mass tort, that makes plain the inadequacy of the law de-
veloped to date. Current rules fail to address the problems of aggre-
gate mass torts, with their layers of lawyers. Who should get paid in
these litigations, and for what? Should the value of the litigation be
equated with a fund and the bulk of the fees be paid to the lawyers for
the aggregate? Are other measures of value available? Should IRPAs
be reconceived as referring lawyers, and given incentives by fee law to
drop out after aggregation? How much of a role (if any) should cli-
ents play in making decisions about paying "their" lawyers?
To respond, we have to move beyond the doctrine and commen-
tary surrounding both attorney-fee award and aggregate litigation; we
need to consider the rationales of litigation and the role of lawyers in
effectuating those purposes. For some, the fee law's focus on out-
comes accurately captures courts' purposes; the problems emerge
from agency and market malfunctions. For others, something in addi-
tion to monetary outcomes is at stake for litigants and for lawyers.
Those alternative approaches are explored below.
IV
COMPETING VISIONS OF COURTS: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
MOMENTS OF MEANING OR INCENTIVES
FOR COMPLIANCE
When requiring people to pay lawyers, judges generally have
taken as the measure of value the results of litigation. In contrast,
when considering the processes that must be afforded to litigants or
claimants in administrative settings, judges have articulated a different
description of the purposes of their proceedings. Below we consider
how fee law and analyses of lawyers' roles relate to claims made by
legal, political, social, psychological, and economic theorists about
court-based decisionmaking and lawyers. Empirical social science
analyses reveal that litigants share with judges and political theorists
aspirations for a judicial system that gives litigants something more
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than money. Economic models of litigation provide an alternative
conception, which, like judges when ordering lawyers' fees to be paid,
focuses on a narrower set of expectations for adjudicative
processes.213
A. Enacting Rights
1. The Process Due
The prominent cases in which judges have set forth explanations
of process are those that consider the adequacy of executive, agency,
or state court procedures. These "due process" cases provide a win-
dow into legal theories of the purposes of process, 214 as does the case
law considering when individuals are precluded from litigation. Our
interest in this literature is not to consider whether, as a doctrinal mat-
ter, one could or should expand preclusion rules or find process ade-
quate in a variety of aggregate mechanisms, nor is it to develop
theories of representation. Rather, we are interested here in identify-
ing what animates commitment to process, how those concerns relate
to societal views of litigation, and then to understand the relationships
among individualization, aggregation, fees, and process.
Judicial statements about due process sometimes describe it as
constitutive of the country itself. The words of Justice Frankfurter
form a kind of "pledge of allegiance" 215 to process as the mode by
213 Other commentators have addressed the purposes of civil litigation and offered ab-
stracted models as well. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1282-84 (1976) (describing private bipolar, retrospective
litigation and "public law litigation," with its multiparty structure, its prospective focus,
and the centrality of the judge); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of
Adjudication, 6 Law & Hum. Behav. 121 (1982) [hereinafter Fiss, Social and Political
Foundations of Adjudication] (contrasting a "dispute resolution" model, with its focus on
individuals in private conflict, with "structural reform" litigation, in which groups and so-
cial institutions dispute public values); Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process,
27 Stan. L. Rev. 937, 937-39 (1975) (describing the "Conflict Resolution Model," in which
the emphasis is on peaceable resolution of presumptively private disputes, and the "Behav-
ior Modification Model," in which courts and civil litigation serve to alter "behavior by
imposing costs on a person" to effect not only that individual but future conduct of others).
Our view is that, whether bipolar or large scale, civil litigation could be seen as centrally
about rights enactment (as defined infra Part IV.A) or effectuating outcomes (described
infra Part IV.B), or both.
214 Our focus here is on litigation in general and not only on tort litigation. The specific
justifications for tort litigation-deterrence, corrective justice, distributive justice, insur-
ance, and risk-spreading-may themselves illuminate or embody purposes of or for pro-
cess. While our discussion addresses normative justifications for process that can be
transsubstantive, arguments about purposes for process may also vary by litigating context.
215 Frankfurter's insistence upon the democratic purposes of courts may have been
linked to the time in which he wrote and his own attitudes toward United States govern-
ance. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-71 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing against the invalidation of a statute that required
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which United States democratic tradition is enacted at specific mo-
ments. Frankfurter argued that "deep-rooted demands of fair play
[are] enshrined in the Constitution"216 and oblige government to pro-
vide, "'whenever it is necessary for the protection of the parties... an
opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgments
sought." 21 7 While proclaiming the flexibility of the due process con-
cept, Frankfurter also claimed that its sources were layered on the
country's consciousness: "'[d]ue process' is compounded of history,
reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the
strength of the democratic faith which we profess." 218 This "principle
basic to our society" (which is "the very ethos of the scheme of our
society") stems from "essential safeguards for fair judgment which in
the course of centuries have come to be associated with due pro-
cess. "219 Due process is expressly linked to English principles of
"'natural justice"2o0 and to "high social and moral values" that ad-
here in "the procedural safeguard of a fair hearing."221
While the sources are history, tradition, the Constitution, judicial
applications, and democratic principles, the definition of due process
offered is, save for the articulation of the concepts of notice and hear-
ing, close to tautological. "Due process is not a mechanical instru-
ment. It is not a yardstick. It is a process." tm Its purposes, however,
are more clearly articulated: ensuring accuracy and legitimacy of deci-
sionmaking and popular acceptance. Or as Frankfurter put it: "The
validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the
school children to recite the pledge of allegiance). Barnette reversed Minersville Sch. Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which Frankfurter had written and which had upheld a flag
salute. For discussion of the controversy surrounding Gobis, see Judith Resnik, Con-
structing the Canon, 2 Yale J.L. & Human. 221,222-26 (1990).
216 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). The emotive context of the case-the Attorney General's
designation of individuals as "communists"-surely animated Frankfurter's exposition.
217 Id. at 162 (quoting Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884)).
218 Id. at 162-63 (emphasis added).
219 Id. at 168, 172. The contemporary tests for the adequacy of process echo these
strands. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Lassiter v. North Carolina Dep't of
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Medina v. California, 112 U.S. 437 (1992). J. Roland
Pennock argues that the "roots of due process grow out of a blend of history and philoso-
phy," that United States constitutional law interpretation can be linked to Kantian and
Rawlsian theories of justice, and that the Court has provided a "developmental theory of
due process," enabling selection and weighting of values. J. Roland Pennock, Introduc-
tion, in NOMOS XVIII: Due Process at xv, xvii (J. Roland Pennock & John NV. Chapman
eds., 1977) [hereinafter Due Process].
220 McGrath, 341 U.S. at 170 n.17 (citation omitted) (citing English materials, including
the principle that "[no party ought to be condemned unheard").
221 Id. at 167 (evidenced, Frankfurter argued, by the low tolerance for not requiring
hearings).
222 Id. at 163.
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mode by which it was reached. '223 No "better way" has "been found
for generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that
justice has been done. '224
Process, qua process, is important, and its import does not derive
exclusively from the experience of immediate participants in a case,
nor is process valued "for its own sake." Process remains instrumen-
tal; it is democracy in action, as well as a morality play. The "play is
the thing" in that one cannot draw the moral lessons without the play.
Frankfurter tended toward the tautological precisely because pro-
cess's purposes can only be achieved by its enactment.225 As a conse-
quence, the distinction drawn by some commentators between what
are called instrumental or outcome-oriented theories of participation
and those described as intrinsic or process-oriented theories of partici-
pation226 do not quite capture the point. While the distinction be-
tween process and outcome is useful in some contexts, the dichotomy
between the two obscures that process has a host of outcomes, one of
which is the decision in a case.
Because the English and United States constitutional traditions
initially made political commitments to due process within the frame-
work of individual litigation,227 the relationship between process and
individual participation was straightforward. The rights to notice and
to be heard belonged to an individual who had the opportunity to
223 Id. at 171.
224 Id. at 172. In an accompanying footnote, Frankfurter quoted Daniel Webster on the
need to "satisfy the community that right is done." Id. at 172 n.19 (quoting 5 The Writings
and Speeches of Daniel Webster 163 (1903)); see also Weinstein. Individual Justice, supra
note 21, at 13-14 (arguing that "the legitimacy of our legal institutions depends upon the
individual's belief that he or she counts in the system").
M Speaking from the perspective of theoretical analyses of the late twentieth century,
Frankfurter's thoughts can be related to Pierre Bourdieu's work, with its focus on the insti-
tutional efficacy of speech and its embeddedness in institutions that both define the ability
to speak and the authority of speaker. The tautological nature of Frankfurter's discussion
can be reread as illustrative of the inseparable interdependence of speaker and institu-
tional setting in which the speech occurs. See Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic
Power 105-136 (John B. Thompson ed. & Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans.,
1991) [hereinafter Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power]. As Bourdieu put it: "The
mystery of performative magic is thus resolved in the mystery of ministry ... through
which the representative creates the group which creates him.. .." Id. at 106. Moreover,
law is the "quintessential form of 'active' discourse, able by its own operation to produce
its effects." Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,
38 Hastings LJ. 805,839 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987) [hereinafter Bourdieu, The Force
of Law].
226 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Pre-
clusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 193, 201-02 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Rethinking the "Day In
Court" Ideal] (distinguishing the two theories).
227 See, e.g., Yeazell, Collective Action, supra note 135, at 48-51 (describing the history
of the "individualistic" traditions of the common law and its "ideal of individualized
justice").
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participate.228 Aggregate modes of adjudication by definition make
elastic the concept of participation; not everyone can personally par-
take, and some have urged rejection of aggregation precisely on those
grounds. Judges struggled through this problem by settling on the
concepts of notice and representation: that when interests of one
party had sufficient similarity to interests of another, participation by
the one, with notice to the other, sufficed3229
Generally left out of the judicial conception of due process is the
role of lawyers in civil adjudication. Indeed, while Justice Brennan
noted that "'[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel, M0 the
due process clause has not been defined to require the provision of
counsel in most civil contexts.3 1 Unlike litigants who describe their
own experiences of law as mediated by lawyers, or empiricists who
study lawyers' effects on litigants' attitudes, judges articulate a vision
of civil process independent of lawyers.
Judicial theorizing of process values comes in two major doctrinal
contexts-the due process cases (in which litigants are pitted against
the state) and the preclusion cases (in which public or private litigants
oppose each other, and the question of relationships among present
and absent litigants is at stake). This extensive judicial discussion of
the values of process stands in contrast to what judges say and do
when asked to award lawyers' fees. Attorney-fee cases provide few
odes to the value of procedural fairness. Rather, in the fee context,
228 As Robert Bone explains, "the conventional understanding of the day in court" that
assumed "all individuals have a right to participate personally in all kinds of cases" is over-
stated and in some instances erroneous and should not be equated with "freedom to make
one's own strategic litigation choices." Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal, supra
note 226, at 204,206; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 Iowa L Rev.
965, 965-66 (1993) [hereinafter Fiss, Allure of Individualism] (criticizing an overly attentive
focus on individualism as having the potential to undermine structural reform litigation).
229 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940). One of the intriguing findings of
recent empirical work on class actions is that despite Rule 23(e)'s mandatory requirement
of notice prior to court approval of settlements or dismissals in class actions, in about one-
quarter of the cases studied in which settlements were brought to the attention of the
courts, no notice was sent to class members. Willging et al., Empirical Analysis of Rule 23,
supra note 2, at 125,132 (also finding that notices "rarely" included estimates of the size of
the proposed class or of the net settlement amounts, or information about fund
administration).
230 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,270 (1970) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
68-69 (1932)).
231 Only when termination of parental rights is at issue has the Court concluded that due
process may require the appointment of counsel. Lassiter v. North Carolina Dep't of So-
cial Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27-28 (1981) (describing the "presumption" against requiring coun-
sel as a constitutional matter in civil cases and mandating a case-by-case analysis of the
individual interests at stake, the governmental interests, and the risk of error).
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judges generally equate the instrumental utility of process only with
its outcomes in terms of either monetary relief or legal rule.
Given the paradigms in which fee petitions arise,232 the differing
approaches in the two sets of cases may stem from the context in
which the questions have been asked thus far. If Congress is read to
have justified one-way fee-shifting to create incentives for private at-
torneys general to deter wrongful behavior, results alone may be the
appropriate implementing measure of Congress's mandate. Further,
when judges assign fee payments to co-plaintiffs, the assumption is
that anonymous litigants all receive similar monetary benefits. Some
form of public/private distinctions may also be at work. Due process
cases and civil rights litigation may be conceived to have public bene-
fits, whereas other forms of litigation are seen as only about "private
ends" in turn equated with money.233
Alternatively, judges may be willing to talk more process than
they will require be supplied by fees paid either by defendants or by a
group of plaintiffs who do not have contracts with the lawyers seeking
fees. That interpretation is supported by another aspect of due pro-
cess doctrine, which is its application. The enthusiasm for process val-
ues associated with the 1970 Supreme Court decision in Goldberg v.
Kelly2-4 was limited by its 1976 decision in Mathews v. Eldridge,235 in
which the Court relied on utilitarian balancing to determine the pro-
cess due.236 As Jerry Mashaw has explained, under that decision the
basic measure of the value of process is its ability to enhance accu-
racy.237 No value is placed on the capacity of process to dignify par-
ticipants or to advance equality. Thus, some symmetry exists between
fee law and due process law: whether obliging fee payments or man-
dating agencies to provide procedure, judges assess only outcomes.
232 See supra Part III.B.4.
233 See supra notes 174-207 and accompanying text.
234 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (holding that the due process clause required that wel-
fare recipients be afforded the opportunity for an oral hearing prior to the termination of
benefits).
235 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976) (holding that due process did not require an oral hearing
prior to the termination of disability benefits).
236 The method required is that a court assess the "private and governmental interests at
stake," id. at 340, and whether the additional procedures requested will result in more
accurate outcomes than result from current procedures. Id. at 335. In many of the cases In
which this test is applied, the records contain very little by way of empirical information
upon which judges can make such assessments.
237 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus For Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 28, 43 (1976) [hereinafter Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus].
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Other process theorists have elaborated upon the judicial discus-
sions of due process and propose values other than results. This is
neither the place to detail them nor to elucidate their differences but
rather to provide a sense of the themes. Legal theorist Frank
Michelman has equated access to litigation with the right to vote; for
him litigation is a basic political process in the United States, enabling
individuals to understand themselves as efficacious38 Process's pur-
poses are "revelation and participation," in which an individual learns
of the reasons behind governmental action and has an opportunity to
contribute to that decision 3 9
Jerry Mashaw has linked process to dignitary interests; relying on
natural law traditions, he sees procedural due process as a means by
which the state respects the autonomy of individuals as "dignified or
self-respecting moral and political agents."24 Others, such as
Deborah Rhode and Owen Fiss, have tied court-based participatory
norms to Burkean theories of governance,241 that the legitimacy of
courts rests on their dialogic capacities to articulate public norms and
values and that their ability in turn to articulate such norms stems in
part from the processes on which courts depend. 42 While not focused
on courts in particular, Cass Sunstein's insistence on the "expressive
238 Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right To
Protect One's Rights (pt. 2), 1974 Duke LJ. 527, 534-40; see also Yeazell, Collective Ac-
tion, supra note 135, at 44 ("[Collective litigation is a form of collective action.").
239 See Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process,
in Due Process, supra note 219, at 126, 127-28. Compare the procedural empirical findings
that litigants perceive they have little control over the legal process. See E. Allan Lind,
Robert J. MaeCoun, Patricia A. Ebener, William LF. Felstiner, Deborah R. Hensler,
Judith Resnik & Tom R. Tyler, In the Eye of the Beholder. Tort Litigants' Evaluations of
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. 953, 967, 968 tbl. 2
(1990) [hereinafter Lind et al., Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences]. Sarat
and Felstiner also found that, in divorce litigation, lawyers counseled clients not to have
expectations of control or of nonarbitrary decisionmaking. See Sarat & Festiner, Lawyers
and Legal Consciousness, supra note 54, at 1674.
240 Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 160-71 (1985). Finding
Justice Frankfurter's resort to "fundamental fairness" insufficient ("I, for one, would like
to have something more to say," id. at 182), Mashaw turns to political theory (Locke,
Bentham, Kant, and Rawls) to develop a theory located within liberal political traditions.
Id. at 183-99. In that book as well as in an earlier essay, Mashaw distinguished the digni-
tary and equality values from particular modes of process. See Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculus, supra note 237, at 46. For elaboration of the history of due
process, see Charles A. Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American Constitu-
tional Tradition, in Due Process, supra note 219, at 3. While Robert Bone agrees that
autonomy is a central aspect of process-oriented theories, he believes such theories to be
flawed. See Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal, supra note 226, at 269-70,279-85.
241 Rhode, Class Conflicts, supra note 26, at 1200-01.
242 See, e.g., Fiss, Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, supra note 213, at
125; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
Harv. L. ReV. 1, 2 (1979).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 361 1996
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
function of law"2 43 makes a related point: that "simple consequential-
ism is not a feasible project for law" because law has social effects that
sometimes engender evaluative attitudes.244
Philosopher Thomas Scanlon argues that due process is linked to
a "single intuitive idea-the unacceptability of arbitrary power-
which constitutes its moral foundation. '2 45 Because "the basis of due
process requirements lies in a condition on the legitimacy of power-
conferring institutions," deprivations by the state are not the only in-
stances in which due process is relevant; misuse of power is a problem
in settings when the state is not a party.2 46 Moreover, because moral
intuitions are at work, tests such as "shock[ing] the conscience" aptly
capture moments when, given the value placed upon nonintervention,
justifications are insufficient.2 47 Political scientist David Resnick also
focuses on the "moral costs of practices" to argue that "morally ab-
horrent" mechanisms as well as morally abhorrent outcomes are cur-
tailed by due process requirements.2 48 A symbolic role for courts is
argued by Australian theorist John Frow, who asks that we understand
trials as societal enactments bridging generations and mediating obli-
gations of the living to the dead, some wrongfully killed.249
Pierre Bourdieu is one of a few theorists of juridical processes
who plainly articulates the role of lawyers. Bourdieu's discussion is
related to sociolegal literature on dispute resolution; he describes one
of the mechanisms by which individuals "name, blame, and claim" (to
borrow William Felstiner, Richard Abel, and Austin Sarat's
phrase2SO), identifying that they understand themselves as injured, as-
sign blame to others, and seek social redress.25' Bourdieu argues that
the "feeling of injustice" is not equally shared but "depends closely
upon the position one occupies in the social space. The conversion of
an unperceived harm into one that is perceived, named, and specifi-
cally attributed presupposes a labor of construction of social reality
243 Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779.
780 (1994).
144 Id. at 821.
245 T.M. Scanlon, Due Process, in Due Process, supra note 219, at 93, 121.
246 Id. at 106.
247 See id. at 120.
48 David Resnick, Due Process and Procedural Justice, in Due Process, supra note 219,
at 206, 218-220.
249 John Frow, Response to Steven Mailloux's Paper, Measuring Justice in Legal and
Literary Theory (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4, on file with authors) ("[L]aw continues to
serve a religious function.").
250 William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Trans-
formation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 631 (1980).
251 Bourdieu, The Force of Law, supra note 225, at 833.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 71:296
HeinOnline -- 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 362 1996
April-May 1996] INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE AGGREGATE
which falls largely to professionals." 25 Legal professionals thus have
the power of "revealing rights" or negating those subjective intuitions.
Professionals in turn are guided by financial interests and their ethical
and political understandings; by closing off the "field" to nonprofes-
sionals, they have the social power ("symbolic capital" is Bourdieu's
term253) to monopolize entry to the understanding of legal
entitlements.254
2. Plaintiffs and Empiricism
Frankfurter's link of process to popular acceptance of authorita-
rian decisions and theorists' aspirations for process to constitute so-
cially meaningful events are borne out by empirical research on
litigants: a good many people within the United States have some
form of what Sally Engle Merry describes as "legal consciousness." 5
As one study of litigants put it, the "most frequently cited objective of
lay litigants [both plaintiffs and defendants] in adjudicatory proceed-
ings was to 'tell my side of the story .... "256 What law has summa-
252 Id. Deborah Hensler disagrees; in her view, attribution of fault occurs at the individ-
ual social level without necessarily involving recourse to professionals, although lawyers
and other professionals may facilitate such attributions. For discussion of this process in
the context of injury, see Deborah R. Hensler, M. Susan Marquis, Allan F. Abrahamse.
Sandra H. Berry, Patricia A. Ebener, Elizabeth G. Lewis, E. Allan Lind, Robert J. Mac-
Coun, Willard G. Manning, Jeannette A. Rogowski & Mary E. Vaiana, Costs and Compen-
sation for Accidental Injuries in the United States 142-72 (RAND No. R-3999-HHS/ICJ
1991).
253 For discussion of Bourdieu's use of this term, see Richard Terdiman, Introduction to
Bourdieu, The Force of Law, supra note 225, at 812 (describing "symbolic capital" to mean
the "authority, knowledge, prestige, or other forms of symbolic wealth that are readily
converted into traditional wealth").
254 Bourdieu, The Force of Law, supra note 225, at 834-37.
255 Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among
Working-Class Americans 5-6 (1990) (concluding in a study of neighborhood and family
disputes that people's "normal way of doing things" includes legal consciousness, defined
as going to court and talking about rights and entitlements); see also Sylvia A. Law, Some
Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at TWenty Years, 56 Brook. L Rev. 805, 816 (1990)
(describing her experiences in litigating due process cases for welfare recipients and stating
that her clients "liked 'rights.' ... It was no accident that American poor people formed
'The National Welfare Rights Organization' (NWRO) rather than, as in England, a 'Claim-
ants Union."').
256 Hensler, Myths and Realities, supra note 1, at 99; see also Robert J. Macoun, E.
Allan Lind, Deborah R. Hensler, David L Bryant & Patricia A. Ebener, Alternative Adju-
dication: An Evaluation of the New Jersey Automobile Arbitration Program 2-3, 62, 63
tbl. 4.10 (RAND No. R-3676-ICJ 1988). And the corollary-that judges should hear and
pay attention-has long had a place in legal consciousness. In some Renaissance Italian
communal buildings, images of the Virgin Mary in paintings of the Last Judgment were
accompanied by the inscription "Odi l'Altra parte" ("Hear the other side"). Dennis E.
Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 Yale L.J. 1727, 1745 n.57 (1987). A similar
Latin inscription "Audite et Alteram Partem" ("Hear also the other side") appears above
the entry door of the Town Hall, built 1448-59, of Gouda, Holland. Id.
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rized under the "due process" rubric, social scientists capture as a
bundle of interests, needs, or wants described in a variety of ways-
vindication, attention, accountability, information, accuracy, comfort,
respect, recognition, dignity, efficacy, empowerment, justice-and link
these to what happens in courts. Research on litigants, particularly in
the context of tort law, reveals a group of individuals who seek some-
thing in addition to money.257 Some of these claims come from indi-
vidual accounts and some from aggregated responses to social science
surveys.
a. Case Studies of Tort Plaintiffs. A host of recent writing as
well as a few films offer descriptive interpretations of tort plaintiffs,
some of whom were members of a group.258 In her book,259 Sandra
Gilbert, better known as a feminist literary theorist than a tort plain-
tiff,2 60 describes her pain and bewilderment at the sudden and unex-
pected death of her husband during an operation. Gilbert details her
subsequent quest for information and understanding about the causes
257 In our (Judith Resnik's and Dennis Curtis's) own experience as prison lawyers, pris-
oners also are not only focused upon formal remedies. They seek recognition by society as
rights-holders and as having a modicum of authority-demonstrated by the power to be
heard in court, to listen to a prison official be cross-examined, to hear that the state has
been made to respond to their claims of wrongdoing. See also Tom R. lyler, Jonathan
Casper & Bonnie Fisher, Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role
of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedure, 33 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 629, 640-41 (1989)
(reporting data from interviews with 329 criminal defendants and concluding that percep-
tions of procedural fairness affected attitudes towards judicial authority and government
more so than did outcomes and favorable sentences).
258 Because our focus is on fee payments to lawyers for plaintiffs, we do not here review
the relatively sparse literature on defendants' experiences of the tort system. One study of
malpractice does detail the experience of defendant doctors and found that "the direct
financial burden of malpractice litigation paled by comparison with the psychological bur-
den that our personal interviews of physicians disclosed. Doctors consistently expressed
great distress, even anguish, over having their professional performance and competence
attacked-perhaps even publicly stigmatized in open court-in a claim brought by a pa-
tient whom the doctor had been trying to care for." Weiler et al., supra note 41, at 126.
Other criticism of the system is plentiful but couched less in terms of personal exper-
iences and studies of litigants and more in terms of critiques of doctrine, rules, and jury
decisionmaking that result in wrongly faulting defendants for injuries they have not caused.
See, e.g., Peter Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 118 (1991);
Jethro Lieberman, The Litigious Society 33 (1981); Warren K. Olson, The Litigation Explo-
sion: What Happened When America Unleashed the Lawsuit (1991); see also Phantom
Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law 28-31 (Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein &
Peter W. Huber eds., 1993).
259 Sandra M. Gilbert, Wrongful Death: A Medical Tragedy (1995) [hereinafter Gilbert,
Wrongful Death], excerpted in L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1995 (Magazine), at 17.
260 See, e.g., Sandra Gilbert & Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman
Writer and the Nineteenth Century Literary Imagination (1979); Sandra Gilbert & Susan
Gubar, No Man's Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the 'fWentieth Century (1988).
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of the death 61 and her dissatisfaction with her lawyers and the legal
system through which she received a monetary recovery.26 Her
opening epigram comes from a 1983 California opinion: "In a wrong-
ful death action, grief or sorrow of the heirs is not a proper element of
damage. '263 Her book is a moving protest against a health-care sys-
tem that she experienced as depersonalized and lacking in accounta-
bility, as well as against the way in which "her" lawyers provided
services and law offered limited acknowledgement of her injuries.264
Karen M. Hicks's book, Surviving the Dalkon Shield IUDI2 of-
fers a related political perspective; as Gilbert brings her professional
training in English literature to bear, Hicks's background in social sci-
ence informs her work. The book is based on interviews with hun-
dreds of "Dalkon Shield survivors" and field notes on her own
experiences and analyzes the creation and work of the Dalkon Shield
Information Network (DSIN), a political organization of which Hicks
was the "principal founder."266 Hicks sees the creation of this organi-
zation as a challenge to the legal system that in her view discounted
women's injuries and made them invisible.'- 7 Her claim is that the
interests of the pharmaceutical industry and of the legal system coin-
261 Her husband bled to death after an operation; Gilbert claimed that physicians failed
to perform tests to detect the problem. Gilbert, Wrongful Death, supra note 259, at 176-
82, 205, 213-14.
2M Gilbert explains her intent to provide her "story as fully and frankly as" she could;
the only fact to be withheld was the amount of the "relatively small sum" she and her
children received, "a sum that the terms of a legal settlement forbid me to name." Id. at
12.
263 Id. (citing Canavin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 148 Cal. App. 3d 512 (1983)). She
also offers a "memo on compensation," listing some of what her husband "has missed"
since his death. Id. at 332-33.
264 See, for example, her description of the initial intake (a few months of screening, by
which time if the case was rejected, the statute of limitations might run), id. at 153-57; the
interview and meetings with attorneys, id. at 210-22 (His voice is "crisp and perfunctory.");
the constant comparison by the lawyer of her case with others he had that were stronger,
her struggle with interrogatories; her discomfort at the deposition and her lawyers' unre-
sponsiveness to her experience of it, id. at 249-258; and the crudeness of the discussion
when settlement is proposed and the absence of explanation, id. at 269-71,273,275,315-16.
W Hicks, supra note 56.
266 Id. at 2. On the role of organizations and social networks in mass tort litigation, see
Hensler & Peterson, supra note 11, at 1023-24; Schuck, Agent Orange, supra note 53, at 26,
41, 219 (discussing Vietnam veterans organizations: Citizen Soldier, Vietnam Veterans of
America; Agent Orange Victims International; Vietnam Veterans Unifying Group; Agent
Orange Children's Fund); see also Amy J. Goldrich, Command Trust Network's Introduc-
tion to the Legal System: A Starter Kit To Help You Learn About the Law Just as You
Learned About Medical Issues (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter Goldrich, Command Trust
Materials] (on file with authors) (materials from the Command Trust Network, a claim-
ants' group co-founded by Sybil Niden GoIdrich and Kathleen NV. Anneken participating
in the ongoing Silicone Gel Breast Implant Litigation).
267 Hicks, supra note 56, at 12 (describing how network members "thrust themselves
into a legal process that neither asked for nor wanted their participation").
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cide to suppress attention to the harms done to women.268 According
to her, the litigation represented not recovery of money but social
justice.
2 69
Hicks describes her naivete at expecting attention from the court;
when she went to the chambers of the judge presiding over the
Dalkon proceedings, she was informed he did not "meet with liti-
gants."270 Hicks perceives the "social movement" represented by
DSIN as responsive to injustice and lack of corporate responsibility;
she also details the discord within groups of survivors and the limited
ability that DSIN had to contact claimants.271 For her, the community
of "survivors" she helped to build provided a means by which to name
a wrong, empowering those otherwise fearful of authority. Her view
of lawyers is mixed; some "demonstrated a primary interest in the is-
sues of justice and basic fairness involved in this case, not a simple
focus on compensation. ' '272 Others had only financial interests or
were motivated by self-aggrandizement 2 73
Turning from accounts by injured parties to third-party descrip-
tions, sociologist Kai Erikson has written a book274 that parallels
Gilbert's in terms of its emotive power. Erikson was employed by the
law firm of Arnold & Porter during its representation of the victims of
the Buffalo Creek Flood in the early 1970s. He offers an analysis of
the individual and communal losses suffered when a torrent of water
and sludge wiped away people, homes, and towns along a river hollow
in West Virginia. Whereas Gilbert offers her own first-hand exper-
268 Id. at 15-65, 118 (describing that DSIN created "an empowering dialogue with
Dalkon Shield women" by cracking "the legalistic rhetoric"); see also Joan E. Steinman,
Women, Medical Care, and Mass Tort Litigation, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 409, 410-14 (1993)
(reflecting on the prevalence of injuries to women in large-scale tort litigation).
269 Hicks, supra note 56, at 118.
270 Id. at 57. Subsequently, when she tried to speak during the hearing on the plan, she
was ejected by marshals from the courtroom. Id. at 70; see also Sobol, supra note 9, at 180
(also describing that, during the hearings on the proposed bankruptcy plan, the courtroom
could not accommodate the number of women who wanted to appear and quoting Judge
Merhige's view that "'there isn't any need for them to stay around"'). According to Sobol,
Judge Merhige explained that "[e]vidence as to the value of any individual's claim is, in the
Court's view, irrelevant to this issue [of determining the estimated value of outstanding
Dalkon Shield claims] and a claimant will not be permitted to testify or offer evidence of
an individual claim." Id. at 179; see also Ronald J. Bacigal, The Limits of Litigation: The
Dalkon Shield Controversy 98-99 (Carolina Academic Press 1990).
271 Hicks, supra note 56, at 64-96, 124-32. The mailing list of claimants cost $82,877. Id.
at 101.
272 Id. at 100; see also Bacigal, supra note 270, at 114 (quoting Dalkon claimants after
the settlement and creation of a $2.475 billion fund: "We've had no recognition or admis-
sion about our injuries much less an apology. This has all been depersonalized into only a
monetary issue.").
273 Hicks, supra note 56, at 101.
274 Kai T. Erikson, Everything in Its Path (1976).
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iences, Erikson piles a myriad of quotes from flood victims before the
reader and argues that the repetition is essential for those who are not
victims to glimpse the experiences of loss. 275 In a film made about
those events, victims spoke of their surprise and anger that the mining
company was unresponsive to their injuries.276 A second book about
Buffalo Creek, authored by attorney Gerald Stem, who while at
Arnold & Porter represented some claimants, describes their need to
have the company "admit responsibility."' 77
In a subsequent series of essays, Erikson reports that what he
learned from Buffalo Creek pressed him to understand more about
what he calls a "new species of trouble."278 Erikson asks why, given
that about fifty thousand people are killed by car accidents, driving
does not prompt individuals to report dread comparable to that de-
scribed by those exposed to pollution and other forms of toxics. After
exploring a range of injuries, from toxic pollutants in river streams to
gas leaks, nuclear radiation accidents, and homelessness, Erikson
claims that these injuries violate the narrative plot line accompanying
ordinary injuries because these "troubles" have no clear beginning or
end but rather place individuals in ongoing uncertainty. These inju-
ries stem not from nature but from technology and do harm both to
individuals and to the social fabric of communities. From such "new
troubles" come feelings of outrage and dislocation, rather than resig-
nation or acceptance. 279
Peter Schuck's analysis of the Agent Orange litigation offers ad-
ditional images of tort plaintiffs. 80 The Vietnam Veterans asserted
harms not only from dioxin but also from a lack of recognition of in-
jury by a society that had not welcomed them back as heroes. Schuck
writes of veterans' views that the Veterans Administration was inac-
cessible, insensitive, and unresponsive to their needs. Part of what
veterans sought was admissions of guilt and acceptance of responsibil-
275 Id. at 183 ("A few paragraphs of description can scarcely begin to convey what the
tragedy must have felt like."); id. at 156 ("The words we will be reading were uttered by
solo voices, each of them expressing a private grief in a private way, but they are drawn
from a vast chorus of similar voices, and together they tell of experiences common to a
whole community.").
276 The Buffalo Creek Flood: An Act of Man (Appalshop Film & Video 1975).
277 Gerald Stem, The Buffalo Creek Disaster at x, 18 (1976). Nancy Morawetz also
reports that those suffering from a very different kind of injury-Cuisinart consumers-
also sought punishment for the company, alleged to have violated antitrust laws, rather
than only monetary compensation. Morawetz, Bargaining, supra note 26, at 15.
278 Kai Erikson, A New Species of Trouble: Explorations in Disaster, Trauma, and
Community (1994).
279 Id. at 142-51.
280 See generally Schuck, Agent Orange, supra note 53.
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ity.281 In a film made by a trust fund created from the proceeds of the
settlement of that lawsuit, the message was that injuries were not ex-
perienced solely by veterans but were shared by families of veterans,
all in need of community services, support, and understanding. 282 Af-
ter presiding over hearings held in five cities across the country about
the settlement of the case, Judge Jack Weinstein described his work as
listening to veterans and permitting "individual contact. 28 3 He wrote
that individuals wanted participation and exchange: someone to call
on the phone, someone to hear their "heartfelt cries for justice," and
someone to respond to their "distress." 2 4 After settlement, more
than a "haif million telephone calls" were logged by the claims facility
established.285
Other examples come not directly from litigants but filtered
through the press. In what was described as "a unique separate agree-
ment," women who won an employment discrimination case against
State Farm Insurance Company agreed to pay part of their damages to
the "37 other plaintiffs who decided not to settle and lost their cases in
court. '286 As one litigant explained: "'It had been their experiences,
their witnesses, their time, their effort and trauma .. that put pres-
sure on State Farm."'
By virtue of personal accounts by participants and through in-
depth social histories by academics, one learns of groups of people
281 Id. at 174-76; see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 768,
768-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing objections by class members to the settlement because
it contained "no admission of guilt, no assignment of blame" and because of government
failure to participate and admit its role).
282 Vietnam Veterans, Their Families, Their Legacy (Farragut North Prods. 1994).
283 Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 764-75 ("More than a thousand class members have
expressed their views .... The quotations [here] do not begin to reflect the moving sights
and sounds of the hearings... ."). Judge Weinstein heard some 600 people at the hearings.
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 134, at 543.
284 Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 134, at 543; see also Agent Orange, 597 F.
Supp. at 770 (reporting on Veterans' objections that "a trial-win or lose-is preferable to
a settlement"); Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at 95. In the Agent Orange
distribution plan, these views were reflected in that $60 million in funds were used to pro-
vide services; one-half was paid to veteran-related groups. Schuck, Agent Orange, supra
note 53, at 219. As Schuck put it, by the settlement, Weinstein "established ... a large new
federal benefit program for Vietnam veterans." Id. at 223; see Vietnam Veterans, Their
Families, Their Legacy, supra note 282.
285 Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 134, at 543; see also Weinstein, Individual
Justice, supra note 21, at 94.
286 Hager, supra note 46, at Al. As of that writing, successful plaintiffs and their attor-
neys had contributed more than $320,000. Id.
287 Id. (quoting Gloria Bernell Scott, who had pledged $5000 to "begin an 'appreciation
fund"'). The 814 women in the settlement were to receive "an average of $193,000," and
none would receive "less than $150,000" (minus fees and expenses). The report does not
clarify how much the losing plaintiffs would receive, as compared to the winning plaintiffs,
nor whether those losing plaintiffs would be charged attorneys' fees. Id. at A8.
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trying to cope with experiences of disaster, a part of which entailed
their functioning as litigants in court. In many accounts, individuals
describe a sense of entitlement to redressm and an expectation that
courts and law (if not defendants) would be responsive to that right.2.9
Lawyers play a prominent role in the writings of plaintiffs. Sandra
Gilbert makes plain that her conversations with her lawyers and the
opposing counsel constitute a good deal of her experience of the law.
As Karen Hicks puts it, "trial lawyers mediate the legal system for
victims., 29
0
Of course, all of these descriptions are partial-both in the sense
of being one-sided and in the sense of being animated by deeply held
personal views about the legitimacy of the status of rights-seeking and
about the nature of the harms experienced. Moreover, post hoc ex-
planations by plaintiffs of their reasons for pursuing remedies may be
influenced by a desire to downplay certain motives and highlight
others perceived to be more socially desirable or noble.
Further, detailing tort plaintiffs' needs is not necessarily to sug-
gest that courts could or should be responsive to those needs, be they
processed individually or in the aggregate. The kinds of injuries that
Erikson sketches have a totality for which it is hard to imagine ade-
quate response-from courts or from other institutions. Even when
the injuries are understood to be less invasive, court-based procedures
288 Perhaps reflective of'such popular concerns about the experience of injustice, Presi-
dent Clinton issued an "apology" to those subjected to radiation by the United States in
experiments conducted from the 1940s to the 1970s. Remarks by the President in Accept-
ance of Human Radiation Final Report, 1995 WL 579664, at *2 (White House) (Oct. 3,
1995) (stating that government has a duty to admit to wrongdoing against citizens). The
President's apology resulted from recommendations made by a committee formed for the
purpose of investigating secret Cold War era government experiments on incompletely
informed or unwitting human subjects. The Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
Experiments found a small number of experiments in which the government violated medi-
cal ethics and harmed individuals. The Committee suggested further factfinding be done
regarding other incidents. In those studies identified to have harmed individuals, the Com-
mittee recommended a government apology to victims and their families; in one instance,
the recommendation of an apology was predicated on the basis of the dignitary harm suf-
fered from the government's failure to obtain consent from subjects. Advisory Comm. on
Human Radiation Experiments, Final Report 801-07 (Oct. 1995) (Recommendations 1-3).
289 See Merry, supra note 255, at 2-4. Note that, unlike Coffee's assumption that in mass
torts, victims "seldom have much in common besides their injury," Coffee, Entrepreneurial
Litigation, supra note 24, at 887, these accounts suggest some degrees of commonality. in
Agent Orange, a shared experience of being veterans in an unpopular war, in Dalkon
Shield, a shared experience of real or threatened impairment andlor potential loss of fertil-
ity. Further, while Coffee identifies the possibility of juries' interests in "levying retribu-
tion," id. at 917, he does not explore whether plaintiffs might share that goal.
290 Hicks, supra note 56, at 100; see also Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at
12 (discussing lawyers' failures to communicate with clients, and clients' communications
of distress to courts). Social theorists agree. See Bourdieu, The Force of Law, supra note
225, at 833-34; Sarat & Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness, supra note 54, at 1664.
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may well be seen as but one of many modes of redress. And to the
extent litigation is one of those modes, it could be conceived to be a
process designed to maximize individuals' desires or could also be
viewed as a process in which litigants' preferences (while interesting)
do not have prescriptive power.291
Our point here is first to mark the possibility that courts, lawyers,
or others within the litigation context could attend to the expression
of some of these needs and, second, to compare these discussions-
about people who present themselves as needy because they suffered
injuries (whether compensable or not)-with descriptions of litigants
who have no knowledge and experience of an injury. Tort cases in-
clude many litigants who report injury prior to group litigation.292 In
contrast, a consumer class action is a case in which the existence of
injury, such as an overcharge, may not be known. To consider how
legal rules might take such distinctions into account, we turn from a
focus on studies of particular injuries to discussion of what empirical
social scientists have found in systematic studies of civil litigants.
These quantitative data provide insight into the views of both plain-
tiffs and defendants in individual cases. To date we do not have em-
pirical research on litigants' experiences in aggregate litigation.293
b. Experiments and Surveys. Empirical studies of litigants
come in two forms. One genre is "experimental" and involves neither
real litigants nor courts. Rather, psychologists set up mock events,
291 Different disciplines consider individual vantage points and use varying terms to cap-
ture beliefs reported by or attributed to individuals. Much public policy research, including
demographic and economic studies and much of the marketing research in the private sec.
tor, relies on reports from individuals about themselves, their experiences, attitudes, and
beliefs. See Deborah R. Hensler, Studying Gender Bias in the Courts: Stories and Statis.
tics, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 2187 (1993) (detailing the interaction between quantitative and quali-
tative reports).
The economic literature explores what it terms "preferences," assumed to have utility.
maximizing capacities; the difficulties of identifying and measuring preferences, let alone of
making interpersonal comparisons, are also a subject of much discussion. See Sunsteln,
supra note 243, at 793-812.
292 A Florida bar rule, recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court, is another
example of the assumption that tort victims know of their injury before contacting lawyers.
See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995), upholding, over First Amend-
ment objections, Florida Bar's prohibition on mail solicitations by attorneys of the families
of tort victims; the bar's view was that such mailings, intrusive on families coping with
painful losses, reflected poorly on lawyers. Id. at 2380. The four dissenting justices argued
that the measure was designed to protect lawyers' reputations rather than litigants' inter-
ests, and that unsophisticated victims would be particularly disserved. Id. at 2384-85 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting).
293 Insofar as we are aware, and despite Judge Weinstein's recommendation, Weinstein,
Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 134, at 472, no such research has yet explained whether and
how the existence of the aggregate litigation affects litigants' perceptions.
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enlist mostly students, present them with hypothetical problems, and
then observe their responses. The strength of the experimental
method is that it allows researchers to vary systematically the charac-
teristics of a situation (here, procedures for dispute resolution) and to
analyze if and how individual behavior is affected; weaknesses of this
approach stem from its very artificiality and the degree to which the
simulation mimics real-world attributes of the procedures studied.
Beginning in the 1970s, John Thibaut and Laurens Walker initi-
ated a series of such experiments,' 94 spawning the procedural justice
literature that subsequently moved those efforts from modeling to the
"real" world.295 Thibaut and Walker focused their inquiry on what
"procedures are most likely to contain features that are responsive to
the particular concerns and values of disputants in various social set-
tings. '296 Attempting to isolate aspects of adversarial and inquisitorial
systems,2 97 Thibaut and Walker identified discrete elements of proce-
dure (such as the degree to which a third party or the disputants had
"control") and attributes of disputants (such as the degree of conten-
tiousness), tested various scenarios on participants, and concluded
both that participants distinguished between outcome and process and
that different forms of process yielded varying levels of participant
satisfaction and perceptions of fairness.
Researchers, such as those at RAND's Institute for Civil Justice,
have subsequently sought to understand what actual litigants-both
plaintiffs and defendants-want in litigation and their perceptions of
it. As noted at the outset, in a study of court-annexed arbitration, the
most "frequently cited objective of lay litigants [both plaintiffs and
defendants] in adjudicatory proceedings was to 'tell my side of the
story."' 298 In decreasing order, one-half of the plaintiffs wanted to
294 John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis 10-
13, 18-19, 30-32, 42-44, 55-57, 68-72, 85-87, 99-100 (1975).
295 See, e.g., E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice
(1988).
296 Thibaut & Walker, supra note 294, at 3.
297 How successful they were is a subject of debate. See, e.g, Mirjan Damaska, Presen-
tation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. Pa. L Rev. 1083, 1095-1100 (1975)
(questioning whether some of the experiments of Thibaut and Walker actually simulated
distinctions between adversarial and inquisitorial systems).
298 Hensler, Myths and Realities, supra note 1, at 99 (sixty-two percent of plaintiffs and
63% of defendants answered thus (citing data from MacCoun et. al, supra note 256)). Be-
tween one-third and one-quarter also wanted to "prove [the] other side [was] not telling
[the] truth." Id.; see also E. Allan Lind, Arbitrating High-Stakes Cases: An Evaluation of
Court-Annexed Arbitration in a United States District Court 44-53 (RAND No. R-3809-
ICJ 1990) (considering litigants' views of arbitration and noting that whether individual or
business entity, whether one time or repeat player, fairness ratings of process were compa-
rable; that litigants' favorable reactions to arbitration hearings appear to be related to the
"greater opportunity for some form of adjudication" than cases resolved with less process;
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"collect" what they "deserve[d]," and thirty percent wanted "a neutral
opinion on what [the] case [was] worth. '299 About one-quarter of the
plaintiffs and almost one-half of the defendants wanted to "put an end
to the dispute. '300
As Deborah Hensler has summarized another study of tort liti-
gants, "objective case outcomes, costs of litigation and time to disposi-
tion contribute less to plaintiffs' satisfaction with the litigation process
than perceived fairness of the process. ' 301 That study compared liti-
gants who had their cases decided by trial, arbitration, bilateral nego-
tiation between lawyers, or by court-supervised (litigant absent)
settlement conferences. Litigants whose cases were decided by trial or
arbitration found those experiences more fair, dignified, and careful
than did those whose cases ended by negotiations with or without a
judge.3 02 In short, these empirical studies conclude that, for litigants
in individual cases, process matters; both plaintiffs and defendants de-
scribe themselves as caring about it, independent and distinct from the
outcome.
B. Effectuating Outcomes
An alternative focus-closer in many respects to the doctrine on
attorneys' fees and to some aspects of due process law analyzed
above-conceives of courts as one means by which to obtain compli-
ance with legal norms. Echoing (or generating) the utilitarian ap-
proach found in Justice Powell's Mathews v. Eldridge calculus, 303
much of this literature considers the role of litigation in terms of the
costs, accuracy, and utility of outcomes; economic models are the
touchstone. The constant concern is that either the direct costs of liti-
gation or the social costs (which include erroneous decisions in all di-
rections, uncertainty, and investment of public funds to administer the
system) outweigh the benefits gained.304 Assuming investment suffi-
also noting that corporate litigants valued formality of process more than did individual
litigants).
299 Hensler, Myths and Realities, supra note 1, at 99.
300 Id. at 99 tbl. 6 (describing "litigants' objectives in arbitration").
301 Hensler, The Real World, supra note 40, at 4 (discussing Lind et al., Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of Their Experiences, supra note 239); cf. Rosenberg, Causal Connection,
supra note 41, at 913 (assuming litigants would trade loss of "personal choice" for a "sub-
stantial increase in compensation").
302 Lind et al., Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences, supra note 239, at 967-
68.
303 424 U.S. 319, 326-32 (1976).
304 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Admin-
istration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973), provides the classic analysis.
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cient to result in court decisions, "two distinct products" result: "dis-
pute resolution and rule making. '305
Theories of litigation have developed not only for the individual
case but for group litigation as well. In both individual and group
situations, the presumptive purpose of litigation is some kind of "ex-
pected relief... either an amount of money or one of a series of
injunctive decrees," and litigants are assumed to have "preferences"
that some believe can be "imputed to them with some degree of confi-
dence. '30 6 Commentators also consider how the existence of a group
may affect the value of individual claims, potentially diminishing some
claims and enhancing others307 Such theorists are acutely aware that,
once a group is assembled, the largest stakeholders may be the law-
yers who represent that aggregate.
In contrast to some legal and political theorists who aspire to a
morality and politics of process independent of the lawyers who ap-
pear on behalf of litigants, economic theories of litigation-like the
litigants who have themselves written about their experiences in law
and the empiricists who have quantified those experiences-often put
lawyers into the underlying analysis. 308 Moreover, economists are in
the forefront of considering aggregate litigation, in which the promi-
nence of lawyers' economic stakes gives rise to concern about lawyers'
relationships to both courts and their client 309
305 Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and
Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. Literature 1067, 1070 (1989). In the context of shareholder
derivative suits, Roberta Romano considers benefits beyond the settlement value of litiga-
tion to include monitoring and enhancing the alignment of director and shareholder incen-
tives. See Romano, supra note 25, at 70-85 (concluding that such litigation is a "weak ...
instrument of corporate governance" and leaving to further study the issue of whether
litigation's production of legal rules creates sufficient benefits to outweigh the costs). An-
other function of litigation noted in some of the economic literature is its informational
value-that it provides a mechanism of informing people about risks of products. See, e.g.,
Paul H. Rubin, Tort Reform by Contract 19-28 (1993); Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation
Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 Md. L. Rev. 1093, 1120-26 (1993); see also Ian Ayres
& Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining. Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate a
Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.. 1027, 1038 (1995).
306 Lewis A. Kornhauser, Control of Conflict of Interest in Class-Action Suits, 41 Pub.
Choice 145, 147 (1983) (discussing class action litigants).
307 See, e.g., Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24, at 907-15.
308 See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 305, at 1069 (for a "rationally self-
interested person" to make decisions about pursuit of a claim, he or she needs to weigh
"immediate costs (hiring a lawyer, filing the claim) against benefits expected in the future
(the proceeds from settlement or victory at trial ... )"). Cf. Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing
Through Agents, supra note 79, at 510 (arguing that economic models of litigation ignore
the role of agents). As noted above, a few political theorists focus on lawyers as well; for
example, Bourdieu examines the role of legal professionals in the production of the power
of law. See supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text.
309 Kornhauser, supra note 306; Romano, supra note 25.
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Economic models generally conceive of the attorney-client rela-
tionship in terms of principal and agent in which the lawyer-agent is
delegated to provide a set of "services" that require decisionmak-
ing.310 These agents in turn require "monitoring," "bonding" (in the
sense of modes of ensuring loyalty311 rather than in the psychological
sense of developing a personal relationship), and incentives to ensure
that the agent pursues the principal's charge faithfully.3 12 Focusing on
large-scale cases, economists posit that client-principals have difficulty
monitoring their attorney-agents for a number of reasons. Because
individual injuries may be small, the law complex and technical, and
the lawyers distant and relatively invisible, the costs of client monitor-
ing are prohibitively high.313 Remote clients in turn undermine con-
straints that the normal means of bonding (rules of ethics,
reputation 314) provide to ensure lawyer fidelity. The incentives (as in
financial investments or awards) of neither the principal nor the agent
provide sufficient insurance of faithful discharge of tasks.315
310 See Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 12-13 (review-
ing the literature).
311 See, e.g., Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business 4 (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) [hereinafter Principals and Agents] ("[B]usinesses,
workers, consumers, and indeed all participants in society at large regularly struggle to deal
with the intractable problems that arise in agency relationships.... Although we must
expect waste, slothfulness, and even dishonesty to be with us always, the question is
whether we can keep them to manageable proportions."); see also Kenneth S. Arrow, The
Economics of Agency, in Principals and Agents, supra, at 37, 50 (noting noneconomic
modes of monitoring, including ethics, education, and social systems, not captured in much
of the modeling as of the mid-1980s); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives In the
Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 Bell J. Econ. 55, 57 (1979) (considering the utility
functions of the principal to be wealth and those of the agent to be both wealth and effort).
312 John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in
Principals and Agents, supra note 311, at 1, 13-18.
313 Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24, at 884-85; see also Coffee, The
Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 71, at 679-80 (discussing small-stake plaintiffs). Some of
the discussion also assumes "a large number of individuals . . represented by a single
individual," and a class in which individuals' only interests are in "maximizing the remedy
personal to" themselves. Kornhauser, supra note 306, at 150, 171 (noting that his model is
a "simple model of conflicts of interests").
314 Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 14-17.
315 See, e.g., Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General, supra note 162, at 243 (dis-
cussing how incentives he terms perverse may prompt plaintiffs' lawyers to agree to nonpe-
cuniary settlements and describing how adversaries may, in essence, collude); John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation,
Law & ontemp. Probs., Summer 1985, at 5 [hereinafter Coffee, The Unfaithful Cham-
pion] (conceptualizing plaintiffs' attorneys as "risk taking entrepreneurs" who cannot be
constrained by clients); Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at
22-27 (discussing the divergences between plaintiffs and their attorneys); see also
Kornhauser, supra note 306, at 146 (describing class actions as one example of the "mul-
tiparty principal/agent relations" problem). In her empirical study of shareholder deriva-
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While some commentators believe that increased judicial moni-
toring would be ameliorative 316 (the judge as surrogate client or as
surrogate fiduciary?), others have advocated that the principal-agent
problem could be avoided if the principal-agent were collapsed into a
single actor.317 The academic proposal is an auction aimed at transfer-
ring ownership of a case, either to the defendant(s) who would settle
for a sum equal to its value or to others who would litigate when nec-
essary. The theory is that such a transfer would best align the incen-
tives of principals and agents, would rationalize the investment of
transaction costs to achieve a particular outcome and would conserve
judicial resources spent in attempting to monitor or alter incentives.318
If successful, the result would be an efficient investment of resources
for an outcome-the speedy transfer of funds to those who have suf-
fered the harm319-which in turn would enable effective private en-
forcement of the law.320
tive actions, Romano found that "awards are paid to attorneys far more frequently than to
shareholders." Romano, supra note 25, at 61.
316 See, e.g., Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at 63; Coffee, Rescuing the
Private Attorney General, supra note 162, at 277-79, 286-87 (advocating judicial control
over selection of plaintiffs' counsel but that plaintiffs' attorneys should then be permitted
to distribute fees among their ad hoc law firm as they desire); Kane, supra note 26. at 390-
93; Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 134, at 505-06. Not explored are the problems
of the judicial agendas, some aspects of which-such as docket management-may well
pose conflicts with plaintiffs' interests.
317 See Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 6. 106-16.
Bidders include defendants. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Market Ap-
proach to Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 909, 913 (1995) [hereinafter Macey
& Miller, Tort Reform]. When the auction cannot transfer the entire claim, the alternative
is a "sale of lead counsel rights." Id. at 914.
318 Macey & Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits, supra note 25; Macey
& Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 108-10. In his essay The Un-
faithful Champion, Coffee also explored but rejected the auction option based on his view
that it did not respond sufficiently to the regulatory needs in such litigations. Coffee, The
Unfaithful Champion, supra note 315, at 77-79; see also Thomas & Hansen, supra note 25,
at 436-53 (considering complexity of judges as auctioneers and undesirability of permitting
defendants to bid).
John Coffee has recently argued that in some class actions, a "reverse auction" occurs,
by which the defendant negotiates prefiling with plaintiffs' lawyers who then file a settle-
ment class action. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 48, at 1370.
319 See Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 103 (contem-
plating that nonlawyers-including defendant companies-might be bidders and that in
such instances the money paid would be transferred directly to the corporation, in a deriva-
tive action, or distributed to shareholders); see also Thomas & Hansen, supra note 25, at
448-49.
320 See Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 110 ("Poten-
tial defendants could be expected to adjust their primary conduct accordingly in order to
equilibrate their marginal costs of expected litigation losses with their marginal costs of
complying with the law."). Cf. Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the
Monitoring:. How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class
Actions, 104 Yale LJ. 2053,2105-09 (1995) (describing an empirical analysis of large inves-
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Proponents of auctions such as Professors Jonathan Macey and
Geoffrey Miller initially acknowledged the limits of their model, de-
veloped in the context of derivative and shareholder litigation. They
noted that auctions might be inappropriate when "important individu-
alized issues.., would require extensive participation by class mem-
bers."'321 Further, when discussing civil rights and other cases in which
injunctive relief is sought, they state that an "auction approach may
simply be infeasible in injunctive cases where ideology is a major fac-
tor."322 In a subsequent article, however, they urged expansion to the
mass tort arena.323
While economists bring lawyers into the picture, little of the eco-
nomic theorizing of litigation focuses on process. Similarly missing in
the analyses of principal and agent is the idea of a relationship be-
tween principal and agent: the existence of the principal-agent unit
does not only entail the discharge of some task with its delegated deci-
sionmaking but also the activity of having the relationship itself.32 4
Some form of relatedness might be relevant to many principal-agent
agreements. 325 But when the principal and agent are client and law-
yer, the relationship also has a social and political valence, with the
lawyer functioning as a conduit for the client to have relationships
with courts, opponents, and co-claimants. 326 Further, the principal-
tors' stakes in securities litigation and arguing for legal rules to permit such investors to
take more central roles). A key distinction between mass tort and securities aggregates is
that in many securities cases, at issue is the transfer of wealth-with attendant transaction
costs-from one group of stakeholders to another, while in mass torts, the plaintiffs have
no stake, ex ante, in the defendant corporation(s).
321 Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 106; see also
Macey & Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits, supra note 25, at 461
(describing cases not eligible for auctions as those that include "important individualized
issues not held in common by the class"). However, their auction proposal is framed for
"large scale, small-claims cases," Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra
note 25, at 4, that could include tort litigants. The initial essays on auctions do not address
whether commercial litigants may be in search of vindication. Morawetz, Bargaining,
supra note 26, at 15.
322 Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 116.
323 Macey & Miller, Tort Reform, supra note 317, at 915-17 (noting problems such as
choice of law, plaintiff-witness cooperation, and the need for some pretrial discovery to
establish value, but arguing that such difficulties are likely surmountable).
324 Gilson and Mnookin do address issues of relationships, but their focus is on the rela-
tionships between opposing counsel. Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents,
supra note 79, at 534-50. They argue that development of "credible reputations for cooper-
ation"-developed in the context of opposing counsel-can alter the incentive structures
of conflicts and "facilitate dispute resolution." Id. at 564.
325 In other words, one might not map all of the principal-agent relationship by assum-
ing that an agent is either self-regarding or other-regarding; at points the two postures
could intersect.
326 See, e.g., Gilbert, Wrongful Death, supra note 259 (recounting her experiences, in-
fused with lawyer failures to respond to her personhood). Even those commentators who
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agent relationship as discussed in the context of auctions in large-scale
litigation misses the multiplicity of clients and lawyers in some aggre-
gates, as well as what much of the literature on lawyering posits that
lawyers do. It is to the role of lawyers in either enacting rights or
effectuating outcomes that we turn next.
C. The Role of Lawyers
Those who theorize about the work of lawyers base their analyses
on an amalgam of doctrine, legal ethics, individual narratives, and oc-
casionally larger empirical projects to identify purposes for lawyers
and what they accomplish. One aspect of this literature (termed by
William Simon the "professional vision"327) assumes the lawyer de-
picted in the codes of conduct. This is the loyal advocate, the client-
focused agent, working diligently within the constraints of law on be-
half of and at the behest of a client,32 to facilitate dispute resolution
and consensual agreements. A related "ideal" is that which Anthony
Kronman terms the "lawyer-statesman," who possesses the "virtue of
practical wisdom" that affects not only individual lawyer-client rela-
tionships but also public policy.329
A lawyer's relationship with his or her client is the centerpiece of
a good deal of the commentary. The assumption is that a lawyer's role
requires a form of relationship with and responsibilities to clients that
may be in conflict with ordinary ideas about how people interact.
Charles Fried offers the model of the "legal friend," a role that can
justify behavior that would be inappropriate (and even immoral) for
distinguish among kinds of claims in classes, and who may recognize the potential for indi-
vidual client control in mass tort aggregates, do not focus on this aspect of lawyering. For
instance, Coffee distinguishes among "Iype A class actions," in which an individual claim is
marketable, that is, the stakes are sufficiently high as to attract an attorney and some "cli-
ent control is possible"; "Type B class actions" in which claims have no independent mar-
ket value; and "Type C class actions," in which a mix of such claims is present; he argues
that Type C claims exemplify most mass torts-with substantial variance in the degree of
injury. See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24, at 904-07.
37 William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469, 469
(1984) [hereinafter Simon, Visions of Practice].
328 William Simon calls this a "libertarian approach," in which a lawyer has the authority
to "pursue any goal of the client through any arguably legal course of action." William H.
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1085 (1988) [hereinafter
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering].
329 Kronman, supra note 137, at 51; see also Sol M. Linowitz with Martin Mayer, The
Betrayed Profession: Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century 244-45 (1994) (simi-
larly invoking the history of the legal profession as imbued with traditions of professional
independence and public service, and calling for renewed commitment to "civic leader-
ship" by lawyers).
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an ordinary citizen or political coventurer. 330 Responding to the con-
cern that the lawyer-client relationship is impersonal and "paternalis-
tic," Richard Wasserstrom argues that the "relationship of inequality"
is intrinsic in professionalism; one can attempt self-conscious efforts to
diminish the demeaning treatment of clients that results. 331
Objecting to a role morality that differs from common morality,
David Luban proposes an ideal of the "morally activist lawyer [who]
shares... with her clients responsibility for the ends she is promoting
in her representation [but who] also cares more about the means used
than the bare fact that they are legal. ' 332 Deborah Rhode argues that
feminists are suspicious of the traditional hierarchy of lawyers over
clients and that feminism can infuse the role with more collegial rela-
tions as well as reframe the structure of the workplaces of lawyers.333
William Simon advocates the "discretionary lawyer" whose responsi-
bilities include not only the client and the legal system but also third
parties who could be hurt by singleminded advocacy; a discretionary
lawyer's responsibility is to achieve justice in a given situation.3 34
Gilson and Mnookin propose a generative role for lawyers to play in
facilitating dispute resolution and in enhancing cooperative
exchanges.335
Tiuing to the context of group litigation, commentators aware of
the limits of lawyering nonetheless voice aspirational themes of law-
yers attending to clients. Nancy Morawetz argues for an independent
lawyer role in evaluating settlements to ensure distributional fair-
ness.336 Deborah Rhode calls for acknowledgment of both conflicts
among clients within groups and obligations to facilitate client input
and evaluation. 337 Lawrence Grosberg aspires to "client-centered
norms" 338 in which an ethic of respect for the individual client ani-
mates efforts to mediate conflicts among them.339 Despite such aspi-
330 Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 passim (1976).
331 Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum. Rts. 1,
16, 19, 23-24 (1975).
332 David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study at xxii (1988).
333 Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 39, 49-53,
57-72 (1994).
334 Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra note 328, at 1083-85; see also William
H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. Rev. 30.
335 Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra note 79, at 510-13.
336 Morawetz, Bargaining, supra note 26, at 32.
337 See Rhode, Class Conflicts, supra note 26, at 1185.
338 Lawrence M. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40 Syr-
acuse L. Rev. 709, 713 (1989).
339 See id. at 714-15. Grosberg justified this approach by resort to morality (the idea of
integrity of the individual) as well as to efficiency (in that the client knows more than do
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rations, the little empiricism that exists about lawyers for groups
concludes that neither those lawyers characterized as social advocates
nor those characterized as economically motivated describe them-
selves as organizing "class members to participate in the suit or to
engage in other activities complementary to the suit."340
Another strand, emerging out of the critical legal studies tradi-
tion, offers a less determinate picture of the world and a less cheerful
version of lawyering. The predicates are that the world is organized
around relations of power, that neither clients' interests nor legal rules
are determinate, and that lawyers and clients construct meaning and
knowledge through interactions in which the lawyer is the dominant
actor.341 Rather than a lawyer giving voice to or "translating" for a
client, telling stories and empowering, the lawyer is often seen as un-
able to hear a client's needs or to respond appropriately.3 2
Depicted sometimes poignantly as people speaking past each
other,3 3 sometimes oppressively as lawyers who silence and
subordinate clients,3 " sometimes in shifting modes in which much but
not all of the time lawyers' powers dominate,345 the picture presented
is that attorneys do not offer much connection and comfort to the in-
dividual clients with whom they work.346 The professional posture of
lawyers is seen as intrinsically more oppressive than empowering.
Some of the criticism is about structures of power in which lawyers
individual lawyers). Id. at 719-22. To that end, he proposed that lawyers in class actions be
required, as a matter of ethical rules, to sample clients and to reach out to them. Id. at 778.
Like the other theorists here, no discussion addresses the IRPAs within the group, and the
model remains focused on one lawyer who has many clients.
340 Garth et al., supra note 40, at 381.
341 See Simon, Visions of Practice, supra note 327, at 469-72.
342 See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: To-
wards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 Cornell L Rev. 1298, 1300-01 (1992).
343 See, e.g., White, Notes On the Hearing, supra note 73.
344 Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Hastings Li. 769, 778-
79,811-28 (1992) [hereinafter Alfieri, Disabled Clients] (discussing the "victimization strat-
egy of disability advocacy" which "reproduces images of... dependence, incompetence,
and deviance" and "inhibits ... narratives of... autonomy and community"); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100
Yale LJ. 2107, 2131 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice] (ar-
guing that poverty lawyers' reliance on their own "narratives to define the client's story ...
silence and displace client narratives"). White argues that, "[b]ecause advocacy is a prac-
tice of speaking for [the client] ... the advocate... inevitably replays the drama of subor-
dination." Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor. 56
Brook. L. Rev. 861, 861 (1990) [hereinafter White, Lawyering for the Poor].
345 See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power Negotiating Real-
ity and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 Cornell L Rev. 1447 (1992) [here-
inafter Felstiner & Sarat, Enactments of Power] (arguing that an attorney's power is not a
constant but varies with the context of law, the kind of client, and the relationships
developed).
346 Sandra Gilbert's book is bleak testimony of this view. See supra notes 260-64.
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collaborate,347 while other commentary focuses on the impoverished
vision lawyers bring to the practice.348
Not utterly depressed, many critical and progressive scholars in-
clude hope for lawyer reorientation toward an explanatory and par-
ticipatory mode. Clark Cunningham argues for lawyers to see
themselves literally as both translators and in need of translation, that
they must learn from as well as provide bridges for clients.349 William
Felstiner and Austin Sarat underscore that clients retain power-of
payment and of settlement or discord-and that mutual interdepen-
dencies of lawyers and clients create sufficiently complex relationships
as to enable the shifting of power between participants.3 50 Lucie
White reminds us of "elusive moments of human connection as well as
the endless currents of contest."' 351 She hopes for a "practice of law-
yering that would continually cede to 'clients' the power to speak for
themselves. '352 Anthony Alfieri calls for "commitment to client nar-
ratives";353 Gerald L6pez argues for "rebellious idea of lawyering"35 4
that rejects the model of lawyers (acting alone or with other lawyers)
as the best problem solvers and that shifts the focus to the interactive
dynamics of client, lawyer, and professional and lay allies, apprecia-
347 Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1721 (1994) (reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds., 1992)).
348 In a recent essay, civil rights litigator Herbert Eastman criticized himself and his
colleagues for failing to convey clients' injuries in an expressive form. Herbert A.
Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J.
763 (1995). He compared the richness of historical and journalistic accounts to lawyers'
"sterile recitations of dates and events" that educated neither judges, far removed from
worlds in which injuries occurred, nor the media and the larger community. Id. at 766-71.
Eastman commented: "Perhaps we write like lawyers to avoid responding as people." Id.
at 801.
349 See Cunningham, supra note 342, at 1357-82 ("[B]y being trapped in my assurance as
a lawyer and professor that I knew the answers, I could not be a student, could not
learn.").
350 Felstiner & Sarat, Enactments of Power, supra note 345, at 1497-98.
351 Lucie E. White, Seeking"... The Faces of Othemess...": A Response to Professors
Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1499, 1507 (1992); see also White, Lawyering
for the Poor, supra note 344, at 887 (urging lawyers to listen, as "learners and as friends" to
clients, when considering how to frame their work).
352 White, Lawyering for the Poor, supra note 344, at 863, 886 (urging lawyers for the
poor to enact in their own attorney-client relationships the transfer of power to the poor).
353 Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 344, at 2146; see also
Alfieri, Disabled Clients, supra note 344, at 835-40 (exploring "structure-transforming
practices").
354 Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 Geo. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989) [hereinafter L6pez, Reconceiving
Civil Rights Practice]; see also L6pez, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 137, at 5-10.
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tion for the partial knowledge of all, and increased collaboration to
alter practices and enhance resources355
Whether liberal, critical, or traditional, theorists of lawyers por-
tray the work of lawyering as a social enterprise, with the potential for
being interpersonally enriching. Lawyers are in conversation and
joint ventures with clients, and sometimes are potential adversaries of
their clients. From these perspectives, lawyers' goals include more
than the economic benefits derived from employment by a princi-
pal,3 56 so that focusing exclusively on problems of monitoring, bond-
ing, and loyalty misses the interpersonal collaboration and exchange,
as well as the political purposes, that lawyers and clients may share.
V
RESHAPING AGGREGATION
A. The Predicate Assumptions: Paying for More than Outcomes,
Anxiety About Lawyers, and Attending to Individuals
Political theorists of litigation tend to ignore the mediating and
sometimes debilitating roles that lawyers play in process; economic
modeling assumes some set of cases without ideological content and
hence proposes reforms to diminish transaction costs by minimizing
litigant participation357 If judges and lawyers are rational actors,
however, they have strong incentives to conceive of litigation as mul-
tipurposed, to believe that some fundamental form of governance is
enacted by adjudicatory modes of dispute resolution, and therefore to
be wary of principal-agent analogies that are not enriched with rela-
tionship, voice, expression, and human dignity.358 If courts are about
355 L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice, supra note 354, at 1608-09. William
Simon criticizes these models, arguing that effective lawyering always entails lawyers' im-
position of value judgments. See William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Law-
yering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48
U. Miami L. Rev. 1099, 1102-03 (1994), in which Simon comments that such scholarship
tends to "sentimentalize poor clients" and their communities, underestimating the com-
plexity and conflict of collective action. Id. at 1114.
356 Indeed, Mary Ann Glendon's recent book, A Nation Under Lawyers 20-32 (1994)
recalls the days (only decades ago) when discussing salaries was considered a topic to be
avoided when applicants interviewed with large firm lawyers, who valued their indepen-
dence and provided for their members and associates. Her plea to lawyers and legal edu-
cators is to regain some sense of law as engaged with reason and embedded in practice. Id.
at 246-94.
357 See Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 117-18.
358 Here again, Bourdieu's discussion is apt; he wrote of how ritualized events support
invisible power, legitimated by shared foundations of belief.
The symbolic efficacy of words is exercised only in so far as the person
subjected to it recognizes the person who exercises it as authorized to do so, or,
what amounts to the same thing, only in so far as he fails to realize that, in
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no more than norm enforcement by means of monetary transfers and
coercive orders, their transaction costs and inefficiencies (as compared
to other means of regulating or effecting monetary transfers) mark
them as headed for either extinction or the periphery.
What courts offer-better than insurance companies and admin-
istrative regulation-are opportunities for public participation, for
transformative exchanges about, as well as reaffirmation of, social and
moral values. Note the baseline: we are not arguing that courts offer
generous opportunities for participation, 59 only that courts offer
more when contrasted with other modes of transferring funds and reg-
ulating behavior, and further, that courts attain legitimacy in part be-
cause they offer such participatory, expressive, ideological moments.
Moreover, even if judges and lawyers no longer have such aspira-
tions for adjudicatory processes, the United States political system has
imbued some segment of the population with expectations that courts
are about more than outcomes; legal consciousness and rights-seeking
abound. Given political and legal theories of process and litigants'
goals and needs (as they express them and empiricists document
them), some form of participation (be it representative or personal)
and some kinds of ideology360 are always present-from the vantage
point of either the justice system or litigants. In short, we assume that
litigation does more than produce outcomes.
We also assume that both economic and political structures create
incentives for lawyers and clients to diverge, and that difficult moni-
toring problems inhere in large-scale litigation. Not only do we agree
with legal economists that problems of lawyering are central, we be-
lieve also that, while the difficulties may manifest themselves some-
what differently in civil fights and tort aggregate litigation than in
commercial litigation, the underlying concerns are the same. In all
instances, because the agents' knowledge is far superior to that of the
principals, the magnitude of the scale increases the problems of what
Kenneth Arrow terms "hidden action."'361 Attorneys' incentives may
vary when lawyers have large sums of money to gain, as contrasted
with when lawyers are litigating structural injunctions for which they
gain less directly in economic terms. Let us not, however, assume that
submitting to it, he himself has contributed, through his recognition, to its
establishment.
Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, supra note 225, at 116.
359 See Gilbert, Wrongful Death, supra note 259, at 310-11; Hicks, supra note 56, at 96-
100; Hensler, Myths and Realities, supra note 1, at 97-100; see also Robert 0. Bone, Statis-
tical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 Vand. L.
Rev. 561, 619-20 (1993).
360 See Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 116.
361 Arrow, supra note 311, at 38.
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these are fundamentally different problems. Remember that institu-
tional litigators also fear bargains that pit their clients' injunctive rem-
edies against the legal right of the public interest law firms that
employ them to recover fees.3 62 Further, ideological agendas may di-
vide lawyer and client,363 and the clients themselves may have diverse
views on the wisdom of particular "reforms."'36 Tort litigation offers
yet another variation of agent-principal conflicts, in that personal
wealth as well as reputations of individual lawyers are at stake, as con-
trasted with the interests of the institutions that employ public interest
lawyers and enable their representation of present and future clients.
Another framing assumption is that within aggregate litigation,
individuals will continue to need attention and that their perceptions
of the process are a social and political concern. We began this essay
with the history of the rise of aggregate litigation that, by definition,
dampens down client participation, if defined as individual control or
authority to direct a litigation 65 But aggregation also enables partici-
pation, if conceived broadly as access to redress.
The questions are whether the conception of participation can be
richer, and what kinds of intermediate solutions (between equating
individual participation with strategic independence and litigating au-
tonomy,366 on the one hand, and equating participation with access
and asking for nothing more, on the other) rulemakers might craft.
Short of individual, independent cases, law could provide moments of
individual attention to litigants within an aggregated whole, could at-
tend to varying and potentially incommensurate valuations across a
range of litigants within an aggregate, could deploy more effectively
362 In Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), the Supreme Court upheld defendants' abil-
ity to offer settlements expressly rejecting lawyers' fees when bargaining with civil rights
plaintiffs entitled to statutory fee shifts. Id. at 729. ve are told that many civil rights
lawyers respond with retainer agreements that authorize them to refuse such bargains.
363 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving TWo Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Inter-
ests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale LJ. 470, 471 (1976) (analyzing conflicts
between civil rights lawyers' goals and educational needs of clients); see also Rhode, Class
Conflicts, supra note 26, at 1211-12 (discussing a dispute among parents of children institu-
tionalized for severe mental disabilities about the desirability of institutionalization); ce.
Nathaniel R. Jones, Correspondence, School Segregation, 86 Yale L.J. 378, 379-80 (1976)
(responding to Bell and arguing that attorneys' goals and clients' needs were congruent).
364 See Hicks, supra note 56, at 88-96 (discussing divisions among claimants' organiza-
tions in Dalkon Shield litigation); Rhode, Class Conflicts, supra note 26, at 1203 (arguing
that named plaintiffs may be poorly situated to monitor on behalf of class and may instead
press their own remedial preferences); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Intervention and the
Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L Rev.
244, 258-60 (1977) (discussing the intervention during the remedial phase by an organiza-
tion, "Bustop," which opposed the school district's desegregation plan).
365 Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal, supra note 226, at 198.
366 See id. at 269-79.
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the many lawyers within the aggregate, and could obtain information
derived from that engagement with individuals so as to affect the
whole.367 Rules of aggregation could focus on process values, individ-
ual litigants' experiences, and the financial incentives affected by
those rules.
We turn therefore in conclusion to general suggestions about how
to translate these concerns into practice. Of course we cannot "pro-
pose a... model that fully and adequately accounts"3 68 for problems
solved imperfectly by economists and ethicists, judges and lawyers, so-
cial scientists and lay participants; we offer instead the issues that
rulemaking and aggregate proposals must confront.
B. Restructuring the Whole with the Process, Individuals,
Lawyers, and Fees in Mind
1. The Many Questions When Structuring Fee Payments
Several issues need to be confronted when fee payments are
made. To date, the principal academic suggestion is that a judicial
auction of representation rights to competing attorneys serves best to
align the interests of litigants and lawyers? 69 We do not object to
competitive bids among lawyers but also do not believe that an auc-
tion provides much by way of response to the problems of fees and
representation in tort aggregation as we have elaborated them. In
some ways, focusing on an auction could distract, rather than sharpen,
the discussion because of the conflation of several distinct
questions.370
A first is about value-what one is paying lawyers for: outcomes,
services, third-party benefits, personal attention, legal education, or
some amalgam thereof? While the auction proposal assumed the an-
swer to be solely the economic value of a cause of action, proponents
of an auction might respond that the commodity on the auction block
367 We understand that this aspiration is optimistic; that some degree of political dispos-
session flows from the delegation requisite in the fact of representation, see Bourdleu,
Language and Symbolic Power, supra note 225, at 171-228, and that our hopes for court-
based dialogic exchanges to "encompass in a single whole both the community and the
individual, the state and the citizen," see Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 99 Yale L.J. 1, 82 (1989), reflect centuries of constitutional aspira-
tions not yet fulfilled.
368 Charles W. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the
Limits of Professional Discipline, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1984, at 293, 319.
369 Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 108-09, discussed
supra notes 317-23 and accompanying text.
370 Compare our questions with those in the exchange between Macey and Miller In
Macey & Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits, supra note 25, and their
critics, Thomas & Hansen, supra note 25.
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could be not only a cause of action and'its monetized value but also a
set of services (e.g., education about legal rights, opportunities to "tell
one's side of the story," and social interaction). One could alter the
price to include vindication rights of litigants and procedural interests
of the judicial system and of diverse communities. If these services
have value, someone will buy them. Indeed, there already is such a
market, called "private judging," in which those with resources
purchase "trial time" from individuals whom purchasers authorize to
decide their disputes.
Thus far, the academic auction proposal has not specified the sets
of goods and services (other than the cause of action) it purports to
offer for sale, has not considered how to price mixed goods, has not
explained how to deal with commensurability problems (such as
whether to permit menus of goods so that sellers and buyers can offer
and select personally tailored packages), and has not considered
whether sets of goods and services are unvaried across kinds of cases,
sellers, or potential purchasers3 71 For example, tort aggregates offer
an example of cases in which some participants might value relation-
ships (both that of the agent-principal and of the court-litigant) and
procedural legitimacy along with the production of damage awards,
injunctive relief, and information.372 Alternatively, if the lawsuit one
has in mind is a derivative action, one does not immediately imagine a
corporation (however much a company may have a legal persona) as
in need of a relationship with lawyer or court. Even there, however,
the didactic aspect of legal regulation of the corporate persona within
the litigation context may have public effects.
A second problem with the auction as a solution is that it fails to
specify how one will price or pay for the services provided and how
one would choose among competing packages. Auctions could be un-
derstood as simply one way for lawyers or others to make price pro-
posals; the bids submitted-via auction or some other method--could
offer percentage of funds recovered, hourly fees, hybrid methods, or
something else. Auctions also do not clarify a third issue: who makes
the bid, a question that is distinct from the mode of payment. For
example, if one were persuaded by Gilson's and Mnookin's thesis
371 See Macey & Miller, Tort Reform, supra note 3i7, at 915-17 (arguing for use of an
auction in mass tort cases and noting potential difficulties only in obtaining cooperation of
witnesses who have sold their claim, appraising claims, and establishing facilities for admin-
istrating future claims).
372 As Judge Weinstein puts it, "every lawsuit implicates the public interest. ... V/hat
renders a mass tort case different is the degree to which all participants-judges, lawyers,
and litigants-must deal with the case as an institutional problem with sociopolitical impli-
cations extending far beyond the narrow confines of the courtroom." Weinstein, Individ-
ual Justice, supra note 21, at 45.
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about the desirability of lawyers engaging in cooperative behavior
with adversaries and if one believed that law firms could obtain and
maintain reputations for such cooperation,37 3 one might want to dis-
courage the formation of ad hoc firms and permit representation of
aggregates only by preexisting firms. Alternatively, if one believed
that some of these cases pose unique problems for which current legal
practice is ill-adapted, one might be enthusiastic about selection of a
range of lawyers, otherwise unaffiliated, who could share in the work
and offer together a composite of skills not found in a single ongoing
firm.374 Further, one might well want other professionals (social
scientists, social services) or co-claimants to provide services and
therefore to make bids.
Yet another question is the method of selection of those to be
hired, which in turn is tied to the question of who selects representa-
tives. Who are the imagined purchasers for the multipurposed process
in the large-scale litigation auction? An assumption animating the
original auction proposal is that litigants lack the wherewithal to bid
but that they are the relevant principals and that the judge acts on
their behalf.375 If one believes that the litigation serves more than
claimants' interests, they may not be the only relevant principals.
Moreover, regardless of one's aspirations for litigation, several poten-
tial agents for claimant-principals are on the aggregate scene. Should
IRPAs choose among bidders on behalf of their clients? Should law-
yers who have served on PSCs before be empowered to decide which
bid to accept? Could judges select lawyers, and both legitimate those
lawyers in the eyes of clients and also obtain legitimacy from those
lawyers during the course of the proceedings? What about judges'
distinctive interests, as managers of dockets? Would judges shop ef-
fectively for lawyers to maximize clients' process and substantive in-
terests, or would they prefer lawyers who promise prompt
resolutions? What about relying on opponents to select claimants'
lawyers? 376 Or an unregulated market? Could claimants participate
in choosing group representatives? Could they be organized in ad-
vance and select lawyers directly, or educate judges or other client-
delegates about their needs? Do those needs exist, ex ante?
373 See Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra note 79, at 516-20,530-34.
374 Cf. In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 223, 226 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (rejecting a
proposed "joint bid" by two law firms because, while joint ventures were common in busi-
ness, permitting law firms to make such proposals would "substantially lessen
competition").
375 Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 25, at 106-08.
376 This is Coffee's claim, that in some cases, via a "reverse auction," defendants pick
lawyers for the plaintiff class by identifying lawyers in one jurisdiction who will settle the
case and preclude other claimants. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 48, at 1371-73.
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Of course, the pool of imaginable selectors is shaped by the tim-
ing of the selection, which is yet another issue. One could have some-
one make preliminary decisions, subject to revision (indeed, making
that a part of the auction package), or one could attempt to take into
account changing information and the evolving size and structure of a
litigation and build in a series of decision points and different deci-
sionmakers. 377 Further, under the rubric of timing comes not only the
issue of selection but also, again, the question of payment. One could
fix a method of payment beforehand, without room for revision, or
one could structure a series of hearings that permit changing decisions
about who is paid and for what.378
Yet other issues revolve around discretion, context, and rulemak-
ing: should this series of questions be asked afresh, at the micro level,
at the commencement, and in the context of each new aggregate? Or
should these issues be fixed, by rules or statutes, and specified across
or by categories of cases? Because we share with legal economists
concerns about principal-agent problems and agree that those con-
cerns cannot be limited to the large-scale, small-dollar claim context,
we are leery of totally discretionary systems in which clients, lawyers,
or judges have unfettered discretion to respond to the series of issues
we have set forth.379
377 Macey and Miller note the possibility of auctioning part, rather than all, of a claim.
See Macey & Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits. supra note 25. at 461.
They also suggest that auctions occur after initial discovery and perhaps with the assistance
of a special master to develop information. Id. at 467.
378 The theoretical model on which the auction rests might be elaborated to take some
of these issues into account, although building such models would be difficult. For exam-
ple, as our economist colleagues have explained it to us, lawyer services might be under-
stood as the quality aspect of the product, while the outcome might be equated with its
price. Bidding simultaneously for these two kinds of goods is difficult, since the pressure
may be on minimizing service to lower the price. Different "customers"--assume here
litigants-might want various components of the product, and the tradeoffs entailed make
the auction model complex, although "mechanism design" might be a means by which to
respond. See Eric L. Talley, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liqui-
dated Damages Rule, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1195, 1220-24 (1994).
379 Yet another problem with an auction is the question of the sale itself, with its result-
ing commodification of the values of process. One might argue that the judge as auction-
eer and the substitution of monetary amounts for rights enactment are at odds with the
political and social claims made on behalf of process and with the social and psychological
needs fulfilled by litigation, that it is noxious to assume that litigation is comparable to
"antiques, horses, houses, and corporations, for starters." Macey & Miller, Auctioning
Class Action and Derivative Suits, supra note 25, at 468. Recall Hicks' argument that some
segment of the Dalkon Shield claimants sought social justice, not money. Hicks, supra
note 56, at 100. As our colleagues Peggy Radin and Nomi Stolzenberg have discussed,
inalienability has a long tradition within property theory, and the kinds of exchanges within
litigation conceived here as socially and politically generative could fall within those cate-
gories. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 Harv. L Rev. 1849
(1987); Nomi Stolzenberg, Restraining Inalienability (forthcoming); see also Viviana A.
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Our hesitancies about the viability of the academic version of the
auction are illustrated in some respects by the experiences of a crea-
tive federal district judge who has endeavored to require attorneys to
bid, competitively, for the rights to represent plaintiffs in securities
class actions.380 Believing that competitive bidding in advance of rep-
resentation best approximates the ways in which clients make deci-
sions, 381 Judge Vaughn Walker has attempted to require bids from
lawyers seeking class certification and status as lead counsel. What his
experience reveals is an amalgam of problems. First, there is some
evidence that lawyers are hesitant to compete in the judicial forum;
the judge has commented on the relatively few bids submitted. 382 Sec-
ond, the problem of timing of appointment is genuine. For example,
in one lawsuit, one set of plaintiffs' attorneys had negotiated with de-
fendants before filing the lawsuit; other lawyers were understandably
reluctant to compete for appointment as lead counsel.383 Moreover,
appraising the qualities of bids requires sophistication; Judge Walker
has sought not only information about proposals for billing fees and
costs; he has also asked for information on malpractice insurance and
completion bonds.384 The packages proposed by different lawyers
vary, and selections require tradeoffs that in turn demand value-laden
evaluations. In one lawsuit, Judge Walker rejected all attorneys' bids
and instead turned to a plaintiff who was an institutional investor with
Zelizer, Morals and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United States
(1979); Richard Titmus, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy
(1971).
We do not make this objection because we think commodification inevitable, as is
court superintendence, if not creation, of at least some lawyer-client relationships within
aggregates.
380 See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re Oracle Sec.
Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 542-48 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (awarding rights to lead lawyers based on
bids presented for fees and costs constituting a percentage of the recovery in a securities
class action); In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 223 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re Wells
Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (same); In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec.
Litig., No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11587 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1995); In re
Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1361 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 2, 1996) (attempting a bidding procedure but ultimately abandoning it); see also
discussion infra notes 381-85 and accompanying text.
381 Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. at 690-92.
382 See Cal. Micro Devices, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11587, at *10 (of 12 plaintiff firms
that were involved, only two submitted bids).
383 Id. at *4; see also Howard Mintz, Judge Levels Collusion Charge at Class Counsel,
The Recorder, Aug. 8, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, The Recorder File
(describing the submission of two bids and Judge Walker's view that plaintiffs' attorneys
had attempted to circumvent bidding process "by acting like a cartel").
384 Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. at 472-73. Judge Walker also rejected the propo-
sal that lawyers from different firms form an ad hoe litigating unit. Wells Fargo Sec. Litig.,
156 F.R.D. at 226.
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a substantial economic stake to whom he ceded the choice of lead
counselP85
In short, when courts create aggregates, it is impossible to simu-
late real clients' experiences. Judges are not surrogate clients, and the
clients within many aggregates are not themselves an undifferentiated
whole. Rather, courts create relationships among lawyers and among
groups of litigants. Whether setting fees and costs ex ante or ex post,
judges have a host of difficult regulatory choices to make. No mecha-
nism exists that reduces the task to a simple equation, and simplifying
techniques always entail value judgments.
2. Some Regulation: The Melding of Procedural and Ethical Rules
What is needed then is an amalgam of either statutes or rules, to
constrain discretion to a degree and yet to permit discretion to re-
spond to the variability in litigating arrangements that even this
lengthy essay does not address. The need for regulation comes from
our view of the source of some of the problems: On judges' and law-
yers' watch, the scale of litigation has increased, and with it the
amount of capital (both symbolic, in Bourdieu's sense as8 and eco-
nomic) at stake. Acknowledgement of the need to police those con-
glomerates should be expressly made by the rulemakers who create
aggregates.
For example, not only should more informal guides, like the Man-
ual for Complex Litigation, offer instruction; rulemaking itself should
articulate that in some class actions, class representatives will have to
fashion means to ensure the delivery of legal services and procedural
opportunities for individual clients.387 Similarly, statutes or other
rules that create provisions for aggregation should acknowledge the
existence of variation among claimants within an aggregate. s  Be-
385 In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1361, at *60 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1996) (ruling that plaintiff may "choose class counsel and
proceed with the litigation as it sees fit").
386 See supra note 253.
387 Judge Schwarzer's suggestion of the expansion of mandates to the trial judge, consid-
ering settlements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), offers some examples of issues, including
distribution among claimants, that a judge might consider. See William W Schwarzer, Set-
tlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 Cornell L Rev. 837, 843-44
(1995).
388 See Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14
Rev. Litig. 79, 105-06 (1994) (commenting on proposed revisions to Rule 23 and arguing
that, while reliance on judicial discretion is appropriate to some extent the rule should
include guidance about how much judges should value litigant autonomy and process val-
ues). But see Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at 3 ("A personal approach in
individual cases cannot be readily reproduced, codified, or institutionalized by rule or
statute.").
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cause mechanisms for achieving some recognition of these interests
have to evolve, be tested, and be revised, the charge at the level of
statute or rule should be somewhat general: take individualization
and delivery of legal services into account, understand the diversity of
interests, and conceive of the common benefits of aggregate litigation
as embracing the process by which outcomes are derived as well as the
outcomes themselves. 38 9
Regulation should not only provide a generic admonition; it
should also authorize judges to police those procedures by warning
lawyers that failure to meet these obligations could be grounds for
disaggregation and could be relevant to the payment of both costs and
fees.390 Here our concerns exemplify the point about the convergence
of rules of procedure and rules of ethics. By organizing aggregates as
we suggest, judges will also be structuring rules of practice, just as they
currently do under the rubric of managing the pretrial process and
discovery. Appellate courts, in turn, should require trial judges who
make rulings on these issues to support their decisions with factfind-
ing; appellate courts will need to provide oversight to buffer under-
standably pressured trial judges' potential to sweep too broadly.
Comparable mandates would be needed to fill the gaps in current eth-
389 As we have been in the process of writing this essay, judges have raised concerns
about conflicts within aggregates and about the inadequacies of the current framework.
For example, in March 1996, the bankruptcy judge who presides over a part of the Dow
Coming Corporation bankruptcy, stemming from the breast implant litigation, dismissed
the creditors' committee that had been formed. That committee had included eight law-
yers, all of whom had been active in the tort litigation about implants, as well as Sybil
Goldrich, who was a breast implant recipient and a cofounder of a support group for
women with implants. The bankruptcy judge concluded that none were "creditors holding
unsecured claims" as required by federal bankruptcy law and that the attorneys had many
possible conflicts stemming from their representation of women with a diversity of claims
and interests; the court also determined that the physician claimants were not adequately
represented and that a committee representing them needed to be formed as well. See In
re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-20512, 1996 WL 127968, at *25 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 21,
1996) (Order Regarding Various Motions for Orders to Appoint Additional Committees
or To Modify the Composition of Existing Committees) [hereinafter Dow Corning Com.
mittee Order]; see also Thomas M. Burton, Judge Reinstates Plaintiffs' Committee in Dow
Coming Corp. Bankruptcy Case, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1996, at B2; Tamar Lewin, Judge In
Dow Implant Bankruptcy Ousts Lawyers on Panel, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1996, at A7; dis-
cussion supra note 266.
390 While the process was ongoing of determining whether the initial "global" settlement
offer in the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Litigation would cover all eligible claims, Sybil
Goldrich suggested a "ratcheting down" of lawyers' fees if claimants' payments had to be
limited. Conversation with Sybil Goldrich, cofounder of the Command Trust Network,
group providing information to women with breast implants (Spring 1995).
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ical rules. 391 Of course, all will fall short of responding fully to the
role ambiguity that exists for lawyers in large-scale cases.392
3. Multiple Agents
In a world of multiple principals,393 attention should be turned to
multiple agents. Instead of going in the direction of collapsing agent
and principal or centralizing lawyering in the hands of a very few, we
urge consideration of expanding and differentiating roles among the
many agents that the economic value of some large-scale litigations
can support. Given that the principals have both commonalities and
divergences of interest, disaggregation of the agency role offers oppor-
tunities. In addition to the deployment of special masters or court-
appointed guardians ad litem, obvious candidates for some agents'
jobs are the lawyers that some litigants bring with them to the aggre-
gate. Judges have already transformed some lawyers into agents for
the whole by naming them members of PSC, liaison counsel, and the
like; we think it time to expand on the concept of common benefit
tasks.
For example, as judges assemble the "players," they could con-
sider enlarging both the set and the number of actors who have court-
conferred stature. It has become customary for judges to choose law-
yers to serve on PSCs, whom we conceive of as the "lawsuit's law-
yers." Judges might also designate other groups of representatives or
call for lawyers, claimants, or others to constitute such groups. Judges
could select a "clients' committee" comprised of both individual law-
yers and clients as well as other professionals-social workers, com-
munity organizers, social scientists, health professionals, lay
advocates, or financial experts-as is appropriate under the circum-
stances.394 These assignments could be to facilitate client-attorney
391 See Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at 53-84.
392 See Twitchell, supra note 26, at 709-14; cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reflections on
Judge Weinstein's Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L Rev. 569, 578
(1994) (questioning whether legal ethics are the model here or whether, given what he
perceives to be interest representation, the "norms governing those who wield authority in
legislatures and city councils or in corporations and labor unions" should be sources
instead).
393 Compare Arrow's discussion, Arrow, supra note 311, at 42,46 (discussing single prin-
cipal/multiple agents and risk averse agents and/or principals).
394 See, e.g., Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation, supra note 133, at 587-88
(arguing that current legal education is not much designed to enhance lawyers' abilities to
be good communicators with clients); see also Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note
134, at 544 (arguing that a "client-court relationship" could enable a sense of participation
and respond to complaints about lawyers' disinterest in playing such a role). For insistence
on the ability of claimants to participate, see Dow Coming Committee Order, No. 95-
20512, 1996 WL 127968, at *12 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 1996) ("In a patronizing and
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communication and to ensure client knowledge about the litigation.3 95
Alternatively, others within the aggregate-claimants or IRPAs-
could propose or create structures that focus on such needs.
Whether by such a committee or not, judges could order lawyers
to communicate with all or a sample of clients directly, so as to en-
hance claimant input.396 Given the data that individual attorneys
spend modest numbers of hours in ordinary litigation,397 such commu-
nications could inform clients of the resources that lawyers could pro-
vide and inform individual lawyers that someone other than the client
might learn of their limited or faulty performance. 398 In this respect, a
"clients' committee" or other court-created entities provide some of
the "bonding" functions that large-scale litigation undermines. 399 Fur-
almost sexist way, the United States trustee made the startling assertion that among the
hundreds of thousands of women who claim injury or illness arising from the Debtor's
[breast implants], he could not find the minimal requisite of three to sit on a committee In
this [bankruptcy] case.").
395 Given the disheartening literature on clients' experiences with lawyers, IRPAs might
need training and/or monitoring to take on the positive aspects of this role, especially if
these roles are conceived to include the kind of ceding of authority from lawyer to client to
which critical theorists aspire. See, e.g., L6pez, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 137, at
44-56; Cunningham, supra note 342, at 1357; White, Lawyering for the Poor, supra note
344, at 863.
396 For example, when assessing a proposed settlement in a class action securities litiga-
tion, Judge Walker required a survey of some plaintiffs with significant claims to learn
whether a proposed settlement and attorney-fee award "enjoyed affirmative support of the
purported class." In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1361, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1996). The Claims Facility created pursuant to
the first proposed settlement in the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Litigation took on some of
these tasks; our call here is for formalizing the need for such activities and considering
whether to develop categories of cases in which court or administrative-based institutions
are presumptively preferable and others in which the lawyer-client unit should be the basis
for disseminating information. Compare Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at
96-98 (discussing the court's "direct relationship" with claimants) with Thomas W.
Henderson & Tybe A. Brett, A Trial Lawyer's Commentary on One Jurist's Musing of the
Legal Occult: A Response to Judge Weinstein, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 592, 594-96 (1993) (argu-
ing for a more limited role for courts). Technology (i.e., computer networks and video-
tapes) enables some alternatives and might also suggest which institutions are best situated
to generate such networks.
397 See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, William L.F. Felstiner, Austin Sarat & David M.
Trubek, The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 Law & Soc'y Rev. 251,266.
67,267 fig. 2 (1985) (examining data on differential modes of payment and concluding that,
whether paid by contingency or hourly rates, attorneys averaged 45-50 hours on cases in
which the stakes were under $10,000); see also MacCoun et al., supra note 256 (reporting
that median billable hours of personal injury lawyers in a sample of cases involving
automobiles was 20).
398 See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799, 873
(1992) (arguing for multiple modes of enforcing lawyers' obligations and a "multi-door
enforcement strategy").
399 Bankruptcy law requires committees of creditors and their composition varies de-
pending on the kind of stake held. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994). However, when tort litiga.
tion has been subsumed in bankruptcy, some judges have not attempted to differentiate
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ther, given judicial oversight of fees, if lawyers in the litigation under-
stand that their contingency fees may be at risk of reduction, their
interest in client services should increase.
This kind of oversight need not only be threatening to lawyers; it
could also be generative, augmenting their ability to represent individ-
ual clients.400 Moreover, in some instances, communications from this
court-authorized committee could validate individual lawyers' com-
munications with clients that little or nothing can be done on the indi-
vidual level at a particular time in a lawsuit. Court attention to the
provision of individual services might also be somewhat responsive to
the "glitz factor," that the high visibility roles of PSC members make
the work of ordinary lawyering appear "mundane," worthy of neither
attention nor financial incentives.
In particular cases, additional committees might be designated for
particular phases. 401 Perhaps another group or committee could take
on the function of designing procedures in claims facilities; its mem-
bers might have special expertise, both in terms of processes that
could be afforded and in terms of the kinds of proof that would be
requisite to receiving compensation.40 Another group might have the
function of monitoring costs and be charged with having or gaining
sufficient knowledge about the PSC's conduct of the litigation as a
whole to be a sophisticated appraiser of the quality and quantity of
the PSC's work.403 Because IRPAs are contractually bound to be-
come sufficiently expert so as to represent individual clients and be-
cause their own economic interests are also at stake, IRPAs might
function as monitors of the progress of the litigation and the expendi-
among the former tort plaintiffs/now creditors to assess the individual values of their claims
and arrange them on different committees accordingly. See, e.g., Kane v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 843 F2d 636, 646-48 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding no prejudice by the assignment of "one
dollar value to each claim"). Compare Dow Coming Committee Order, No. 95-20512,1996
WL 127968, at *3-*4, *12-*13, *25 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 1996) (detailing the differ-
ences among claimants and disbanding a Tort Claimants Committee comprised primarily
of plaintiffs' lawyers).
400 See, e.g., Rheingold, supra note 102, at 6-8 (detailing activities of lawyers for group
litigants, including developing studies of products, employing mock jurors, holding schools
for lawyers, preparing model trial notebooks, creating data bases, commissioning biostatis-
ticians, and arguing for regulatory changes).
401 See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 Iowa L Rev. 981, 983
(1993) (arguing that at the remedial stage of structural litigation, a "distinct normative
theory of participation" is needed from that deployed during the liability phase). We are
less clear than Sturm about the independence of liability and remedy.
402 For example, such a group could require firms to provide uniform billing forms or set
up a data base to make information readily compared.
403 The costs of such monitoring should come from lawyers' fees so that the process of
supervision would be paid by the lawyers, not the clients, thereby creating incentives to
have billing and expense records readily accessible to third-party monitors.
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tures made, and work either in lieu of or in conjunction with sophisti-
cated clients.404 As long as IRPAs' payments and the attorneys' fees
as a whole are capped by the contingency-fee contracts signed or hy-
pothesized or by a POF set at the outset,40 5 and their additional work
is also not billed as extra travel expenses or the like outside the fee
arrangement, IRPAs could perform this function at no additional cost
to the clients. IRPAs are thus unlike the addition of outside lawyers
or guardians ad litem and intervenors that some commentators have
suggested should become monitors for claimants' interests.40 6
Such involvement might enhance the quality of litigation40 7 as
well as possibly reduce costs of litigation to the client-principals. 408
IRPAs' assumption of this role would be responsive to the concern
that, because clients have no options to shop for alternatives, no
404 In the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Litigation, a claimant was included on the plain-
tiffs' committee. See Goldrich, Command Trust Materials, supra note 266, and discussion
of the committees now formed in the related Dow Coming bankruptcy, Dow Corning
Committee Order, No. 95-20512, 1996 WL 127968 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 1996), dis-
cussed supra note 389. IRPAs could also provide some of the functions that a variety of
commentators call for by the creation of "class monitors." See, e.g., Bums, supra note 127,
at 196 (arguing for abolition of the named representative of a class and calling for others to
perform a supervisory role over lawyers); see also Christopher P. Lu, Procedural Solutions
to the Attorney's Fee Problem in Complex Litigation, 26 U. Rich. L. Rev. 41, 63 (1991)
(describing problems of policing lawyers applying for fees).
405 As noted, in disaster cases (fires, plane crashes, building collapses), most plaintiffs
have signed contracts; in products cases (such as breast implant and Dalkon Shield), some
plaintiffs have retained counsel, but others enter the litigation via notices of potential
funds. In some cases, judges calculate the total attorneys' fees to be paid as the sum of all
the individual contingency-fee contracts entered into or that would have been entered into
had each plaintiff retained his or her own attorney.
4M Coffee rejects a role for intervening class counsel because of cost. See Coffee, Res-
cuing the Private Attorney General, supra note 162, at 263-67 (searching for a "more eco-
nomical remedy" to protect class members' interests). Other proposals for judicial
monitoring come from Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at 98-99 (proposing
judicial supervision of attorney-client contact); Kane, supra note 26, at 405-09 (calling for
more cooperation and partnership between class action lawyers and presiding judges).
47 One researcher has reported that when individual clients are actively engaged, they
receive better services. See Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's In Charge?
106 (1974) (concluding that clients who were more assertive obtained better legal services
than did passive clients). Whether IRPAs' engagement can serve the same function as a
client has not yet been addressed in the empirical literature.
408 In terms of costs of litigation, the reduction would occur if IRPAs' oversight itself
costs less than the sums saved by such a review. That oversight could be less expensive If
judges required that all expenses be entered into a computer data base that would be
accessible to other plaintiffs' attorneys and their clients. In terms of attorneys' fees, this
approach has advantages whether the method of calculation is by a percentage of the fund
or a lodestar. If judges or litigants set a percentages of recovery for PSC members at the
outset, IRPAs' policing could protect against underinvestment of time or potentially too
eager interest in quick settlements. If a lodestar is to be calculated after the case con-
cludes, then the IRPAs could obtain useful information about productivity, duplication, or
waste.
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mechanism exists to discipline PSC lawyers.409 Active engagement of
some IRPAs could offer a genuine possibility of substitution of coun-
sel on PSCs if misbehavior can be detected as a litigation proceeds.
This role might be viewed as particularly useful if one is troubled by
the fictive nature of some of the valuations of claims en masse 410 or by
the variation among claimants in terms of the value attached to the
injury. Alternatively, if one perceived IRPAs as less able than the
lawyers selected for the PSC, one would be concerned that IRPAs'
participation could lead to lower overall valuation of the group's claim
or to wide variation among similarly situated claimants. Perhaps
judges or lawyers could designate yet a different group to assist in the
creation of client networks, independent of lawyers or with lawyers in
subsidiary roles. 411
These groups are not subclasses; they are not conceived solely as
representing interests that vary across the plaintiffs. These commit-
tees or groups would be, like a PSC, committees that function to serve
the claimants as a whole-and whose creation recognizes that such
service entails a range of concerns of which "global peace" is but one.
While some of these committees should be created by judges as early
as possible after aggregation,412 others may be needed at subsequent
phases of litigation.
We do not try to forecast all the iterations or forms but rather to
suggest that judges, lawyers, and rulemakers should consider how to
augment the structure that has developed thus far-with its singular
focus on the lawyers for the group en masse, some of whom are
picked for their ability to bankroll, some for management skills, some
because of ties to particular judges or defendants, some for prior ex-
perience, and some because of a client and/or lawyer base of support.
Given the well-documented disadvantages of both lodestar and per-
409 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24, at 885-87. Coffee also argues
that, to the extent control of PSCs is needed, steering committee members are better situ-
ated than a senior partner at a traditional firm to monitor the utility of the lawyers' work-
to assess the contribution to the "team effort." Coffee, The Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note
71. at 708-09. Coffee does not address the need to monitor for attention to individual
clients' needs.
410 See, for example, Schuck's description of the negotiations leading to the SISO million
settlement in Schuck, Agent Orange, supra note 53, at 143-67.
411 Cf. Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 21, at 49 (describing his "impression that
few of the groups of plaintiffs I have dealt with in the Agent Orange, asbestos, or DES
cases were helped systematically or sympathetically as communities by lawyers handling
their cases"); see also Goldrich, Command Trust Materials, supra note 266 (booklet that
"does not contain legal advice," for "women with implants" to help them "ask questions
and seek explanations").
412 They could, for example, be established in case management ordersandlor in notices
given pursuant to Rule 23.
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centage of the fund methods of payment, we do not hinge suggestions
of additional committees or of other mechanisms on or to a particular
form of fee payment for common benefit lawyers. We worry about
clients paying additional sums-in costs or attorney fees-for the fact
of aggregation absent a showing of their benefit (broadly conceived)
from that aggregation. The administrative structures we recommend
should be paid, to the extent possible, from lawyers' fees or be sup-
ported by volunteer services.
4. Multiple Fee and Cost Proceedings
Turning to attorneys' fees, the poor fit between methods crafted
with very different paradigms in mind demands revision of current
practices in the context of mass torts. Large-scale litigation seeking
monetary damages gives the aggregate of clients bargaining clout un-
available except to individual clients who are either very wealthy or
have sufficient repeat business to attract dealmaking. The custom of a
single attorney-fee proceeding at the conclusion of a lawsuit should be
rejected, replaced at least by discussion, if not negotiation, at the be-
ginning of the aggregation about costs and fees. Decisions made
should be subjected thereafter to periodic review.
Groups of claimants could interview lawyers, review proposals
for services, and serve either to select or to advise judges on selection.
If judges continue to appoint lead counsel on behalf of these clients,
judges could structure fee rules to emulate some aspects of today's
marketplace-by refusing at the end of cases to function as insurance
for lawyers who have spent more in time and resources than antici-
pated when they volunteered to participate as common benefit law-
yers, by negotiating for rates for items ranging from photocopying and
travel to associates' hours, and by seeking national uniformity on rates
rather than idiosyncratic arrangemeits.413 While inviting competitive
bidding is one option, another is to have specific guidelines promul-
gated by a specially created commission of lawyers, judges, and liti-
gants.414 Absent such standards, at the inception of the aggregate,
judges should oblige all lawyers to put their fee information on the
record and set either a fixed percentage (subject to reconsideration
periodically) or make plain the kinds of work that will be compen-
sated on an hourly basis.
413 One model could be the United States Trustee Guidelines, supra note 84; another Is
the per diem rate provided for federal employees, judges included. See Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, 3 Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures at 57, 57-
97 ("New Per Diem Locality Rates") (Jan. 17, 1995) (on file with authors).
414 As proposed by Bieder, supra note 84.
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Judges can also ensure that litigants, the public, other lawyers,
and themselves obtain the requisite information about costs and fees
as the case progresses by requiring every lawyer in the litigation to
keep track of their hours and by demanding such information on
computer-based compatible billing systems rather than by the chrono-
logical list of activities, per lawyer, as is now commonplace. 415 Fur-
ther, the current practice of great secrecy in fee applications should be
replaced by open access, closed only upon a showing of strategic disa-
bility flowing from such disclosure. 416 F'mally, rather than conceptual-
izing the fee hearing as a singular event, judges should anticipate that
interim fee awards and multiple hearings might well be necessary, es-
pecially when the remedial phase of such litigation sometimes may
last years if not decades.417 Moreover, relevant participants in such
proceedings are not only lawyers but also claimants, who could be
queried about the quality of their experiences, about the information
provided, and about the accessibility of their lawyers. Absent national
standards, appellate review will be needed to oversee trial court pow-
415 See, e.g., the Sample Order provided by Manual Third, supra note 11, § 41.32, in
which lawyers are required to keep daily time and expense records.
416 See, e.g., Bowling Fee Hearing Transcript, Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-1-91-256
(S.D. Ohio 1995) (debating whether information about fee agreements among class and
other counsel should be disclosed); Manual Third, supra note 11, § 24.212 (noting that
sealed information about fees may be appropriate during litigation to avoid revealing at-
torney work product). The 1995 securities legislation provides that settlement agreements
"shall not be filed under seal" absent a motion and a showing of good cause, and that
settlement agreements should include statements about attorneys' fees and costs. Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(a)(5) (West Supp. 1996); see
also E. & S.D.N.Y. Loc. R. 5(a) (requiring disclosure of fee-sharing agreements when at-
torneys request fees in "stockholder and class actions"), discussed supra note 78. As a
means of checking plaintiff counsels' fee requests, some judges have required defense
counsel to provide parallel information. Hirsch & Sheehey, supra note 83, at 10-06.
417 The Heart Valve Litigation is an example; a system is provided by which recipients of
heart valves can obtain "explants"-removal and replacement of valves over a period of
many years. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc. 143 F.R.D. 141, 148-50 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (also
discussing the establishment of "patient benefit," "medical consultation," and "fracture
compensation" funds). When awarding fees to the class attorneys, the district court re-
jected a request to provide a lump sum for fees for future services but provided what it
termed a "novel" fee structure. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-1-91-256, slip op. at 58 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 1, 1996) (Memorandum and Order on Applications For Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses) (on file with authors). Judge Nangle determined that "Class and Special Coun-
sel" will be "entitled... to up to 10% of the defendants' [future] annual payments into the
pitient Benefit Fund, plus expenses," id. at 57; counsel must annually apply and provide a
statement of services to which opportunity for objections will be available; the fund's
trustee will make recommendations and a report; and the district court will then determine
the propriety of payment "at or near the time that [the] work is actually done and these
benefits are actually conferred upon the Class." Id. at 57-58.
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ers, and hence rules on appealability-already upon occasion made
elastic because of these issues-will need to be adjusted.418
Will the proliferation of structures create wasteful investments of
time? Who needs more lawyers in a world in which many fear
overlawyering? Our interest here is not in increasing the number of
lawyers engaged in the same tasks but rather to structure litigation so
that more of the lawyers involved are given specific responsibilities for
the varieties of work that such aggregates encompass. Obviously,
whether staffed by lawyers or other personnel, such additional work
might have to be paid for or provided on a volunteer basis.419 Pay-
ment would be possible for lawyers as long as they were understood as
conferring a "common benefit." If any lawyers worked as monitors,
they might "pay their own way" by superintending costs charged to
plaintiffs more closely than could a judge.420 In contrast, the work of
committees designated to consider the process or to focus on individ-
ual clients could not be readily monetized. Therefore, the legal rules
on the value of common benefit lawyers would have to shift to incor-
porate the idea that litigants' experiences of the process have a value
that redounds to the benefit of the group as a whole.42' In terms of
paying nonlawyers, here the Bankruptcy Act provides a model; its fee
provisions expressly recognize the authority of courts to order pay-
ment for persons other than lawyers.422 Other aggregate statutes
could follow suit.423
418 See, e.g., In re Showa Denko K.K. L-Tryptophan Prods. Liab. Litig.-II, 953 F.2d
162, 164 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding appealable a pretrial assessment of expenses from plain-
tiffs' lawyers).
419 Some lawyers have served on PSCs without compensation beyond the fees paid to
them by individual clients. See Notice to Plaintiffs' Attorneys in L-Tryptophan Cases, Sec-
tion II (on file with authors) ("L-Tryptophan PSC has disclaimed any intent to apply for
fees for time or services.").
420 See, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427, 1437 n.8 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Even
the best-run steering committees will necessarily involve some inefficiency and duplication
of effort."). Under Oklahoma fee-shifting law, the court declined to require payment of
assessments to a steering committee without an evaluation of the underlying legal expenses
represented by such charges. Id. at 1437.
421 See, e.g., Schuck, Agent Orange, supra note 53, at 199 (reporting that Judge
Weinstein did not compensate one lawyer, who had spent a good deal of time "organizing
veterans," because of a view that the work did not benefit the class as a whole).
422 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (1994) (authorization for payment for services rendered by
trustees, examiners, "professional person[s]," or attorneys and their paraprofessional
employees).
423 Federal procedural rules do not provide for fee shifting or fee awards, except as
sanctions. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (pleadings); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (pretrial matters);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (discovery); Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 (settlement). The premise is that the
Rules Enabling Act limits the power of rules to make such "substantive" decisions. See
supra note 99. Nonetheless, federal judges in class actions superintend payments to law-
yers, court-appointed experts, special masters, and administrators; judges could do the
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5. Insisting on Complexity
We make these suggestions cognizant that some will object, argu-
ing that what we are proposing is too complex. But it is not our sug-
gestions that are complex, it is the underlying litigation that includes
diverse interests brought together under the aegis of a single court
proceeding. Others will argue that to include a variety of participants
and to make plain the economics of the transactions will at a mini-
mum slow down the process by putting too many players at the table
and, more likely, undo the deal by shifting the focus from the whole to
its parts. Here they may point to the recent history of the breast im-
plant litigation, in which the clarity provided by a proposed settlement
and the breadth of its notice brought in so many claimants that the
economic value of the recovery dropped and the deal fell apart. 42 4
We readily acknowledge that uncertainty may have positive ef-
fects on bargaining and that some deals may well be struck that, had
disclosure been made, would fall apart. But while a given case may, in
retrospect, be termed a success (or at least a resolved dispute), few
commentators or participants close to the current mass tort aggregate
process applaud it. This is not a thriving social system that candor
might undermine 42s but one beset by problems that has drawn criti-
cism from most if not all quarters. Aggregation has too often oper-
ated to submerge the interests and needs of participants 426 and to
undermine the rationales for court decisiomaking. Some attention
needs to be paid to the diverse clients; some form of what Deborah
Rhode has termed a "pluralistic approach" 427 should inform the
processing and outcomes of mass torts. Group litigation has basically
belonged to judges, special masters, and lawyers-talking only with
each other and making decisions about categories of claims. We think
it time to change.
same for the kinds of work we suggest they mandate-using their authority under Rule
23(a)(4) to ensure the "adequacy of representation" or receiving additional authorization
by way of new rules or statutes.
424 Meier, supra note 44.
425 Cf. Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 296 (1990). Unlike Altman's
analysis of judicial misconceptions about judging that may constrain judges in socially use-
ful directions, the lack of candor here is not borne from lack of professional introspection
about what is "really going on." In our experience, the insiders know full well what drives
the bargaining system, and some of them are upset. disquieted, or outraged by the conduct
they observe.
426 See also Douglas Laycock, Due Process in Trilateral Disputes, 78 Iowa L Rev. 1011
(1993) (calling for representation in employment discrimination cases to include employees
other than those alleging discrimination); cf. Fiss, Allure of Individualism, supra note 228
(arguing that representation of one's interests in litigation should suffice).
427 Rhode, Class Conflicts, supra note 26, at 1222 (proposing this approach in the con-
text of structural reform litigation).
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Of course, to empower lawyers, other professionals, and selected
litigants is immediately to worry about their self-interests.4 28 We rec-
ognize many questions that creation of structures other than a PSC
will prompt. One set of problems relates to how additional lawyers
will be chosen and what incentives will be created by the existence of
these new roles.429 A second set of concerns is about the strategic
effects of diffusion and some forms of disaggregation.4 30 Other issues
relate to nonlawyer participants and which of them will come to the
fore.4 31 Yet another question is whether, as Peter Schuck argues, the
intragroup conflicts among claimants, their genuine differences in in-
jury and goals, and their geographic dispersion are hurdles too high
for their functioning as a coherent organization.4 32
Other problems return us to the question of value. Will the costs
of such new structures and procedures outweigh the marginal util-
ity?433 Will the social and public benefits be less than the individual
benefits, or distributed unevenly among plaintiffs? How should/could
judges respond to those claimants seeking large amounts of individual
attention and those who find less sufficient? Should there be cross-
428 See, e.g., Yeazell, Collective Action, supra note 135, at 53 (discussing the "economic
individualism" of plaintiffs' lawyers as animating their opposition to class action certifica-
tion of the Dalkon Shield litigation).
429 For example: How will lawyers get onto any of the proposed committees? For how
long should they serve? Could they rotate on and off (term limits), thereby lessening their
expertise but also weakening the potential for collusion? Will those involved on the client
committees (or their equivalents) try to overindividualize, undermining the utilities of col-
lectivization? Will lawyers on these committees gain too much clout, be seen as judges'
emissaries to the public? Will they imagine themselves as repeat players, attending more
to their lawyer colleagues and the judges than to a mass of clients who are unlikely to
employ them again?
430 For example, will fractionization result in these added committees strengthening de-
fendants' powers to divide and conquer? That is, would'opponents be able strategically to
exploit the existence of these committees to the detriment of plaintiffs? See, e.g., Coffee,
Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24, at 915-16; Twitchell, supra note 26, at 738-43.
431 Which clients and other professional or lay participants will be sufficiently visible to
be selected? Who will be seen as "acceptable" to judges and lawyers and who deemed too
"difficult" to work with? Further, does putting a client or lay person on a committee truly
give that person voice, or will the professionals quiet lay participants' voices? Cf. Lauren
K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 879, 893-97 (1993) (discussing the nonlawyer members of
the Advisory Groups created by the Civil Justice Reform Act and reporting little participa-
tion by those members).
432 Peter Schuck, Mass Tort Litigation: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80
Cornell L. Rev. 941, 971 (1995).
433 Or will it be possible that "divided ownership" will facilitate better outcomes, and
those even more "efficient" than currently? See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 305, at
1029-30, 1036 (working in the context of "private information" about valuation of an "enti-
tlement" and arguing that, in some contexts, "endowing" each of two claimants with a
"partial claim ...can reduce the incentive to behave strategically during bargaining,
thereby enhancing economic efficiency").
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subsidizations? Will judges and lawyers tolerate subsidizing organiza-
tions that have goals such as procedural fairness and litigants'
experiences?
We think that it is worth the investment of resources in experi-
menting, worth the incursions on contingency-fee contracts of individ-
ual lawyers and clients to support such invention, worth the risk-
taking by those who play roles on these committees that the funds
recovered may be insufficient to reimburse them, and worth the pos-
sibilities of causing dissension in the ranks of claimants and their law-
yers. If collectivization can provide the occasion for altering the
measures of value and can create positive supervision of attorney-
client relations, then by the fact of collectivity, it is possible that indi-
vidual litigants could fare better than they do singly, not only in terms
of outcomes but also in terms of the process provided to them by law-
yers and by courts.43
Will anyone adopt these proposals? While the dynamics and in-
centives sketched so ably by a host of commentators, coupled with the
concentrations of money and power validated under current aggregate
structures and judicial and societal desires for speedy conclusions,
might not inspire optimism, judicial decisions over the past year sug-
gest that our concerns are increasingly known to and shared by some
close to aggregate litigation.435 Ignoring these issues inflicts serious
costs, and we see the loss as both collective and individual.
434 Using, for.example, Sandra Gilbert's account of her "own" case, supra note 259.
435 See, e.g., Dow Coming Committee Order, No. 95-20512, 1996 WL 127968 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Mar. 21,1996); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-1-91-256 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 1996)
(Memorandum and Order on Applications for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses); In re Cal.
Micro Devices Sec. Litig., No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1361 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 2, 1996); In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., No. C-94-2817-VRV, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11587 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1995).
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